Ten years ago, Bashar al-Assad began his war against the Syrian people. Western countries are imposing sanctions to get him to change course. But the measures fail to achieve their goal, some even have the opposite effect, says the scientist Rim Turkmani in an interview with ntv.de. Turkmani, research director at the renowned London School of Economics, conducted a study to examine the effects of Western sanctions over the course of ten years. She found that those who were loyal to Assad and criminals benefited, they are richer and more powerful today, while millions of Syrians are suffering from the sanctions like never before.
ntv.de: Tomorrow will be the tenth anniversary of the beginning of the war in Syria. More than 11 million people need emergency aid, the country is in a dramatic economic crisis, spurred on by sanctions from the West. At the same time, you show in your study that these sanctions did not reduce violence and oppression. For the western states this means: missed the target?
Rim Turkmani: Not only that, but the opposite: the second phase of the sanctions, which hit the regime's resources hardest, was the most brutal period in the Syrian conflict. The target persons were hit to a certain extent by the measures, but much more blatant was the damage to the economy and thus to people as a whole.
How could the sanctions against the terror regime work so differently from the way they were intended?
In our study, we analyze three main phases of the sanctions, for example: Phase 1 started with the first sanctions in April 2011, shortly after the protests had started. They targeted the main actors in the regime and imposed an arms embargo. These sanctions had no noticeable effect on government funds and resources at all. The consequences of the arms embargo were also minimal, because Syria's military depends primarily on Russian arms deliveries.
The Syrian scientist Rim Turkmani conducts research at the renowned London School of Economics. Her study on the effects of Western sanctions against the Assad regime sparked controversial debates at the Berlin Syria Panel of the Center for Humanitarian Action.
According to your study, phase 1 had no consequences. How did it go on in phase 2?
Phase 2 began in August 2011 with sanctions aimed directly at Assad's financial reserves and his ability to conduct foreign trade. Sanctions against the banking sector hampered him in international transactions, trade, money transfers and open loans. They also reduced the export income of the public and private sectors. The third phase started in May 2014 when the US was also targeting financial institutions in Russia. It continues to this day, enhanced by a law that sanctions any foreign body that does business with Syria or supports the regime.
That actually sounds very effective.
The sanctions from phases 2 and 3 had an effect, they really reduced Assad's financial reserves and made it difficult for him to do financial deals. Their stated goal, however, was to change the regime's behavior by destroying its economic base.
Didn't that happen?
I agree. Instead of changing his behavior to meet the conditions for a relaxation of the sanctions – for example, no longer persecuting citizens and arbitrarily imprisoning them – Assad looked for new sources of money and redistributed the existing ones. The regime, on the other hand, has never considered spending less money on the military and security apparatus.
Where did Assad find new sources?
He raised taxes to improve his finances. And he has formed a network of warlords and henchmen who raised illegal funds for his most important institutions. At the same time, the regime continued to use coercion and violence to control all actors – warlords, entrepreneurs, ordinary Syrians. Public spending has meanwhile been reduced, including subsidies on essential goods for the health sector, for education, electricity and gasoline.
Does that mean that the sanctions also hit normal people?
They weren't on the sanctions list, but ultimately, the measures hit ordinary people the hardest, due to the indirect consequences. Poverty increased dramatically and the prices of basic goods such as food skyrocketed. More and more Syrians lost their jobs, Syrian money lost dramatically in value, and non-governmental entrepreneurs in particular were the ones to suffer.
How has the Syrian economy fared? Syria used to be an emerging country, currently two thirds of the population do not have enough to eat.
The sanctions from phase 2 in particular paralyzed the economy, trade, the energy and food sectors as well as the banks. The drying up of all foreign currency reserves has put pressure on the Syrian pound and allowed the black market to flourish. Even state banks depended on informal networks for foreign exchange trading. That created the perfect conditions for war profiteers, criminals and Assad loyalists, everything was deserved for nothing.
Did the Assad aides ultimately benefit from the sanctions?
They gave many an important new role in foreign trade. Those who knew ways to circumvent the sanctions, with good connections abroad, with access to international law firms, unsanctioned companies and banks, now became the interface between Assad's apparatus and the outside world.
And the market in Syria itself?
The deteriorating opportunities for the independent private sector created a monopoly for Assad's loyalists and war profiteers. This gave them more power at the expense of small, independent firms and became the most important employer alongside the state. Their businesses grew, became more influential, even when faced with sanctions themselves. The measures also gave Iran and Russia much more power over economic, military and political decisions by the regime.
Their results give the impression that the effective sanctions have worsened the lives of the Syrian population economically and politically rather than opening up new opportunities. Is that how you would sum it up?
You have to see that different sanctions had different consequences. Those against criminals and the security apparatus were very focused. But with others we find that they paralyzed the economy and made it almost impossible for ordinary people to protect themselves. Ten years have now passed, the economy is getting weaker and weaker, people are now starving. Solutions must now be found to mitigate the damage to the population.
How could this succeed and at the same time regain influence in and on Syria and initiate a process of democratization?
The US has influence because it is on the ground in northeast Syria and sits on the UN Security Council. For Europe, however, the economy is the gateway to more influence. This is where sanctions come into play, but they have to be part of a broad political strategy. Many sanctions that hit the civilian population in the health, energy and food sectors have to be adapted; changes others in such a way that they only meet specifically responsible persons or institutions. A change of course in sanctions policy could help to overcome the current economic situation and become part of a political strategy to end the conflict.
Frauke Niemeyer spoke to Rim Turkmani
. (tagsToTranslate) politics (t) Syria (t) uprising in Syria (t) Bashar al-Assad (t) sanctions