Interview with historian: “The Kremlin is trying to prolong the war”

Interview with historian
“The Kremlin is trying to prolong the war”

Moscow’s armed forces are making slow progress in Ukraine. In an interview with ntv.de, historian Christian Hartmann uncovers mistakes and weaknesses in the Russian army. He warns that even Putin’s defeat could be dangerous for the West.

ntv.de: A month after the start of the war, the Russian army seems far from achieving its goals. From Moscow’s point of view, what has gone wrong in the past few weeks?

Christian Hartmann: So far, one can only guess at the precise course of the war. Even Clausewitz spoke of the “fog of uncertainty” that lies over every occurrence of war. However, we can get a first impression through social networks and media reports. As far as we can see, the Russians started with an operation similar to that used in Afghanistan, namely the deployment of paratroopers at Hostomel Airport near Kyiv. The classic pattern: you fly right into the heart of the opponent and take out the command center. At the same time, conventional armed forces are coming overland and trying to penetrate the country and thus “conquer” it. This surprise coup alone did not go as originally thought.

An airborne landing near the enemy capital sounds like a very risky venture.

Christian Hartmann is Head of the Deployment Research Department at the Bundeswehr Center for Military History and Social Sciences in Potsdam.

(Photo: picture alliance / dpa)

It worked in Kabul in 1979, but not this time. I think this failed operation is characteristic of the situation as a whole. The Russian army did not at all prepare for this strong resistance. As a professional, what amazes me the most is the number of abandoned military vehicles that can be seen in photos and videos. As a soldier, you actually learn to render your own device unusable if you give it up. This is part of the basics. What is also becoming clear: the logistical supply and repairs are not working. Other shortcomings also become apparent. Nonetheless, one must not now proceed to underestimate the striking power of the Russian army as a whole.

In the Ukraine, the mud period, called Rasputitsa, is now beginning. This had already slowed down the Wehrmacht in 1941. How might the change in weather affect the fights?

Historical experience shows that in Eastern Europe there are two seasons when a war of movement can be waged – summer and winter. Of course, we no longer have the same conditions as in the 1940s. There are now many paved roads in Ukraine. Nevertheless, one has to bear in mind that if the Russian army wants to prevent its advances from being channeled, it has to look for ways away from the main lines of communication.

One must not forget: The range of a tank in the terrain is limited. It is usually transported to the places of use by rail. And if the central lines of communication are contested or severed, this can impede, possibly even halt, the Russian advance. My interpretation of Russian behavior is that they are currently trying to expand their positions in front of cities like Kyiv and Mariupol to force decisions through sieges.

So away from war of movement to war of position?

Exactly. I think Putin is now pursuing a kind of “Syrian solution.” Instead of forcing a military decision on the battlefield, it shifts to a war of terror against the civilian population. The art of warfare is to bring about a decision as quickly as possible with as few casualties as possible, while observing the principles of international law. Now the opposite is happening. The Kremlin is trying to prolong the war and damage the weak groups protected under international law as much as possible.

With regard to the sanctions imposed by the West, isn’t time actually a factor that plays into the hands of the Ukrainians?

Actually already. But it’s the only option left to the Russians. You can’t really get hold of the opponent. Then they just try to destroy the big cities and with it the entire infrastructure. The Russians expected a surprise coup, like in Crimea in 2014. But that option is no longer available. At the moment it is a war of attrition and is being waged less against the enemy army and increasingly against the civilian population. This is catastrophic.

What does the war reveal so far about the weaknesses of the Russian army?

First of all, the great inexperience of the young soldiers, who have surprisingly little to counter military emergencies. The classic strength of the Russian army lies in its mass. But even in Soviet times, especially in the final phase of the Cold War, parts of the armed forces were simply rotten. In the areas of logistics, maintenance and telecommunications, there seem to be profound problems. Combined arms combat doesn’t work either. With helicopters providing cover for the marching columns, ambushes could be stopped relatively easily. But apparently they are not able to do that in Ukraine.

If there is still no breakthrough in negotiations and fighting continues, what is your forecast for the coming weeks?

It is still completely open in which direction things will develop. The crucial question is: what consequences will Putin draw from the situation? If his plan fails, it is questionable whether his regime will be able to cope with the defeat. Then, of course, you have to ask yourself the question: would Putin be prepared to escalate further? It could also be that Putin’s position of power in Russia itself is becoming unstable. In the event of his personal danger, a further escalation of this war is quite conceivable – not only in Ukraine. This could also be very dangerous for the West. In the worst case, a Russian civil war would threaten.

Janis Peitsch spoke to Christian Hartmann

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