The most recent federal accounts for AHV finances up to 2050 provide indications of the extent of the further need for reform. The figures mentioned are not to be weighed in gold. An elegant answer to the forecast uncertainty would be restructuring rules based on the actual AHV financial situation.
Further reforms are needed to secure AHV pensions.
Nobody can know the future. But certain things are predictable. For example, the global warming trend is likely to continue; this is only ensured by the greenhouse gases emitted to date, which only have their full effect on the climate Years to decades after ejection unfold. The same applies to Swiss old-age provision: Even after the popular vote in September for the “AHV 21” package, the AHV needs further restructuring steps, because without new reforms, the increase in financial burdens is programmed by today’s demographic fundamentals.
In the next five to twenty years, large numbers will retire. In addition, life expectancy is constantly increasing. In the future, fewer workers will have to finance more pensioners. The exact extent of the consequences is open. The unknowns include immigration and economic development.
The youngest AHV long-term invoices of the federal government provide indications of the possible extent. According to the calculations, the AHV must expect steadily increasing deficits from around 2029. Without reforms, the annual deficits will grow to over CHF 10 billion by 2050. The numbers should not be weighed against gold, but without countermeasures, the AHV annual deficit in 2050 will probably be well above the minus of 2030.
But just as there are climate deniers, there are also demographic deniers. In the voting campaign for the September elections on the “AHV 21” reform, the opposing unions accused the Federal Council of black painting. In the past, scenario calculations by the federal government had underestimated immigration and wage growth and thus presented a poor picture of AHV finances. In 2009, the federal government adjusted the assumptions; he was then relatively close to reality with his AHV scenarios up to 2021. And from today’s perspective, the most recent assumptions are not a product of pessimism.
But such assumptions can be disputed forever – especially if the scenarios extend to 2050. However, there is an elegant way out of such quarrels: an AHV debt brake based on actual figures from the social security system. This could look something like this: If the AHV reserves fall below a certain threshold, the Federal Council must quickly submit a restructuring proposal to Parliament. If there is no agreement in Parliament within a reasonable period of time, an automatism will take effect. This would bring about half additional income for the AHV (e.g. additional federal subsidies) and savings (e.g. via an increase in the retirement age).
The left has so far rejected such a debt brake – which shows that their black painting allegations are only hypocrisy. The real political argument about the AHV does not concern the financial forecasts, but the type of restructuring. The blockade forces on the left only want to restructure the AHV on the income side – through more wage deductions and state subsidies. Because this maximizes the hidden redistribution from top to bottom and from young to old. From this point of view, however, any increase in the retirement age is taboo, because this would slow down the increase in hidden redistribution. Some bourgeois politicians also tend to put the greatest possible burden on the young. Because the older people have a much higher voting weight at the ballot box, and the young people have other priorities than pension provision and can therefore be cheated relatively easily.
The trend is clear: the sooner AHV is restructured, primarily through additional subsidies and wage deductions, and the longer it takes to restructure, the more expensive it will be for young people.