Expert André Haertel says Putin is a realistic foreign politician. His goal: control of countries in the territory of the former Soviet Union. However, the Russian President does not have a master plan. Rather, the moment for an escalation is favorable – for many reasons. In the interview, Härtel talks about the factors that led to this and possible reactions from Germany and the EU.
ntv.de: Does Putin want to resurrect the Soviet Union?
André Härtel: There is actually something to it. However, one has to be careful: Putin is not a dreamer. I still consider him a very realistic foreign politician. He is concerned with more or less controlling states on the post-Soviet territory and preventing them from joining the EU or NATO and thus saying goodbye to the Russian catchment area in the long term.
dr André Härtel works at the Science and Politics Foundation in the Eastern Europe and Eurasia research group.
(Photo: SWP)
Which brings us to the middle of the Ukraine conflict…
I think a lot of what we’re seeing now goes back to a 2011 article in which Putin was relatively clear about his foreign policy vision for the region. The Eurasian Economic Union that was initiated at that time has been an integration project based on the EU model since 2015, for which Kazakhstan and Ukraine – which, however, never became members – were key states. The European Union somewhat ignored this Russian project in its 2013 association agreement with Ukraine, making the EU a direct competitor for Putin’s plans.
And he had to react to that.
Putin is aware that Russia, with its current economic strength, can hardly compete with the EU and is less attractive to countries like Ukraine or Georgia. Therefore, he resorts to security policy. He wants to prevent politicians from coming to power there who want to lead their countries into Western institutions. The conflicts in the Donbass, in Georgian Abkhazia and also around Transnistria in Moldova are means of preventing the political leadership there from moving fundamentally closer to the West.
Some of these conflicts have existed for many years. Last year Russia stationed troops on the border with Ukraine. Why is the situation escalating now?
That’s a good question and one that has a lot of speculation. I think that much of Putin’s foreign policy happens on the fly, without a very big master plan. He just waits for an opportune moment. Angela Merkel’s resignation as Chancellor was a key moment for Putin. Along with other factors, he likely saw this as a good time to ramp up the escalation.
What are these other factors?
For example, the perceived instability of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Ukrainian government. But long-term factors also play a role, for example the generational change in Ukraine. There is still a generation there that strongly remembers the Soviet Union. In 10, 15 or 20 years, on the other hand, a generation will dominate for which statehood in Ukraine is a matter of course. Putin has recognized that this may be one of the last times to bring Ukraine back into Russia’s sphere of influence without having to use unduly large resources to do so.
What are the factors related to Germany and the EU?
These are the change to a social-democrat-led federal government, the perceived weakness of Europe and the fact that the EU is currently preoccupied with itself – not only with the corona pandemic, but also with right-wing populist movements and the lack of migration policy – and that the European project remains on a certain status quo. Putin sees a gateway there.
You speak of a weakness in the EU that Putin perceives. At the same time, he says that Russia is being threatened by the West.
That’s part of his tactic: the encirclement narrative, according to which the US and NATO want to step up their engagement and pressure Russia. I think he’s perfectly clear that the opposite is the case: that the Americans would very much like to withdraw further from Europe, that they would like to give the Europeans more responsibility for their security and actually not that many resources in a conflict with Russia want to invest because they have other priorities.
Putin is demanding security guarantees from the West that are actually unachievable and in some cases non-negotiable for NATO. Why?
This catalog of demands is based on an assessment of the situation that does not correspond to reality. There is no political process of Ukraine’s NATO integration. This is mentioned again and again, also because the Ukrainians themselves demand it. However, if you look at the debates within NATO, it is absolutely clear that Ukraine will never join NATO. Russia’s security interests have been shared by NATO countries such as Turkey and Italy for years – so there is no consensus for Ukraine to join. That’s one hundred percent perceived in Moscow, but the rhetoric is different. It is just a pretext created by Russia to make such demands.
But there are NATO activities in Ukraine.
That, too, is a pretense, both in terms of Ukraine and other NATO countries such as the Baltic States. So far, relatively small contingents of a few hundred soldiers have been stationed there, who have no attacking quality, not even promising defensive abilities. The concept of Forward Presence actually only serves to give these states a better sense of security. The NATO presence in Ukraine, in turn, includes temporary joint maneuvers and military trainers, such as a small British contingent. The accusation that NATO wants to station missiles in Ukraine is unreal. Why would NATO field them in a country as unstable as Ukraine?
Recently there were talks between Russia and the USA over the Ukraine conflict. The EU sat at the proverbial cat table. How can the EU move away from this role?
Putin is also concerned with dividing the West. In a way, he has succeeded in doing this by forcing the US through troop movements to once again take the lead among the Western powers. When it came to tough security policy issues, it was always difficult for the Americans to get the Europeans involved. Putin knows that, of course, and the debates about how far the Europeans will be taken along suit him well. Not only Putin, but also the USA does not see the EU as a reliable and relevant actor in terms of security policy.
How should Europe deal with this?
On the one hand, we have the problem that the continuity of Ukraine policy cannot be maintained under Chancellor Olaf Scholz. It was foreseeable that the new government would first look at how it positioned itself in this conflict and internationally in general. At the moment we don’t even know where we stand in Ukraine politics. Scholz’s rhetoric is the same as Merkel’s, but the actions are not. I believe that Social Democrats in particular are encouraging Scholz to see whether a more moderate course towards Putin can be taken. As a result, Germany’s leadership profile within the Normandy format is history. But it needs the leadership of a large member state or the Franco-German engine so that the EU can even act as a joint player in foreign policy. This is currently not the case.
The federal government is currently facing a lot of criticism for its line.
The Russian troop movements and the pressure that Russia is exerting have ensured that old debates flare up about Germany’s reliability, about the value of the transatlantic alliance, but also the debate about a new pan-European security order. These are very dangerous questions for the EU’s foreign policy profile.
What are the ways out?
A more coordinated overall strategy is needed between the western partners. I advocate a division of labour, because it is simply not realistic that Germany, with its past and the current state of the debate, is supplying arms to Ukraine. Others can do that, but Germany should also give them a free hand within NATO. Instead, Germany and the EU should stand up for the economic, energy policy and state security of Ukraine. A lot has been achieved in the past six or seven years, and the federal government and the EU have a strong profile, much stronger than in security and defense policy.
Relying too much on the US for security policy is dangerous when you think of President Donald Trump.
Yes, but it won’t work without the Americans. The Europeans need the security component that only the Americans can provide in order to put a real deterrence strategy into motion. But of course the US is no longer the safest ally. There has been speculation that Biden could offer something to Putin, thereby overriding European interests. But I believe Biden is a seasoned foreign policy maker who keeps the interests of the West in mind as a whole.
Do the Europeans have to rethink this?
There are two messages for them: First, they must realize in the next few years that the interests of the Americans are no longer congruent with their own interests – the Europeans must find their own role in security policy. Second, I think the US is more politically stable than people think. However, Europe must be aware that they can also be absent as partners for a certain period of time. We saw that under Trump.
Markus Lippold spoke to André Haertel