After the British left the EU, France and England are increasingly at odds with each other. The two countries have a long history of attraction and repulsion. It’s not just about rivalry and power, but also about worldview.
The mother of all French defeats. The Battle of Waterloo with the Duke of Wellington. Illustration by JC Stadler.
Karl Marx once remarked that world historical events happened twice – the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce. What has happened between Dover and Calais in the past few weeks is reminiscent of this saying: fishing boats are confiscated, catches confiscated, even warships patrol. The tabloids are full of war metaphors and threats.
What is going on between France and the UK, the partners of the former Entente cordiale (which was never particularly cordial), the two Western European allies of World War II? Where does this sharpness come from, the escalating mutual mockery, where does this back and forth of ultimatums and counter-ultimates come from?
First of all, a differentiation must be made: From the English point of view, France was and is the archenemy, the only serious rival in the struggle for global empire, the cultural antipode. The fight against Germany in the 20th century was in many ways an exception, even if Hitler and the Nazis remained as alive in England as in any other country.
Territorial ambitions
However, this English view is by no means shared by the Scots or Irish: Scotland was a close ally of France until the personal union in 1603 and threatened England. Anti-English reflexes in Scotland run deep: from the Battle of Culloden (1756), which finally destroyed the last supporters of the Catholic-Scottish Stuart pretender to the throne of England, which was now firmly in Protestant hands, to the triumph of the Scottish National Party ( SNP) and its call for independence, there has always been a strong Scottish self-confidence.
And Ireland – at least the present republic – always saw in France a natural ally against English striving for dominance – like the settlers across the Atlantic, who would never have achieved their independence without massive French support. Suffice it to recall Lafayette and Rochambeau.
Throughout his life, de Gaulle never forgot what he felt in London as Churchill’s humiliating treatment.
In today’s confrontation, many factors flow together. There is the historical heritage. England ruled more territory in present-day France than the kings of France for three hundred years before 1450. Many of the most famous wineries in Bordeaux were in English hands at the time. In 1420, after the Battle of Azincourt, the English Henry V married a French crown princess, but died before he could accept his inheritance. 1431 his son Heinrich VI. crowned King of France in Paris. It was the failure of territorial ambitions on the continent that England turned to the sea – first Ireland, then North America, then India and finally East Asia, Australia and Africa.
The kings of England only gave up their claim to the French throne in 1802, when they had the golden lilies removed from their coat of arms. France has nevertheless remained a counterpoint. The rationalism of Descartes, the radicalism of the French Enlightenment and the bloody furor of the 1789 revolution still have a deterrent effect on many Englishmen today. The deductive method, the strict systematics of a Roman-inspired Code Napoleon, was suspect to the English and their common law, which was based on empiricism and the individual case.
The tension between England and France is characterized by the antinomy between monarchy and republic, between the state church and secularism, between sea supremacy and land empire, between empirical pragmatism and strict conceptual hierarchy, between a traditional but affable aristocracy that is remote from the state and business and a performance elite that isolates itself , is considered aloof and lives from directing the state and the economy.
Animosity after the Suez Crisis
Throughout his life, de Gaulle never forgot what he felt in London as Churchill’s humiliating treatment. He had never left any doubt that there were three great powers – and France. There were further irritations: after the Suez Crisis in 1956 Great Britain swung completely in the wake of the USA and relied on Polaris/Trident missiles for its nuclear submarines. France, on the other hand, was striving for absolute nuclear sovereignty with its Force de Frappe. While Great Britain made itself the champion of NATO, de Gaulle withdrew his country from the NATO military structures; Sarkozy only reversed this step in 2009.
Such animosity may have had an after-effect in the two de Gaulle vetoes against Great Britain’s membership of the EEC. But in 1973 they seemed finally overcome: the French and the British built the first civil supersonic aircraft together, the Concorde, and the Channel Tunnel finally became a reality.
