In South Sudan, the peace agreement undermined by the continuation of intercommunal conflicts

When the first shots rang out in the early morning of November 30, the approximately 9,000 displaced people in the Aburoc camp were still asleep. Several hours by boat from the small town of Kodok, capital of Fashoda county in northeastern South Sudan, the camp has since 2017 housed Shilluk populations who have fled previous episodes of violence.

“The attack took us by surprise,” recalls Oscar*, a 25-year-old aid worker, himself from Fashoda County. A resident of the camp, he managed to save his skin by embarking on a first canoe to reach Kodok, then on another boat to reach Malakal, the capital of Upper Nile State, some 100 kilometers to the south.

Now a refugee at the UN protection of civilians site in Malakal, he testified by telephone: “The Aburoc camp was completely burnt down and 79 bodies were found there: those of the elderly and disabled, who were unable to flee. There are also many people, especially children, who died in the surrounding swamps, but we don’t know how many. »

Oscar approves of the intervention of government troops, who repelled the thousands of attackers from the “White Army”, a militia made up of young Nuer shepherds. Even if voices were raised, including among the Shilluk, to ask for a peaceful resolution of the crisis.

“It’s a proxy war”

The attackers, mobilized by the Nuer “prophet” Makuach Tut, come from the neighboring state of Jonglei, partly devastated by four consecutive years of flooding and where herds have been decimated. “Attacking the Shilluk kingdom is a way for these young people to recover cows, to get rich”, analyzes Ter Manyang Gatwech, director of the NGO Center for Peace and Advocacy (CPA).

But the poverty and idleness of Nuer youth are not enough to explain these brutal attacks. “It’s a proxy war” argues the activist. For him, as for many sources, President Salva Kiir, a Dinka, and his vice-president – ​​and main opponent – ​​Riek Machar, a Nuer, would continue to clash through interposed militias, particularly in Upper Nile State. . And this despite the 2018 peace agreement and the formation of a government ” of national unity and transition” in February 2020, supposed to put an end to the civil war that started in 2013, only two years after the country’s independence.

The Upper Nile conflict, which has displaced around 50,000 civilians, began in August 2022 between two splinter factions of Riek Machar’s movement: that of General Simon Gatwech, a Nuer, and that of General Johnson Olony, a Shilluk. After their break with Machar, a year earlier, they had turned to President Kiir. This rapprochement was materialized by the signing in January 2022 of the Khartoum Peace Agreement (KPA). Simon Gatwech had obtained the vague promise of a high position in the future unified army and Johnson Olony the assurance of the integration of his troops.

But this agreement was never implemented and, for reasons that remain unclear, the two generals went to war. “It is following these fights that the young [nuer] were mobilised, explains Ter Manyang Gatwech, conceding that “it’s a very complex conflict, there are a lot of nested levels”.

General Shilluk Johnson Olony was able to navigate the Nile freely with his warships

For Edmond Yakani, director of the NGO Community Empowerment for Progress Organization, there is no doubt that the KPA was in fact imagined by Salva Kiir’s camp as “an instrument of division” between the two factions. With the secret objective of profiting from the attacks of the militias of Johnson Olony on the strongholds of Riek Machar to weaken his old enemy. In fact, Olony benefited from the at least implicit support of the government by being able to navigate freely on the Nile with its warships. “Why didn’t you stop it to prevent the escalation?” », asks an observer.

A kingdom “emptied of its inhabitants”

On December 14, faced with the deterioration of the situation, Human Rights Watch dared to ask this question: “Is the conflict in South Sudan really over? », noting that this persists between government and opposition as well as within rebel factions in some parts [des Etats] of Unity, Upper Nile and Central Equatoria”.

Because what is happening in Upper Nile is not an isolated incident. In 2021, violence between Azandé and Balanda raged in the town of Tombura, Western Equatoria. In early 2022, Riek Machar’s birthplace and stronghold, Leer County, in Unity State, was devastated by pro-government militias.

Recruited from neighboring counties by pro-government “commissioners”, these militias carried out raids that displaced 40,000 people. These actions against civilians, one of whose objectives was to take control of the main ports on the Nile, have been documented in a report published in May by the United Nations. These ports and the checkpoints scattered along the river are lucrative tolls on goods transported by boat.

Both Unity State and Upper Nile are oil producers, a vital source of revenue for the country. “By destabilizing these areas [qui hébergent des bastions de l’opposition], the presidential camp is trying to establish its control”, analyzes a diplomat on condition of anonymity. But it is a dangerous game with serious consequences for the future of the peace process.

The attack of thousands of Nuer youths on the Shilluk kingdom in November ravaged Fashoda County. “The Shilluk kingdom is emptied of its inhabitants. There is no peace. On the contrary, everyone is preparing for war,” regrets Peter Adwok Nyaba, a retired politician from the region, questioning South Sudan’s ability to build itself as a nation.

The government, however, denies throwing oil on the fire. In a December 30 press conference, Deputy Foreign Minister Deng Dau denied any involvement of the peace accord partners in the Upper Nile conflict. “I want to challenge the idea that the government deliberately encourages violence at the state and county level, that is not true,” he said, asking for the support of the international community to end the violence.

Although the government coalition has managed, since August 2022 (and more than three years late), to integrate some 50,000 soldiers from the opposition and the government into a unified army (out of the 83,000 planned), most of the key points of the peace agreement have not been implemented. This is the case, for example, of the drafting of the Constitution. And, supposed to close the transition to peace, the elections scheduled for December were finally postponed for two years.