The first year of the war was characterized by Himars rocket launchers, old German Cheetahs and state-of-the-art anti-aircraft defenses – but above all by rapid offensives. The situation in Year II was determined by other factors: drones, some of which you could buy at hardware stores, and complete reconnaissance, which made movement on the front lines extremely difficult. Five lessons from the second year of the war.
1) Drones dominate the battlefield
Is this still the same battlefield? In the fall of 2022, Ukrainian troops quickly recaptured a lot of land through quick, unexpected attacks. A year later, it seems almost impossible to surprise your opponent, and that applies to both sides. “We are currently observing two decisive trends on the battlefield that are mutually dependent on each other,” says Major General Christian Freuding, head of the Ukraine Situation Center, ntv.de. “One is the intensive use of drones, no longer as individual devices, but in masses. We are also seeing a significantly increased importance of electronic warfare.”
The massive use of drones creates a kind of “glass battlefield” – every movement is spotted very quickly by a drone from the opposing side, so attempts at attack are almost nipped in the bud. Movement, if any, occurs primarily at night. Drones are also used in direct combat.
Small first-person view drones (FPV drones) – often originally developed for civilian use – give the operator a one-to-one awareness of the situation on site via a screen. Equipped with explosives, they can attack enemy positions and ships. “Drones are also very good at anti-tank defense,” says security expert Gustav Gressel. “When the Russians launch a mechanized attack, Ukrainian drones usually detect it while the tanks are still on their way to the initial attack position.” An FPV drone only puts a battle tank out of action temporarily and not permanently. But if it is unable to maneuver, it can then be destroyed very accurately with artillery as a standing target.
While the Ukrainian troops were the first to integrate drones into their warfare so successfully, Russia has now ramped up its production and has significantly overtaken the Ukrainians in terms of numbers. Ukrainian manufacturers currently source their components mainly from China, and that is problematic. Beijing is handling its exports to Ukraine more and more restrictively, which is why producers are struggling with a shortage of components. Meanwhile, Western supporters are striving to greatly expand their own production – including for Ukraine.
For this purpose, the Bundeswehr has set up a “Drone Task Force” with the aim of establishing various types in the Bundeswehr as quickly as possible and training soldiers on them. Drones are now also being considered at the European level. Within the division of responsibilities for Ukraine support, the Baltic states have taken over the IT sector. They are seeking funding for European drone production and the production of components for Ukrainian producers.
2) Electronic warfare and programming become more important
Electronic warfare works in the electromagnetic spectrum, which includes electromagnetic waves, radar waves, radio waves, and infrared rays. Among other things, they are used to locate the enemy, to deceive or disrupt them, but also to combat enemy targets.
While air defense systems are not suitable for fending off small FPV drones because they are too massive and the defensive ammunition is far too expensive, electronic warfare is of great importance here, for example with jammers. The radio transmitter interrupts the enemy operator’s command signal to his aircraft. The drone still works, but no longer receives any information about what it should do. “Most Russian tanks already have a proximity jammer integrated,” explains Gressel, who researches at the European Council on Foreign Relations. “In the last 50 meters before reaching the tank, the operator can no longer see how the drone is flying.”
Current weapons development is therefore also about containing the effect of radio interference. To do this, the drones can be made independent using software. If the device could initially be programmed which target it should attack, then it can also carry out the attack if contact with the operator is disrupted. “But then the drone has to be programmed so well that it can distinguish independently: What is the object being targeted and what is the tree behind it?”
While the opponents on the battlefield in Ukraine often face each other motionless, there is a constant competition raging in the background. “The development cycle for such measures is very short,” explains Gressel. “A program that makes a drone immune to hijacking and jamming can be obsolete again within two weeks.”
The Ukrainian manufacturers are more in demand here because they have a more direct line to the troops – for example, to have data provided that can be used to analyze the damage and look for defensive solutions. The bureaucracy in western countries would make things even more difficult. Ukrainian industry can also rely on basic skills here because it already had a thriving IT sector before the war. This is not the case in Germany; here we have to make up for lost time.