For forty years, the common EU framework seemed to bring the two canal riparians closer together. In 1998, the two paved the way for a security component of the EU (Gasp) in St-Malo, and in 2011 they signed the Lancaster House Agreement, which provides for far-reaching cooperation on military issues. However, even then there was some sheet lightning: in the 1990s, the BSE epidemic caused France to suspend British beef imports – which angered the whole of England. In 2003, France opposed the British-American invasion of Iraq and briefly formed a counter-alliance with Germany and Russia. The idea of sharing the second aircraft carrier built by the British with France quickly came to an inglorious end.
Just apparently kindred spirits
The Brexit referendum of 2016 was a turning point. France perceived this as a direct affront, because it destroyed the vision that the EU (designed largely according to French ideas) would be Europe’s “manifest destiny”. Brexit also had a name: Boris Johnson. Nevertheless, a good relationship initially developed between Emmanuel Macron and him. Both were populists, both had risen to the highest office of state against the «mainstream». Both spoke the other’s language perfectly.
But then the EU appointed Michel Barnier as its Brexit negotiator. Barnier, of all people, who as commissioner had tried to put the City of London on a leash – at least that’s how many English people felt. Before long, it was clear to British tabloids that the EU, and France in particular, was only out to punish the intrepid British for their independence quest in belated vendetta for Waterloo.
Nevertheless, official relations initially remained good. Johnson flattered Macron, and he initially saw the enterprising Briton as a kindred spirit with whom one could do business. However, Macron quickly realized that the high-flown words from London corresponded to little concrete action. The bridge across the Channel, which Boris Johnson so eloquently talked about, will not be built, nor will the one across the Irish Sea between Northern Ireland and Scotland, also one of Johnson’s pipe dreams.
The turnaround came with Covid-19 and the surge in migration flows. France insisted on drastic corona protection measures in the neighboring country because almost 80 percent of all traffic between Great Britain and the continent flows through France. London saw this as a vote of no confidence, protested vigorously – and finally gave in. Immigrants create an even greater problem. The number of those trying to cross the English Channel in unseaworthy boats is constantly increasing. In the fall of 2021, a boat carrying 27 migrants capsized. Boris Johnson took this as an opportunity to write a letter to Macron in which he not only implicitly blamed France. He called for joint bilateral patrols and joint coastal protection – and expected France to do something that he had previously ruled out for his own country.
On the tip
The Brexit treaty has set many things in principle. However, the interpretation and practical application of these general provisions repeatedly come up against cliffs. How French fishermen are to prove their historic fishing rights in British waters remains hotly debated. Fishing is an insignificant economic factor in both countries, but the fishing ports are located in structurally weak areas whose voting behavior can make a difference in elections. France is threatening to cut off the energy supply to the Channel Islands, which lie a few kilometers off the coast of Normandy.
Meanwhile, France is quietly but consistently building a connection network that bypasses Great Britain: direct telephone and power lines to Ireland, expansion of direct ferry connections to Ireland’s ports. At the same time, some historians and politicians deliberately address the old alliance between France and Scotland; Finally, Mary Stuart, the mother of James I, had a French mother (Marie de Guise) and, as the wife of Francis II, was Queen of France for a year. If children had sprung from this marriage, there might have been a trilateral personal union between England, Scotland and France.
With the Channel Tunnel and the ferry ports of Calais, Dunkirk and Dieppe, France has its finger on England’s jugular, so to speak. When workers in the port of Calais and in the railway sector go on strike, the results are chaotic. A tacit encouragement to work to rule and not to work overtime would seriously disrupt normal operations.
Franco-British relations are on the brink. What happens next will depend on personnel changes in the coming year: Who will be France’s next president? And how long can Boris Johnson survive, whose golden charisma is peeling off more and more every day, revealing a vulgar, flippant, narcissistic busybody? In many ways, Johnson is an English de Gaulle – just without his dignity.
Britain’s relationship with France will only normalize again when their relationship with the EU relaxes. You don’t have to love the EU – but you shouldn’t demonize it either. In any case, it will still be a few years before England has overcome the trauma of Brexit.
Rudolph G Adam was a German diplomat. He headed the German embassy in London.