Among these belligerents, we find most of the countries of North-Eastern Europe. Those who fear the Russian pressure at the borders the most. Lithuania and Latvia, in particular, did not regain their independence with Estonia until after the fall of the USSR, and hold a grudge against it. Between Poles and Swedes, this is not the time for tender friendship either. The United Kingdom, which left the European Union, Denmark and Romania further south, are also part of this clan, more willing to show muscle than talk. The Netherlands joined this group more recently, after the crash of an MH17 plane from Amsterdam to Kuala Lampour, shot down by Russian separatists in July In all, nine countries. A minority certainly, but very vocal.
Ambiguous attitudes
At the other end of the tender Russian map, there are a small half-dozen countries that have a rather ambiguous attitude towards Moscow. They may be close by interest, by ideology or by historical tradition. This is the case of Cyprus for example, which has close ties with Russian banks and oligarchs, and is not a member of NATO. The other neighboring island, Malta, which is also not a member of the Alliance, is clearly “non-aligned” in the traditional sense of the term.
At the center of this Russian chessboard, we find Hungary, which since the departure of the British has become the “Mister Nem” (“No” in Hungarian) of European foreign policy. In recent years, at the same time as he hardened his conservative rhetoric, its leader Viktor Orban operated a clear shift, towards Russia, in the name of “pragmatism”. To the point of being one of the most Russophile countries. He did not hesitate to ask Russia for the Sputnik vaccine and is looking for Russian investors to boost his economy. And Orban himself was received Tuesday, with great fanfare, at the Kremlin by Vladimir Putin. Greece or Slovakia are also quite ambiguous. The existence of strong Greek and Hungarian minorities in Ukraine also explains these positions. Minorities who have been indirectly affected by Kiev’s decisions against the Russian language.
Between the two, we find a huge majority of countries which believe, like France or Germany, but also Spain or Austria, that we must speak with Russia. Be firm, but don’t close the door. Provide sanctions, but impose them as late as possible. In short, do not break the thread of the dialogue.
The Finnish example?
We do not only find Western countries. Bulgaria, a member of the Atlantic Alliance, thus oscillates in a proximity to Russia and a more determined attitude. His political class is very divided on the issue. Green Ireland is not talked about. But his Minister of Defense, Simon Coveney, took his finest pen a few days ago to ask the Russians to move his boats away from the exclusive economic zone. And he got it, nicely, quietly.
Belgium and Luxembourg are very embarrassed as soon as we speak too loudly with the Kremlin. Discreet, they nevertheless maintain close contacts with Moscow.
Despite the nuances, however, there are few countries ready to endorse the idea of a new security architecture from the Atlantic to the Urals, as the French dream of it. Emmanuel Macron’s latest proposal, to “build a new order of security and stability” presented at the European Parliament on January 19, thus flopped. In fact, only one country has succeeded in this mix of firmness and dialogue: Finland. A European country that has the longest border (1,340 km) with Russia. Being the closest to the Russians while keeping them at a distance has been Helsinki’s successful bet so far. An example ?