Tribune. December 1858: the satirical journal The Charivari publishes the caricature of a big Chinese bourgeois swallowing opium served by a European merchant. The Middle Empire was then literally on its knees, dependent on opium imported from the West. Yet Chinese reformers had warned of this dangerous addiction. “If military aggression can ruin a people, suggested the entrepreneur Zheng Guanying (1842-1922), it is clear that commercial aggression can invisibly ruin a people. “
2021: has the tide turned? Has Europe in turn fallen into the trap of decadence and dependence which China has escaped through its ambitious policy of industrialization? Will Europe be able to resist Beijing’s trade offensive, which will inevitably be followed by the growth of its political and military influence? Europe’s problem is not even that it does not see the danger, but that it no longer knows how to react.
Certainly, Europe and France have prevented the telecoms giant Huawei from nesting in their 5G networks. A 2020 French law excluded the company from vital parts of the network and large cities. But that did not stop the “digital silk road”. Orange, for example, affirmed its intention to continue its cooperation with Huawei to maximize its room for maneuver in other member states and penetrate the African market. The French operator has joined forces with another Chinese company to pull an undersea cable from Pakistan to Marseille …
Technocracy or strategy
Limiting Huawei’s business is just one battle in the vast war for economic power and, more broadly, for global domination. Europe tends to focus on limited battles and take only limited action, while China’s strategy is long-term and comprehensive. On the control of strategic investments, the European response seems strong, but its implementation depends on each Member State, which often lack the resources and will. In addition, the Chinese approach is becoming more inventive, using funds from intermediary companies or limiting itself to minority holdings.
Europe relies on its trade defense measures, such as anti-dumping procedures, even though they are rarely used and China relies heavily on other means to promote its exports, such as export credits, manipulation of its currency, its industrial policy and the protection of its vast market to strengthen its central place in production chains. For Europe, trade remains a technocratic matter; for China, it is a strategic question.
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