Interview with Oleksiy Melnyk: “Bakhmut is a promising direction for Ukraine”

Ukrainian military expert Oleksiy Melnyk is “at least not disappointed” by the NATO summit in Vilnius. He considers the two conditions that must be met before Ukraine can join the alliance to be understandable. Regarding the course of the Ukrainian offensive, he says that it is progressing more slowly than hoped, especially compared to the successes of the past year. The reason is that the Russians have mined huge areas. “Even if you clear mines carefully, that’s no guarantee that the same places won’t be mined again a few hours later, this time from a distance.”

Bachmut is “in the meantime a promising direction for the Ukrainians,” says Melnyk. Regarding the criticism of the use of cluster munitions, he says it is impossible for Ukraine to use them against residential areas like Russia did. And the battlefields are mined anyway. “Due to the shortage, the Russians also use masses of decommissioned, outdated ammunition, of which up to 30 to 40 percent do not explode and remain lying around. When it comes to the promised cluster munitions from the USA, this value is worlds smaller.”

ntv.de: Mr. Melnyk, you are one of Ukraine’s most prominent experts on international security issues. How do you assess the results of the NATO summit in Vilnius for Kiev?

Oleksiy Melnyk: As an expert, at least I wasn’t disappointed. The partners take seriously that the future of Ukraine should lie in NATO. The fact that there were no miracles comes as a surprise, at most, to people whose expectations were overheated – especially by politicians, who should have taken better advice from experts beforehand.

The most important result for Ukraine: On the way to NATO, the so-called Membership Action Plan will no longer apply. What does that mean in practice?

This solves an important bureaucratic problem that could potentially arise. If someone had wanted to slow down the admission process in the future, they would have said: Now the Membership Action Plan must also be fulfilled. Therefore, it is significant that it is no longer necessary for Ukraine – unlike Georgia. But when Ukraine did not receive a Membership Action Plan at the Bucharest summit in 2008, it was actually only formal. A system has been developed which in fact replaces it almost 1:1 – which includes, for example, the National Annual Programme, the fulfillment of which remains a condition for Ukraine and with which Kiev has been working for over ten years. Bottom line, it’s the same. So it’s a big bureaucratic victory that doesn’t change that much in practice.

What conditions does Ukraine have to meet in order to be accepted into NATO? Ukrainian officials complain about little concrete about it.

I’m surprised when people say something like that, because there are actually two basic conditions that could hardly be more specific. For one, it’s the end of the war. It’s a very understandable, objective story, although nobody knows exactly when and how it will come about. Because the cessation of fighting is not the end of the war per se. From a purely formal point of view, Russia, for example, is still at war with Japan because there is still no peace agreement. There are many scenarios: Ukraine’s return to the 1991 borders, but also a compromise truce. The fact that from a Western point of view it is not possible to define this in more detail is due to the general starting point.

And the second requirement is the actual Membership Action Plan, called the National Annual Program. It consists of five basic criteria – and the area of ​​defense is just one of them. There are no questions about this one: we all see that the Ukrainian army would be a great asset to NATO. But when we talk about four other areas, such as the judiciary, there are serious structural problems. To say that we’ve come this far with these would be an exaggeration.

How realistic do you think it is, then, for Ukraine to be admitted to, say, NATO in the next ten years?

I see that positively. The main problem, of course, remains condition one. Given the necessary pressure, the necessary systematic progress can all be achieved sooner or later, as is already happening in some cases in the case of integration into the EU. With the end of the war it is different. One difficulty is that certain residual risks also remain afterwards. Let’s imagine the following: The war is over, even more complicated countries like Hungary agree to Ukraine’s entry into NATO – and the day after entry, Russia attacks the Ukrainian border again to put Article 5 to the test. If NATO does not respond decisively, the entire international security system will burn, which would be a great success for Moscow. It’s an unlikely scenario, but one that must be kept in mind nonetheless. However, I remain 100 percent of the opinion that Ukraine’s admission to NATO would not be a ticket to war with Russia, but a serious strengthening of the alliance.

