After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Swiss military department concluded a year later that Swiss neutrality had become a security risk. Today, the Swiss army is much more dependent on cooperating with armies and alliances than it was in 1992, says long-time security policy expert Bruno Lezzi.
SRF News: Neutrality as a security risk – was that an issue in military circles and in public at the time?
Bruno Lezzi: In this sense, it was not a topic that would have moved the public. Neither does the military public. Of course, this question always played a major role in all major total defense exercises of the army. In this sense, the question was always present in the background.
At the time, the military department argued that in many areas one was dependent on cooperation with other countries. Armament, anti-missile defense – these are all very topical issues. Can Switzerland today be defended autonomously?
What does autonomously defendable mean? It depends on the conflict picture that we want to adapt to. You see it in the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, missile defense plays a very central role.
They say they want to work together more. But then, when it really matters, you leave it open.
I believe that dependency has become greater than it used to be due to modern technology and the networking of systems.
So today you would actually be much more dependent on being able to cooperate?
Yes, exactly. Let’s take air defense as an example. We can manage the air policing service ourselves to a certain extent. But we can no longer manage air defense alone in a European war. Even if the F-35 has more capacity than the F/A-18.
Legend:
6035 million francs. That’s how much the 36 new F-35A fighter jets from the USA that Switzerland will buy cost. It is the most expensive armaments deal in Switzerland.
Keystone/Ennio Leanza
We are dependent on NATO’s complex air defense systems. We would have to be more involved in these systems if we really wanted to use the full potential of such an aircraft.
In the document from the then military department, the army raises the question of who would even be interested in cooperating with Switzerland if, in the event of a conflict, Switzerland might withdraw again.
That is exactly the core problem. This topic is still left open in the new supplementary report to the 2021 security policy report. They say they want to work together more. But then, when it really matters, you leave it open.
Legend:
Quote from: Autonomous Defense Capability and Neutrality. Discussion Paper for the Krafft Working Group, June 1992.
Dodis
Is neutrality a security risk for Switzerland today?
I wouldn’t put it so absolutely. We do not know how the different conflicts develop in their dimensions. Just when terror was in the foreground, neutrality was of little use. The old-school neutrality according to the Hague Agreements of 1907 was tailored to the classic interstate conflict.
Today’s conflict between Russia and Ukraine would be an interstate conflict, but again under completely different conditions. Neutrality can affect security in a number of ways. However, I would caution against considering them outright as a security risk.
Nevertheless, you express difficulties with comprehensive neutrality. What is your idea of how neutrality will continue?
We won’t get any further with legal cleverness. Finland and Sweden in particular are showing the direction in which things should go. That’s the rapprochement with NATO. These two countries, well versed in security and military policy, have felt that they can no longer do it alone.
However, they are in a completely different geopolitical or geostrategic situation than Switzerland. I think we can only make progress if we put the issues on the table and discuss them openly.
Tobias Gasser conducted the interview.