Can Russia destabilize the Balkans? The EU provides the answer

Putin’s war and the Russophilia of many Serbs are raising fears of destabilization in the Balkans. But geography and economic interests make that unlikely. Nonetheless, the EU must remain engaged in the region.

The brutality of the Ukraine war brings back bad memories, especially in the Balkans – Sarajevo residents fleeing snipers in July 1992.

Tom Stoddart Archives/Getty

The war has been eating its way through Ukraine for three and a half months, leaving death, destruction, grief and hatred in its wake. In no other region of Europe has he awakened such strong memories as in the ex-Yugoslav countries: the besieged cities, apartment blocks that have been shot up, fleeing women and children in the Ukraine are reminiscent of the Yugoslav wars. They cost the lives of 140,000 people in the 1990s.

There are other similarities. What Putin gives as the reason for the war, the alleged genocide of compatriots in the neighboring country, was also one of Belgrade’s justifications for the armed conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The parallel creates additional concern in the region.

Because Serbia and the Serb-dominated part of Bosnia are sticking by Putin. Majorities of the population see the war as an act of self-defense against those who want to dominate the continent and Russia.

In this narrative, Putin is the man who stands up to the American plot and pays back for humiliations suffered by Serbs in the 1990s. Climaxing with the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999 and Kosovo’s independence in 2008.

It is clear that the Kremlin is trying to use Serbian leverage to weaken Europe’s defences. A conflict in the Balkans at this point in time would throw the EU out of its precarious balance and probably quickly overwhelm NATO as well.

The only question is: will the Serbs play along? The answer is: Hardly if the EU doesn’t make any gross mistakes.

Economic successes of Serbia thanks to the EU

The key to a successful European strategy lies in Belgrade. There, Aleksandar Vucic switches and manages almost as he pleases. And this for ten years, first as prime minister and for the last five years as president.

All but a few Serbian media are loyal to him, the separation of powers has atrophied and the opposition has long been weak and divided. In April, Vucic once again convincingly won the elections.

But his power is not only based on the recipe of illiberal democracy. As a guarantor of stability, Vucic has managed to attract a considerable number of European investors, mainly from Germany and Italy, to Serbia. The factories in the country are extended workbenches of Western European parent companies and export almost exclusively to the EU, by far Serbia’s most important trading partner.

This has resulted in modest but steady economic growth. The country is firmly integrated into the European economy. There are no reasonable alternatives to this.

Energy from Russia and “steel” friendship with China

Another element of Vucic’s prestige is its seesaw policy between the European Union, Russia and China. It gives voters the impression of national independence and cosmopolitanism. Older people are reminded of Tito’s non-aligned policy during the Cold War. But times are different now – especially since the outbreak of the Ukraine war.

Serbia is an EU candidate and has been negotiating with Brussels for ten years, albeit with minimal progress. Because serious reforms would mean that Vucic would have to loosen his grip on the media, that the governing parties would no longer abuse the administration as a sinecure, and that the judiciary would administer justice independently. All of that is not the case. Because Vucic’s compass doesn’t just point to Brussels.

Belgrade also maintains close ties with Russia and has been trying to strengthen those with China for years. It is heavily dependent on Russia in terms of energy policy: almost 100 percent of natural gas imports come from the country. At the end of May, Vucic announced that Putin had offered him a cheap three-year supply contract over the phone.

He should have been sealed and sealed by Foreign Minister Lavrov in Belgrade on Tuesday. But now Serbia’s neighboring countries, the NATO countries Bulgaria, North Macedonia and Montenegro, have sent a signal. They prohibited Lavrov from overflight. The visit has been cancelled.

The friendship with China is more recent, but is described by both sides as “steel” with much propaganda effort. Beijing invests in mining and heavy industry and provides loans for infrastructure projects, most of which it then carries out itself. The economic influence should not be overestimated, but Beijing is politically significant: Like Russia, it supports Serbia on the Kosovo issue. Both major powers refuse to recognize the former province as an independent state.

The procurement policy of the Serbian army also follows the pattern of equidistance. At an arms show near Belgrade in April, European Airbus helicopters were presented, followed by a Chinese anti-aircraft system, Chinese combat drones and finally Russian MiG-29 fighter jets.

The pressure of the EU on Serbia must increase

Since the attack on Ukraine, the pressure on Serbia to align its foreign policy with that of the EU has increased significantly. Candidate countries are also fundamentally obliged to do so, but Belgrade has so far successfully fouted it.

Although Serbia condemned the Russian attack on Ukraine in a UN resolution, it refused to impose sanctions on Moscow. But now the spaces are closing. That applies primarily to Milorad Dodik, Vucic’s ally in Bosnia-Herzegovina, who dominates the Republic of Srpska.

After Dodik had threatened separatist steps, the EU did not stop at verbal warnings for once, but increased the EUfor peacekeeping force in Bosnia-Herzegovina by 500 men in March. That was a clear signal and reminds potential troublemakers in the country that NATO can send many more troops into the country if necessary.

The Europeans should now also speak plainly to Belgrade. Because the last thing the EU needs is a Trojan horse in the Balkans opening up a second front for Putin. Brussels must now set clear and binding conditions. Anyone who benefits from EU funds as a candidate for accession can no longer sit on two chairs, but must support the sanctions against Russia.

The message should get through, because cracks are already appearing in the governing coalition. Vucic himself prepares the audience for a change of course when he publicly complains that he doesn’t know how much longer he can continue to pursue autonomous politics.

The tabloids obediently follow and try their hand at Russian bashing: Putin, it is said, is threatening to stab Serbia in the back. Following the pattern of the separatist people’s republics in Donbass, he could recognize Kosovo.

Should Vucic (and Dodik in his slipstream) distance himself from Moscow under consistent pressure, this would not really be surprising. More than anything, these politicians want to stay in power. And if they really have to choose, they will choose the EU over Russia. A look at the map and the flow of money explains why.

The integration offer of the EU remains important

In some respects they even benefit from the fact that the EU is taking more energetic action and is also geopolitically calculating. For Brussels and the Western European capitals, the reform agenda of the countries in the Balkans is only of secondary importance. What counts at the moment is that the gaps in foreign and security policy in the region are closed. That suits many authoritarian politicians in the Balkans – by no means only Vucic and Dodik.

All in all, the chances are not bad that the situation in the Balkans will remain stable. However, this is subject to two interconnected conditions. One is that Russia is not winning this war, the other is that the EU is continuing to pursue a reasonably consistent policy in the Western Balkans.

Otherwise, revanchist politicians could sense their chance. The “bringing home” of Kosovo and a new attempt at a Greater Serbia would then quickly come to the fore. And once the borders in the region start to move, the Greater Albanian project will not be long in coming. None of this would happen without bloodshed, because the existence of Bosnia-Herzegovina and North Macedonia would be threatened.

It therefore remains important that the EU renews its integration offer to the western Balkans and adapts it in such a way that these countries will be an integral part of this union in a few years.

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