Historical Documents – When the Swiss Army began to doubt neutrality – News


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In 1992, the military department concluded that neutrality had become a security risk. This is shown by documents from the Federal Archives published by the Dodis research center.

turning point. This term also applies to the phase in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Simply under different signs than today.

In 1989 the Berlin Wall came down and the Iron Curtain fell. The Soviet Union dissolved in 1991 and the threat from the East was gone. Old beliefs in Switzerland were also shaken, such as that the Swiss army could defend the country autonomously.

On June 23, the Deputy Secretary General of what was then the Federal Military Department EMD (now the Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport, DDPS) wrote:

The document lay locked away in the Federal Archives for 30 years. Now it becomes publicly available through the database of Dodis (Swiss Diplomatic Documents). It shows: In 1992, the EMD leadership had doubts about the autonomous national defense – and about neutrality. The discussion paper was addressed to the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA), which headed a working group on the future of neutrality.

limits of autonomy

In the discussion paper, Kaspar Villiger, who worked for the then Minister of Defense at the time, listed various examples of where autonomy was reaching its limits. In the event of a conflict, the Swiss army is dependent on supplies from abroad.

One is also dependent on foreign countries for the maintenance of armaments and for the procurement of information. The claim to autonomy in air defense is also problematic. The EMD was convinced that protection against “new dangers” such as long-range missiles could only be built up in an international network.

The EMD warned that these weaknesses could mean that Switzerland could become vulnerable to blackmail because it was left without allies. The culprit was found: neutrality.

Document with quote.

Neutrality as a military risk. The historian and head of the Dodis research center, Sacha Zala, says that neutrality has thus lost the magical effect of a protective shield that had been perceived for decades. “This is a very remarkable, sober and most likely correct assessment of the situation from a military point of view.”

What is Dodis?


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Legend:

Dodis Director Sacha Zala.

KEYSTONE/Valentin Flauraud

According to Dodis, it is the independent competence center for the history of Swiss foreign policy and Switzerland’s international relations. Dodis is known for its website and database. The research center digitizes hundreds of documents every year. The database is publicly accessible.

These documents come primarily from the Federal Archives. The protection period expires after 30 years. From January 1, 2023, documents from 1992 will be freely accessible to the public and research.

Dodis is an institute of the Swiss Academy of Humanities and Social Sciences (SAGW). Last year it celebrated its fiftieth anniversary. Dodis is led by historian Sacha Zala. The research center is largely funded by the federal government.

In the early 1990s, the risk map for Switzerland changed for the better in a short space of time. Dodis director Zala says the fall of the Berlin Wall triggered a general spirit of optimism in foreign policy. As early as 1990, a small group of pioneers in the section for international law in the FDFA started to think about the consequences for neutrality.

International sanctions against violators of international law

In the same year there was also a change of direction in Swiss neutrality policy. The Federal Council decided, without hesitation, to adopt the UN Security Council’s economic sanctions against Iraq. A study group set up by the Federal Council in 1991 suggested that Switzerland should reduce its neutrality to its core content.

And this is exactly where the military department raised concerns in 1992. The EMD warned that neutrality reduced to the core would also pose a security risk for Switzerland. Europe is growing together and a majority of states have come to the conclusion that mutual security guarantees offer more security than autonomous defense capabilities.

Document with quote.

The military department thus dismantled the argument that in the event of war one could still join an alliance like NATO.

EMD proposed «differential neutrality» in 1992, EDA rejected it


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As a solution, the military department did not propose abandoning neutrality, but wanted to introduce “differential neutrality”. Switzerland should remain neutral in non-European conflicts, including conflicts between two European countries. But if the entire continent, including Switzerland, is threatened, then neutrality will no longer apply.

In order to prepare for such a threat, the military department would have liked to cooperate or even enter into mutual security guarantees – with NATO and with the then Western European Union, which was later merged into the Common Security and Defense Policy of the EU (GSDP).

In the discussion paper, for example, the EMD proposed working together internationally on the procurement and maintenance of armaments. Likewise in training, logistics, in gathering and evaluating news. But the integration into an integrated international command structure or a joint operation with alliance partners should have been made possible in this way.

The FDFA was skeptical. It was disturbed by the concept of “differential neutrality”. It is a loaded term from the 1920s, when Switzerland became a member of the League of Nations with “differential neutrality”. It is also difficult to precisely delimit the various conflict scenarios. Furthermore, security is indivisible. Neither NATO nor the Western European Union know “half membership”.

The prospects of being able to negotiate a special solution for Switzerland with these alliances were not considered to be great, wrote the then deputy head of the International Law Section in the FDFA, Thomas Borer, to the EMD (he later became known throughout Switzerland as head of the Task Force Switzerland – Second World War and as ambassador in Berlin).

For the time being, the FDFA wanted to remain neutral, reduced to the core, and hoped that neutrality would automatically lose importance: “The more this European security system works and the more effective military cooperation is, the less it will need our armed neutrality,” wrote the FDFA to the EMD.

How did the leading foreign department react to the analysis from the EMD? It tore the arguments to pieces and cheekily wrote back to the EMD:

Document with quote.

The EMD or later the DDPS never complied with this request. But the 1992 assessment that autonomous national defense is an illusion remains valid to this day.

EU membership application – Federal Council was divided


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1992 was a fateful year in foreign policy: on December 6, a narrow majority of the electorate rejected accession to the European Economic Area EEA after a fiercely conducted and emotional voting campaign. The Bundesrat had to decide beforehand whether or not to submit an application for membership of the European Community, today’s EU.

The Federal Council was divided – it took several rounds before it was able to get through. This is shown by Federal Council minutes and documents that are publicly accessible from today.

Swiss Blue Helmet Battalion

There are also documents on other foreign policy issues from 1992. In May, for example, Swiss voters decided to join the Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Switzerland then founded the “Helvetistan” constituency together with Central Asian countries. This gave Switzerland weight and influence in the two financial institutions.

Although Switzerland was not yet a member of the UN, the Federal Council presented a plan for a Swiss blue helmet battalion. All this can be read in the original sources on the website of Dodis, Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland.

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