The Ukrainian counter-offensive has been underway since June 4, even though the intense preparation phase was of course already in full swing in the spring. How do you rate the intermediate result?

We are making progress on three corners of the southern front towards the so-called land bridge to the Crimea. Are these advances slower than desired? Sure, especially compared to the three very successful operations last year that people here have in mind: in addition to Kharkiv and Cherson, I also mean Russia’s “gesture of goodwill” in late March 2022, i.e. the clear defeat in the battle around Kiev. What does this primarily have to do with? I speak to local people regularly and they are negatively surprised by the extent of the mining. The mined areas are huge. And the problem is, even cleaning mines carefully doesn’t guarantee that the same spots won’t be mined again a few hours later, this time from a distance.

It’s a tough operation, no question. But what I would never do: mathematically add up the territory gained by Ukraine so far and draw conclusions about how many years we can liberate which territory. That is absolutely dubious, you shouldn’t listen to such experts at all. I remain cautiously optimistic despite the difficult war of attrition at the front.

General Valeriy Zalushnyi, the popular commander of the Ukrainian armed forces, said recently the “Washington Post” that NATO would not have started such an operation without air sovereignty. What do you think?

Well, I didn’t understand Zalushnyj’s interview to mean that such operations cannot be carried out without air sovereignty, although it is of course true that NATO would act differently with its possibilities. In my opinion, the commander simply reacted to the criticism that everything was allegedly going too slowly. The difficulties of the counter-offensive without F-16s were known in advance to the Ukrainian General Staff.

But there is reality. The fighter jets will not be there in Ukraine for a few months at the earliest. I name the most optimistic variant because we have all already seen that many deliveries are running a little faster than announced. Should we have tolerated the counter-offensive and waited? Then, in the fall, there will be plenty of rain, offensive operations would be more difficult, and the Russians would mine even more territory by then. In addition, the Russians had air superiority in the Ukrainian offensives in Kharkiv and Kherson districts, but they were successful. It is important to remain calm and remember that the majority of the brigades formed for the counteroffensive were not yet on the front lines. And the promised deliveries of cluster munitions from the USA should make up for the lack of fighter jets a bit.

What’s up to date with Bachmut? The Russians took the city in May, but even then it became apparent that the situation on the flanks was potentially dangerous for them. This seems to be confirmed in the last few weeks.

Bakhmut, meanwhile, is a promising direction for Ukrainians. If the Ukrainians manage in a comparatively short time to nullify the victory that Russian propaganda has praised so much, it would be a tremendous political and psychological success. The prospects are indeed there, although one must always remain cautious. The Russians are concentrating more and more reserves on the flanks, but the Ukrainians have already taken many strategic heights and things are not looking good strategically for the Russian army. In general, Bakhmut itself does not have a huge strategic value, but the Russians spent a lot of forces there – and there is a theoretical possibility of encirclement. Of course, the Ukrainians also suffered great losses in the battle for Bakhmut, but what is important: new Western weapons or new brigades are practically not involved there. And: The Ukrainians act completely differently than the Russians in their months of fighting, during which they have stormed house after house in the city itself.

You mentioned cluster munitions. What would you say to the critics of the delivery in Germany?

First of all, although Russia is waging a barbaric war and has used cluster munitions against major cities like Kharkiv, it is important for me to stress that Ukraine must not stoop to this level. However, the situation with cluster munitions, apart from their effectiveness against larger enemy troop concentrations, is as follows: On the one hand, it is impossible for Ukraine to use them against residential areas or cities. But if we talk about the battlefield, then not only is almost everything mined there anyway. Because of the shortage, the Russians are also using masses of discarded, obsolete ammunition, of which up to 30 to 40 percent fail to explode and remain dead. When it comes to the promised cluster munitions from the USA, this value is worlds smaller. Therefore, their delivery will hardly change or aggravate anything. Mass demining after the war would be necessary anyway.

Denis Trubetskoy spoke to Oleksiy Melnyk