3) Time is a crucial factor
After February 24, 2022, support for Ukraine began in Western countries, but hardly anything came when the Ukrainians requested it. Many weapons first had to be repaired, logistics had to be ensured, and the process of political decision-making also had to be taken into account. If in the first year of the war the Ukrainians seemed to compensate for such delays with their will to fight, the second year of the war clearly showed the end of the line.
Because Kiev’s troops first had to wait for heavy Western weapons and to complete their training, the spring offensive became a summer offensive. By now, however, the Russians had become so comfortable in their positions buriedthat the Ukrainians no longer managed a breakthrough. With the failed counteroffensive it became clear: It doesn’t matter whether the tank delivery comes four months earlier or later.
The soldiers are currently suffering because Western countries have lost track of time when it comes to ammunition – and the risk that the USA, by far the strongest supporter, could fail prematurely. That is now the case. The Europeans are scraping together the last of their ammunition because production was not scaled up in time.
A lesson that can already be learned from the war: It is not enough to worry when an emergency has occurred. “If the worst came to the worst, we wouldn’t have time. We have to be quick and prepared,” says Major General Freuding.
You can prepare in different ways: For the ammunition sector, this can mean having production capacity available, even if it is not fully utilized. A production line can be kept in operation at a low level so that in the event of war it can massively ramp up production with a minimum of time. The NATO countries have agreed on the rule that each member country should stock up on ammunition for 30 days. Apart from the fact that hardly any NATO country meets this requirement: the governments have to take into account what their armies will continue to fight from day 31.
4) It depends on the reserve
“Another insight from this war is that we have to be able to endure for a long time,” says General Freuding. “So we have to create supplies, increase production capacity, but also take precautions to ensure that we have the long-term human resources.”
But such endurance in the long term cannot be achieved with a regular army alone. “We have to create a well-qualified and sufficient reserve,” is Freuding’s position. He advocates for a reserve that is equipped to be successful in long-term military conflicts. “If we look at the duration of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, we have to think about how we can increase the scale here.”
In concrete terms, this means: It is not enough to focus solely on how the Bundeswehr can grow from 183,000 to 203,000 troops. New reserve structures must also be created, because the second and third waves in a long war are fought by reserve forces. In terms of effort, such a project seems almost larger than the expansion of the Bundeswehr itself. Perhaps that is why little has been heard from politicians about it so far. It is also worth taking a look at the northern countries, which have been dealing with these questions for decades. Defense Minister Boris Pistorius is planning a trip to Scandinavia at the beginning of March.
5) NATO must do more
Even if the governments of the NATO member countries are currently still busy with crisis management and the search for ammunition is TOP 1 on the to-do list: political lessons must also be learned from two years of war. The defense alliance “must finally begin” to initiate a broad, “robust and targeted containment strategy internally. Aimed at systematically reducing the Russian regime’s radius of action and – ideally – eliminating it in the long term,” says Langjà Year-old NATO strategist Stefanie Babst.
Such a strategy also includes a concrete accession perspective for Ukraine, which many member states see more as an act of solidarity than as a step in their own interest. In the long term, however, Ukraine will not once again give up on being nuclear protected from Russia. The war exposed Kiev’s surrender of old Soviet nuclear weapons in the 1990s as a mistake from a Ukrainian perspective. Now the country would have to receive the promise that it will soon come under NATO’s nuclear shield. Because Ukraine’s own nuclear armament cannot be in the interests of the partner countries. “NATO should begin accession negotiations with Ukraine as quickly as possible,” says Babst ntv.de. “That would be a strong strategic signal to Putin.”
Furthermore, it would also be a signal to the international economy, which will not enter the country as long as security and peace are not guaranteed. But the more companies invest in Ukraine, the faster Kiev will become independent of the financial injections from partner countries.
Strategist Babst advocates preparing for scenarios that now appear to be just one option among several. If the war comes to a standstill at a border along the Russian-occupied territories, the question arises as to who will support Ukraine in securing the border? “In my opinion, this could only be possible with a somehow designed Western military presence, perhaps a coalition of the willing under the UN flag?” Despite a number of theoretical options, according to Babst, mental preparations should already be discreetly discussed between the allies. “Simply ignoring this scenario and hoping that the Ukrainians would somehow manage it themselves is strategically ignorant.”