A few days ago, armed men attacked several places of worship and a police station in the Russian Republic of Dagestan. 20 people died. After the attack on a concert hall near Moscow in March, which left more than 140 people dead, this is the second major Islamist attack in Russia within a few months. The Kremlin is trying to downplay the problem, explains Eastern Europe expert Alexander Friedman in an interview with ntv.de. Instead, the government is mobilizing the population against the supposedly greater enemies – Ukraine and the West. Kremlin chief Putin is putting the Russian Federation at risk with his “obsession with Ukraine,” says the historian from the University of Düsseldorf.
ntv.de: After the Islamist attack on Crocus City Hall in March, Russia immediately blamed Ukraine, even though IS claimed responsibility. Did Moscow’s propaganda also make a connection to Ukraine after the attacks in Dagestan?
Alexander Friedman: In the case of Crocus, it was the top officials and Putin himself who relatively quickly pushed the theory of an alleged Ukrainian connection. This time it was primarily local politicians from Dagestan who immediately blamed Ukraine. The strategy behind it: If you cite external influence as the reason for terror, you don’t have to concern yourself so much with internal problems. Ukraine is ideally suited as an alibi theory.
Alexander Friedman holds a doctorate in history. He teaches contemporary history and Eastern European history at Saarland University and Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf.
So basically the Kremlin propaganda does not blame Ukraine this time?
The propaganda discourse in this case can be summed up as follows: Ukraine is probably not behind it, but it has benefited from it. It is trying to ignite conflicts in Russia and is hoping that ethnic and religious conflicts will now break out in Russia.
But is Ukraine actually a beneficiary in this situation? What impact could the attack have on the war?
There will probably be no direct impact on the course of the war, but the events do play a role in the analysis of the situation from the Ukrainian perspective. Ukraine has not had many successes on the front lines at the moment. At the same time, the Russian side still has the will to continue the war. In Ukraine, the opinion is repeatedly expressed that internal conflicts and problems could bring Russia down. Accordingly, the Ukrainian side is trying to divide Russian society as part of its war propaganda. This is also a propaganda war and it is being waged by both sides. And the Ukrainian side is not exactly squeamish in this regard. After all, it is fighting for its survival.
However, Russia’s internal conflicts could also have unforeseeable consequences.
The question of what will become of Russia, a nuclear power, if there is a civil war and the country collapses is more of interest to the West. The Ukrainian discussion is a different one. The question is much more whether this could be useful for the Ukrainian victory or not. And if Russia sinks into a civil war that leads to the collapse or weakening of the Putin regime, that would be good for Kiev.
How likely is it that the situation in the Caucasus will spiral completely out of control?
The Caucasus is a powder keg anyway and the Russian approach to it is not sustainable. The economic situation there is difficult. Dagestan has one of the highest birth rates and unemployment rates in Russia; it is a multi-ethnic region with archaic structures. The republic is one of the regions that is particularly heavily subsidized by Moscow. The strategy is: we are prepared to give you a lot of money, as long as it stays quiet. However, Russian policy is a fire-fighting policy. So if there is a fire at some point, they try to put it out, for example with financial subsidies. But they have not yet created a long-term livelihood and prospects for people.
The fact that people see no future provides fertile ground for radicalization. Does the Kremlin understand this?
The significance of radical Islamism in the Caucasus is either vehemently underestimated or not understood. The focus is on the West, which is portrayed and perceived as the greatest threat. And in this context, the significance of Islamism is simply played down.
A day after the attack in Dagestan, in which a synagogue was attacked, a Hamas delegation visited Russia. Isn’t Moscow’s positioning in the Middle East conflict adding fuel to the fire?
Russia is clearly on the Palestinian side and is spreading radical anti-Israeli propaganda. And the fact that the attacks have an anti-Semitic component is new. Before that, the issue of anti-Semitism had not played a significant role in the North Caucasus. The anti-Semitic orientation is also a side effect of Russian propaganda and the anti-Israeli agitation that is being spread by the Russian side.
Despite everything, Putin’s power does not seem to be in danger.
From a Western perspective, there are often rather undifferentiated ideas about the situation in Russia. For a long time, it was said that Putin’s regime was stable and that nothing could happen. But then came the Prigozhin mutiny a year ago, which showed that Putin is not as strong as people think. Then came the anti-Semitic pogrom in Makhachkala, then the attack on Crocus City Hall and now the attack in Dagestan. You can see that the regime is actually having a very hard time maintaining control over the situation.
How is Putin trying to cover this up?
Putin is selling an illusion of a harmonious, contented, peaceful society. But that is only his ideal. There are numerous problems, conflicts, and difficulties of a systemic nature that will never be resolved. Even after the attacks in Dagestan, there is no discussion about how such an attack could have happened, what it means for coexistence in a multi-ethnic state. These are the questions that are never asked because in a dictatorship they are not openly discussed. Instead, people prefer to talk about the fight against the external enemy – Ukraine and the USA. This could mean that surprises await us in the future.
Do you think that the Ukraine war will be decided in the Caucasus?
If there is indeed an escalation in the Caucasus, the Kremlin will immediately have other concerns than the war in Ukraine. At the moment, it does not look like that. However, it must be said that there are also volunteers from Chechnya who are fighting for Ukraine. These are separatists who fought against Russia in the 1990s. Ukraine’s victory could feed their hopes that Russian rule in the Caucasus will collapse. But Putin is currently in control of the situation in the North Caucasus. After the mobilization in October 2022, there were protests in Dagestan. The Kremlin responded promptly. Dagestan has been left alone for the most part. In Moscow, they understand that if you exaggerate, there can be an explosion immediately.
So the Kremlin is basically able to keep the situation under control?
Russia has serious problems with its migration policy. Islamophobia, which Moscow often accuses the West of, is actually widespread in its own country. Anti-Muslim racism is a huge problem there. Attacks such as the one on the concert hall near Moscow or the brutal murder of a Russian Orthodox priest in Dagestan reinforce this anti-Muslim attitude in society. Putin’s stories about a harmonious, peaceful society without ethnic, cultural and religious tensions are a dream. The reality is different.
What consequences could this have?
Ethnic and religious conflicts can develop quickly. This can have dramatic consequences for Russia as a multi-ethnic state. It is quite possible that Putin, with his obsession with Ukraine and his world power games, could even gamble away the Russian Federation. An explosion cannot be ruled out.
Uladzimir Zhyhachou spoke with Alexander Friedman