A major war between Iran and Israel appears to have been averted for the time being. But why can one assume that Iran does not want such a war? The German-Iranian Middle East expert Ali Fathollah-Nejad on the regime’s goals and what it fears.
ntv.de: An estimated 170 drones, more than 30 cruise missiles and 120 ballistic missiles – the massiveness of the Iranian attack on Saturday night surprised many. How fine is the line on which Iran is balancing between showing strength and risking war with Israel?
Ali Fathollah-Nejad: If we look at the military strike on Saturday night, we see: Tehran warned the Americans that it was not a surprise attack. Mainly drones were used, which are easy to intercept. What Iran has not used: no barrage of ballistic missiles that could reach Israel in 12 minutes, and no involvement of Hezbollah, which, with its missile arsenal of more than 150,000, is a major threat to Israel. Pictures of projectiles without warheads were circulating online. Hardly any of the missiles fired hit any target. So there was a lot of showmanship and it was enough for the Iranian side to claim a big victory.
The German-Iranian political scientist and author Ali Fathollah-Nejad has conducted research as a Middle East expert for international think tanks and is director of the Center for Middle East and Global Order (CMEG).
(Photo: Nassim Rad)
To whom was this victory message addressed?
The regime’s primary aim was to restore its own credibility with a face-saving demonstration of power – in the eyes of its support base in its own country, but also in the region within the so-called axis of resistance.
… So Hezbollah in Lebanon, Islamic Jihad, Hamas, the Houthis in Yemen and militias from Syria and Iraq…
Frustration had been building among these Iran allies and domestic supporters because the Iranians had not responded to similar Israeli attacks in recent months and Hamas had not stepped aside as much as they had hoped.
When you talk about domestic supporters, how big is that base? Can you give a house number?
We’re talking about 10 to 15 percent of the population who support the regime. Not everyone shares their ideology, but some simply benefit, politically or economically, and are therefore behind the system. The ideological hardline supporters were increasingly dissatisfied, as were Iran’s allies, because since December Israel has eliminated an important Hamas official in Beirut, then in January there was the attack on the most important commander of the Revolutionary Guards in Syria. In the eyes of supporters, a divide has emerged between fiery Iranian rhetoric and military restraint. Little happened after these killings.
Was the attack in Damascus two weeks ago a turning point?
At this point the regime has calculated: Now we really have to react, but in such a way that a major war does not break out. Iran is still not interested in a war against Israel and possibly against the USA in tow. It would endanger regime security and cost Iran dearly, militarily and economically. Iran is still in an economic crisis and financial resources are limited.
What would make such a war so dangerous for the regime in Tehran?
The USA is the strongest military power in the world and Israel is the most important military power in the region. Conventionally, Iran is no match for the two at all; at least in this respect it would be a fight between David and Goliath.
Even if Iran were to use all of its resources – i.e. fast rockets of its own and, above all, support for Hezbollah, which stands on Israel’s northern border with its 150,000 rockets?
No. Iran can certainly cause major headaches and also impose immense costs on the other side. The bottom line, however, is that Tehran has no illusions that it can stand up to Israel and the USA. Above all, the Islamic Republic has to deal with an immense gap between state and society. In the event of war, it could not count on a movement of national unity. The Iranian regime definitely could not rely on what the Americans call “rallying around the flag” – short-term, massive support for the state in the crisis. What’s more, the highest security circles in the country cannot ignore the risk of an uprising in the course of a war. And there could also be splits and conflicts in the security apparatus.
Overall, it sounds like a major war is really not recommended for Iran, at least now.
Iranian society knows full well that there is a stark difference between the interests of the regime and the interests of the country. The regime’s goals and its regional policy impose immense costs on the country. Accordingly, there is no support for any expansionary policy by Iran in the region. Not even with a view to Israel. The images that we have now seen from Tehran – people celebrating the attack from Israel on the streets – these were people from the support base already mentioned. That’s only a small minority of the population.
During the Shah’s regime in the 1970s, Iran and Israel had a relaxed relationship. So large parts of the Iranian population still see it that way?
The enmity with Israel arose with the revolution in 1979, when the Islamist revolutionaries took power and made Israel an enemy, a so-called little Satan. The USA was the “Great Satan”. It is an ideological hostility, not necessarily a geopolitical one. Iranians do not share the regime’s hatred of Israel.
The Revolutionary Guards have announced a new policy: that from now on, “whenever the Zionist regime attacks our interests, properties, individuals and citizens, we from the Islamic Republic of Iran will retaliate.” Does this put the conflict on a new level going forward?
Initially, the Iranian embassy to the United Nations proclaimed that Saturday night’s attack had concluded the operation. Later, Revolutionary Guards commander Hossein Salami said that the Iranian side now had a new equation with which to respond to Israeli attacks from Iranian territory in the future. This is a rhetorical attempt to raise the price of an Israeli retaliation. The extent to which the Iranians would actually handle it that way is another matter, because it poses a certain danger. But it is clear that the rules of engagement between Israel and Iran, i.e. how they behave towards each other militarily, are changing due to this first direct attack by Iran. We have to wait and see how strong this change will be.
Jordan shot down drones that were en route to Israel on Saturday. How risky is this for Jordan’s King Abdullah? The mullahs had warned beforehand, but he defied it.
Jordan is pro-Western, but not necessarily pro-Israel. Especially since a large part of the Jordanian population are Palestinians who had to flee their homeland. Now Jordan has essentially taken part in the defense of Israel. This is indicative of the desire to avoid a major war in the region. But the Iranian attack has also aroused sympathy, especially among the Arab population in the region. She sees that Iran is the only state that dares to really attack Israel, also in connection with the Gaza war and the suffering of the Palestinians there. Iran is perceived by a significant part of the population as a defender of the Palestinian cause. Due to the Gaza war, it is currently difficult for those Arab states that are critical of Tehran to take a public position.
Positioning is a good keyword: How should the West deal with Iran’s behavior? Also with regard to his pursuit of nuclear capabilities?
Iran is emerging as the most important destabilizer in the Middle East. There is only a pseudo-stability in the country itself, especially since what I call the long-term revolutionary process is underway. The gap between state and society is enormous and reforming the system is actually impossible. That’s why I’ve been calling for a turnaround in Iran policy for years. In order to curb Tehran’s aggressive regional policy, a coalition of Western and regional states that appear and act as one would be needed. Iran has advanced its nuclear program in the past and may have reached threshold status as a nuclear power. The International Atomic Energy Agency complains that it can no longer fulfill its mandate to control the Iraqi program. This is another reason why an accurate assessment is difficult. However, Tehran would still have to develop launchers, which could give us about one to two years.
Is the threat from the militarily strong Hezbollah from Lebanon more crucial for Israel?
Short and medium term, yes. This is a big factor, which is why there are discussions in Israel about whether they should be weakened with a preemptive strike. However, I do not see the danger that Iran would completely activate Hezbollah in the conflict with Israel. Hezbollah is a kind of life insurance for the Islamic Republic if there were to be a major war in which the regime in Tehran would be directly threatened. It doesn’t want to shoot its powder beforehand without a reason.
Frauke Niemeyer spoke to Ali Fathollah-Nejad