Claiming that guns don’t bring peace is “not a valid argument when one country wants to wipe out another,” says security expert Jana Puglierin. “Anyone who argues like this is playing into Putin’s narrative.” Puglierin can understand that this position is difficult for many Germans: “Politicians from all parties have repeatedly told the Germans in recent decades that there is no military solution. To explain to the population now that the possibility of negotiations must be prepared militarily – this is a radical reversal for the Germans.
ntv.de: One often hears the sentence “wars are rarely decided on the battlefield” as an argument against arms deliveries to Ukraine. Is that true: are wars rarely decided on the battlefield?
Jana Puglierin: Historically, the outcome of a war on the battlefield is at least prepared for. There are wars that end in clear victory for one side – the classic example of this is World War II. And there are wars in which one side is not defeated, but sees no progress militarily and therefore withdraws. Examples of this would be Russia in Afghanistan or the USA in Vietnam. To say that wars are not decided on the battlefield is an oversimplification. Like the phrase: “There is no military solution.”
Jana Puglierin is the head of the Berlin office of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) think tank.
(Photo: ECFR)
Are there military solutions?
That depends on what you see as the solution. Russia, for example, has absolutely achieved its goal by using military force in Syria. The goal wasn’t peace, but to prevent Assad from being deposed. Even with the annexation of Crimea or the Russian igniting in eastern Ukraine from 2014, Russia has achieved its goals with military means. In this respect, both sentences fall short. They ignore the fact that conditions are fought out militarily that make diplomacy possible in the first place.
Former general Erich Vad told Emma magazine last week that the assumption that Putin does not want to negotiate is not credible. What do you think: does Putin want to negotiate?
Russia is reducing city after city to rubble and ashes. I don’t know how anyone can get the idea that Russia is ready to make concessions. Although Russia is signaling a vague willingness to talk, it is at the same time creating facts that make a negotiated solution impossible, for example by including the four Ukrainian regions in the Russian Federation in violation of international law.
Is entering into negotiations also made more difficult by the fact that the Russian war goals are not clearly defined?
This is a mistake, Russia has clear goals.
Which?
On December 17, 2021, two months before the war, the Russians submitted two draft treaties to the United States and NATO. In it you have clearly outlined how you envision the European security order. They want to drive the Americans out of Europe, at least militarily reverse NATO’s eastward expansion and return to generally accepted spheres of influence. As for Russia’s goals in Ukraine, one can talk about whether Russia is aligning its war aims with realities on the battlefield.
But?
Putin made it clear what he wants in his essay “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” in the summer of 2021. In it he says that “true sovereignty” is only possible for Ukraine in association with Russia, that Ukraine is part of the “triune Russian nation” and consequently has no right to exist as a separate state. Even three days before the attack on Ukraine, he clearly stated the aim of the war.
In the “Speech to the Nation” on February 21, 2022.
This is the speech in which he announces that Russia will recognize the “sovereignty” of the “People’s Republics” of Luhansk and Donetsk. In it he repeats many things from his essay: that Ukraine was created artificially by the Bolsheviks, that it is an “integral part” of Russia. Putin’s war aim is to wipe out Ukrainian sovereignty, independence and freedom.
You mean Russia wants to annex all of Ukraine?
Not necessarily, but it wants to have an impact on all of Ukraine. That has been the goal since 2014, and that is also what the Minsk Agreement was about. Minsk was a way for the Russians to gain direct influence over the government in Kyiv, even if it didn’t work out in the end. When Russia speaks of “demilitarization” and “denazification,” what is meant is that Ukraine should not be a sovereign, independent state that can determine its own path.
SPD leader Klingbeil has said that he sometimes gets “dizzy” when he sees “that discussions are now only about weapons” and that he is “shocked when I see the term diplomacy being treated almost contemptuously these days “. Do you think that is an accurate assessment that diplomacy is despised in Germany?
I can understand that many people in Germany do not understand why there are no negotiations to end the war. Politicians from all parties have repeatedly told Germans over the past few decades that there is no military solution. Explaining to the population now that the possibility of negotiations must be prepared militarily – that is a radical reversal for the Germans. Nevertheless, I find it problematic when arms deliveries and negotiations are presented as opposites. “Guns don’t make peace” isn’t a useful argument when one country wants to wipe out another. Anyone who argues like this is playing into Putin’s narrative. For the sake of fairness, one has to note that Klingbeil does not do that, but also said that Ukraine must be strengthened militarily.
How does contrasting arms sales and negotiations strengthens Putin’s narrative?
If Western societies are putting pressure on their governments to refuse military support to Ukraine, then all Putin has to do is wait until Ukraine stops receiving aid. But since we have just spoken about the SPD: The SPD parliamentary group in a paper at the turn of the century (pdf) reaffirmed the basic conditions for peace outlined by the G7 countries in October – including the need to restore Ukraine’s territorial integrity. In addition, the principle applies to any negotiation efforts: not without Ukraine, not across Ukraine. That’s the right approach for me.
Chancellor Scholz believes that his government is making “wisely considered and internationally closely coordinated decisions” with regard to arms deliveries. What could, for example, be the wise decision to rule out the delivery of “Marder” armored personnel carriers and “Leopard” main battle tanks in December and to promise them in January?
My impression is that the German government wants to support Ukraine, but at the same time is always concerned that this could lead to an escalation by Russia. When the Chancellor speaks of “prudence,” I think he means a tentative approach. The Americans call this “boiling the frog”. It’s about slowly ramping up support for Ukraine so as not to provoke Russia too much. However, it must also be said that the federal government would rather join the ranks than lead the way.
How free is the federal government in the question of arms deliveries? Can she “weigh things up” or does she just have to do what the US wants her to do?
I believe that the alignment between Scholz and Biden is very close and that their perspectives on the war are not that different. And of course a federal government does not simply have to do what the USA demands of it – think of Gerhard Schröder’s no to the Iraq war or the attitude of the grand coalition to Nord Stream 2. If Germany wanted to, it could say: Do it we are not. But the federal government is quite comfortable with the fact that the USA is the leading power. Conversely, the United States also leave Germany a lot of leeway. The US tries not to push the Germans too hard to do more. They don’t want to act like they did under Trump. It’s more of an encouragement.
What does this mean for the “leopard”? Do you expect that the delivery of main battle tanks will be decided at the meeting of Ukraine supporters in Ramstein this Friday?
There will probably be a coalition of states that want to deliver. I also assume that Germany will approve these deliveries, and will probably even participate in them. It’s the same discussion as with the “Marder” armored personnel carriers. I really wonder why something like this isn’t better prepared. Instead, German battle tanks and also “Marder” were used for ring exchanges. It was already foreseeable in September that Ukraine would sooner or later need western armored personnel carriers and main battle tanks.
For the new Secretary of Defense, what are the three most important areas that need to be addressed now?
The central task is to bring about the turning point, to work for the needs of the Bundeswehr. Of course, it comes as a shock when Eva Högl, the military commissioner, says that you don’t actually need 100 billion, but 300 billion euros to change something in the Bundeswehr. But I think she’s right. The new Secretary of Defense must know that the task is immense and that the special fund will not suffice if the regular defense budget does not increase over the next few years. There is also an urgent need for procurement reform. And it is important that the Bundeswehr is enabled to meet our NATO obligations.
Hubertus Volmer spoke to Jana Puglierin