The East Europeans warned against Putin when the West did not yet see the war coming. At the NATO summit in Vilnius, their advice was again ignored. Security expert Rafael Loss, from the European Council on Foreign Relations, explains to ntv.de what is behind the attitude of the alliance.
ntv.de: It was clear from the start that Ukraine could not become a member of NATO while the war was still raging. The Kiev and the Balts pleaded for a perspective with a clear timetable and are sobered. right?
Rafael Loss: Despite this universally acknowledged reality – no wartime accession – it was probably hoped that the language in the final declaration would be a bit more specific about future NATO membership. It could have been more concrete and a little more empathetic, maybe it should have been.
Can you give an example?
If you look at the sentence about the Kakhovka dam, then the blast is presented there as a consequence of the war, but not as a consequence of a specific Russian action. This causes astonishment in Ukraine, but also elsewhere. At the same time, NATO has chosen formulations in several places that one might assume are intended to preserve political freedom for possible negotiations with Putin. If it were about bringing about an end to the war.
The political scientist Rafael Loss conducts research at the European Council on Foreign Relations on German and European security policy and the transatlantic relationship.
Again, we would like an example.
For example, NATO says we support Ukraine “as long it takes.” However, it does not define which goal is being supported: It does not say “as long as it takes” until Ukraine is liberated. Rather, it is placed in the general context of defensive struggle: “As long as it takes” to defend their sovereignty and territorial integrity. That is less sharply worded than “as long as it takes” until Ukraine has liberated its Russian-occupied territories and the people there.
And has what advantage?
The harsh wording would put the West in difficult waters if negotiations were to begin with Russia before Ukraine was fully liberated. This is one of several places where you can see that NATO wants to retain political freedom here, but that stands in the way of a statement that is as concrete as possible from Ukraine’s point of view.
Is it worth that price? At the end of the day, is it worth giving up concreteness in order to secure this freedom?
If you look at yesterday’s NATO statement alone, it’s difficult. Today, however, the new NATO-Ukraine Council met and there was a statement by the G7, which means that some things have been politically recaptured. A development can also be seen in Volodymyr Zelenskyj’s reaction today compared to yesterday.
Yesterday he tweeted that it was “unprecedented and absurd” that there was no timeframe for accession. Today he called the G7 security pact a “victory”.
Various phone calls were certainly made to capture the frustration that was very evident yesterday. The communiqué of the G7 could now be the starting signal for a truly permanent and expanded support for Ukraine, which is also being consolidated more and more out of the rhythm of the Ramstein conferences. That one enters into contracts, not only verbally, but in writing assures oneself of help. That you involve the arms industry. But then the supporter states would have to be much more ambitious in their aid.
When the Ukraine war began, it was often said, “The Balts warned us. If only we had listened to them earlier”. Now nobody listens to the Balts again. They wanted a concrete timetable for accession.
One problem is, and the Lithuanian Foreign Minister pointed this out today, that the concepts of time within NATO are very different: the Poles, the Balts see themselves confronted with a Russian enemy that has existed for decades. Some of the Western Allies are looking no further than the next election. That makes political action difficult.
The need to decide everything unanimously is probably not helpful either?
The result is always the minimum consensus that everyone was just about able to agree to. In my view, the Balts were not being ripped off, but interests were being balanced. But you can see that critically: A minimum of two percent was agreed for defense spending, which could have been more ambitious. The idea of opening a liaison office in Japan as NATO fails because of Macron. In terms of Ukraine’s NATO membership, the White House was probably where the most restraint was.
In addition to the declarations, there were various promises of weapons in Vilnius. After Britain’s Storm Shadow, France also promised cruise missiles today. What factor is this in Ukraine’s capabilities?
I consider this decision to be extremely important, and Emmanuel Macron has scored politically with certainty. Taurus, the cruise missile from Germany, is not yet on the tableau. German support in this area could provide significant added value for Ukraine, because the exact numbers of weapons from London and Paris are not known, but they will not be too high.
Chancellor Scholz stressed again today that Putin will not be included in the decision on Ukraine’s NATO membership. “Russia will not be able to dispose of it,” he said. How reliable is such a promise?
I think NATO tried to reflect that in the communique. For example, according to a report by Politico, she initially considered writing “conditions allow” instead of “conditions are met” in the conditions for joining NATO – in other words, accession will take place if the conditions “allow”. This “allow,” that was the thought, could imply that Russia would have to give an OK in some form for accession. “Conditions are met,” on the other hand, sounds more self-determined; if Ukraine meets the conditions, it can join.
And this wording is there now too?
Yes, but no one knows how the political context will develop over the next few years. And Sweden’s experience is sobering that the Turkish President was able to put the brakes on Sweden’s accession for a year. I think Ukraine is skeptical that, when the time comes, a demand could arise from some hindquarters that would also stop its accession for the time being. It is conceivable, for example, that Viktor Orban will try to make political capital for himself by referring to the Hungarian minority in Ukraine. The decisions in NATO are democratic decisions, nothing can be guaranteed.
Frauke Niemeyer spoke to Rafael Loss