Hosts the G20 summit
For Germany, India is too often a misunderstood partner
A guest article by Thorsten Benner and Tobias Scholz
September 9, 2023, 7:04 a.m
Although India is of central importance for Germany, a realistic view of the country is often missing here. India’s alliance policy, for example, is only apparently contradictory. To understand this, we need exchange.
This weekend, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi will be in the global spotlight as host of the G20 summit. For the second time this year, Chancellor Olaf Scholz will travel to the country, which is now the most populous country with 1.4 billion people and is also the fifth largest economy in the world. Despite India’s growing importance, Germany often lacks a realistic view of Germany’s central strategic partner and its foreign policy.
Neither illusions about a partnership of values nor public outrage over India’s self-proclaimed “neutral” stance towards the Russian invasion of Ukraine are productive. Only if we understand India’s pursuit of a role as an independent global power pole and also its security policy vulnerabilities can Germany utilize the considerable potential of its relations with India.
India as pole of a multipolar world order
India is determined to seek greater international power and recognition under Prime Minister Modi, first elected in 2014, and his Indian People’s Party (BJP). Like Chancellor Scholz, Modi sees a multipolar world order emerging in which India wants to play a central role. The political guideline is strategic autonomy, according to which all partnerships are cultivated based on advantages for one’s own security and economic interests and not on the basis of shared values.
It is therefore not a contradiction for India to, on the one hand, work more closely with the West within the framework of the Quad group with the USA, Japan and Australia, and on the other hand to be a member of the BRICS group and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) together with China and Russia. Cooperation in the Quad group helps Indian security interests, especially the creation of countervailing power against China. The BRICS group serves as a counterweight for India against the economic dominance of the USA and a Western-dominated trade and financial system. Above all, New Delhi wants to ensure, through its presence in increasingly Chinese-dominated institutions such as the BRICS and the SCO, that nothing fundamental is decided there against Indian interests.
India’s turning point: The incomplete break with China
India’s own turning point was the year 2020. Military clashes with dozens of deaths on the Chinese-Indian border caused a fundamental rethinking of China. Like Germany and the European Union, India is pursuing a de-risking approach towards China, which focuses on reducing economic and technological dependencies as well as diversifying partnerships in terms of security policy.
One of the top priorities is strengthening bilateral relations with Australia, the EU and Japan. However, relations with the United States in particular have experienced a major boost in the context of increased tensions with China, which is particularly noticeable in cooperation on arms projects.
So confirmed At the end of August, the US Congress signed a historic agreement under which the US company GE Aerospace will now jointly produce jet engines for F414 fighter jets to be used by the Indian Air Force together with India’s Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). In an allusion to the good relations and possible cooperation in space announced Prime Minister Modi enthusiastically said in a conversation with US President Biden during his state visit to Washington in June this year: “Even the sky is not the limit”.
India has not yet found the appropriate answer
But India’s strategy of containing China does not always work. The fact that China prevailed on the issue of BRICS expansion by six states at last month’s meeting in Johannesburg shows the limits of India’s rise. A new Chinese government map released shortly after the BRICS summit reaffirms China’s claim to several areas controlled by India in the north and northeast.
The government sees Chinese President Xi Jinping’s announcement that he will not attend the G20 summit in New Delhi as a deliberate undermining of India’s claim to leadership. For them, the Chinese provocations not only question the country’s territorial integrity. They also promote an inferior image towards China, which the Indian government wants to prevent by all means possible. A severely negative trade balance with what remains its largest trading partner, China’s military superiority and its alliance with India’s historic arch-enemy Pakistan make it difficult for New Delhi to find appropriate responses to Beijing’s aggressive behavior.
Criticism of the Russian war of aggression remains quiet
With a view to Russia’s war against Ukraine, India is pragmatically pursuing its interests within the framework of security and economic policy constraints. More than quiet criticism Modi did not say anything publicly to Putin (“Now is not the time for war”). On the one hand, this has to do with the fact that India is heavily dependent on military cooperation with Russia (and previously the Soviet Union) for historical reasons. More than two thirds of the Indian military’s platforms are of Russian origin.
On the other hand, the Indian government fears that a move away from Moscow will promote an anti-Indian China-Russia-Pakistan coalition. The government majority, in line with the opposition, rejects the sanctions imposed by the West against Russia. However, with regard to Russian energy exports, Europe should refrain from expressing outrage towards India. “Politico Europe” recently complained that diesel, kerosene and other products processed from Russian oil are coming to Europe from India. “The culprit? India” headlined the magazine.
This outrage is hypocritical. Nobody is forcing Europe to import oil products from India. And the problem lies deeper. The USA and Europe have deliberately not imposed global sanctions on the import of Russian energy sources. Instead, they have decided to tolerate them on the world market so as not to suffer a price shock themselves.
India is becoming increasingly important for Germany
Instead of pointing the finger at India, it would make more sense to help the country reduce its arms and energy dependencies on Russia. The Federal Government’s effort to rethink the often restrictive arms export policy towards India is, in the balance, the right step, without whitewashing the Modi government’s problematic record with regard to democracy and minority protection.
As a key security player in the Indo-Pacific and with its growing economic and technological importance, India is becoming increasingly important for Germany and Europe, which are striving for new partnerships and diversification. India sees itself, also within the framework of the G20 presidency, as “Voice of the Global South“. Indian Foreign Minister Jaishankar explained recently, it is “our responsibility to bring the divided world together.”
As much as this claim is an expression of the sober interest politics of an emerging great power, India’s role as a bridge between the West and the Global South can certainly be advantageous for Germany. Based on a more realistic understanding of India’s strategic positioning, Germany can better pursue common interests. To achieve this, in the future we will have to invest much more heavily in India expertise in German think tanks and other research institutions as well as exchanges with Indian partners.
Thorsten Benner is director of the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin.
Tobias Scholz is a non-resident fellow at GPPi and is doing his doctorate on Indian foreign policy at King’s College London and the National University of Singapore.