Lhe sustainable exploitation of fishery resources is a biological issue, but also an economic, social and political one. Because these resources are common, the production of each operator depends not only on his own exploitation effort, but also (negatively) on that of all the others who exploit the same resource. In the absence of regulation, the phenomenon of “race for fish” sets in, leading to the development of production overcapacity, a lower valuation of production, and conflicts. Fisheries management has been put in place precisely to combat this phenomenon, observed all over the world, and has been able to meet several complex challenges.
In the North Atlantic, the approach was initially centered on the implementation of conservation measures, aimed at limiting the levels of removals and thus allowing the growth of fish and the renewal of exploited populations. The international research efforts carried out for more than seventy years have resulted in a science of the exploitation of fishery resources that is today very operational. Based in particular on models representing the fishing effort and its impact on the populations exploited, it makes it possible to identify the levels of catches allowing hope to maintain fishing yields at levels guaranteeing sustainable fishing. These models participate in particular in the annual fixing of the “total authorized catches” (TAC) for each stock thus assessed.
Allocation of quotas
The consideration of economic and social issues in these diagnoses has tended to increase, with, for example, the opening of the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea to the social sciences. The determination of conservation measures presupposes agreeing on long-term objectives for fishing, justifying the catch limits implemented. The common European fisheries policy aims maximum sustainable yieldi.e. the greatest quantity of biomass that can be extracted from a fish stock without affecting its reproduction process, with the aim of environmental, economic and social sustainability.
The facts show that the race for fish develops as long as the rules governing exploitation do not address the sharing of fishing possibilities. In a fishery managed by TAC, for example, sooner or later the phenomenon of a race for fish sets in, everyone trying to take the best possible catch before the limit is reached and the fishing season closed. A second major challenge is therefore to anticipate rules for the distribution of fishing possibilities, by selecting who can fish, and by distributing these possibilities between groups of users. Fishing quota distribution systems, allocated to collectives such as producer organizations, or to individual operators, depending on the country and the fisheries, contribute to this objective. This security is now recognized throughout the world as a major issue for the economic viability of these companies.
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