Nico Lange on the Ukraine offensive: “The Russian mines are the biggest obstacle”

Security expert Nico Lange believes that the delivery of cruise missiles to Ukraine is important for the Ukrainian offensive to be successful. There are two options for Germany: You can technically adapt the Taurus cruise missile and then deliver it. Or the British and French give Ukraine more Storm Shadows and SCALP and Germany replenishes their stocks with Taurus. In an interview with ntv.de, Lange also calls for new solutions for clearing minefields and talks about the mood in the Ukrainian army.

ntv.de: There are minor Ukrainian successes along the front line, but no real breakthroughs, even though the offensive has been running for two months. You were recently in Ukraine – what is the Ukrainian army lacking? In material, in soldiers or in a good plan?

Nico Lange: The Ukraine has material, it has highly motivated soldiers and it has a plan. However, one has to ask oneself whether expectations and military reality fit together. The counter-offensive began perhaps too optimistically. Ukraine had to realize that it could not achieve the hoped-for breakthroughs.

Nico Lange is Senior Fellow of the Munich Security Conference’s “Zeitwende” initiative. Until the beginning of 2022 he was head of the management staff at the Federal Ministry of Defence. Lange lived and worked in Ukraine and Russia for a long time, he is fluent in Ukrainian and Russian.

(Photo: private)

Why is that?

Ukraine has no air superiority and is dealing with very extensive and managed minefields. In the south of the Ukraine there is also the fact that the terrain is very clear: the steppe there is flat land, you can see for miles. Everything the Ukrainians do there is immediately seen and opposed by the Russians.

Hasn’t Ukraine adjusted its approach?

Of course she did. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian army is limited to making smaller advances, clearing mines and systematically reducing the number of Russian artillery pieces. In this way, it improves the conditions for attacks and has now made significant progress in two front sectors in the south, but no breakthroughs yet. All in all, the effort for the Ukrainians is much higher than it would have been in the autumn of last year, when the Russian defense lines had not been expanded to such an extent.

You spoke of managed minefields. What is that, actually?

This is a new phenomenon. What we see in Ukraine are not the classic minefields that are still known from the Balkan wars of the 1990s – areas in which mines were systematically laid, which later had to be laboriously removed because the laying plans no longer existed. Some mines that Russia uses in Ukraine are much more modern. There are, for example, those that attach themselves to a vehicle from below when it drives over it and then explode at a later point in time. In addition, these minefields are very, very large, you cannot avoid them, as the German armed forces, for example, practice. The eviction is almost like a fight against windmills – especially in the flat terrain in the south where you are seen from all sides.

This makes mine clearance even more dangerous.

The sappers of the Ukrainian army are always under fire and in the greatest danger. The fact that the minefields are managed also means that new mines are constantly being laid with modern mine launchers. These mines are the biggest obstacle. The Ukrainians and their partners didn’t see it that way before – simply because they had no experience with such minefields.

You have a view of the minefields suggestedto think about “completely new solutions”. In which direction could they go?

The capabilities of the mine clearance systems available to date are disproportionate to the size of the minefields. There is an American system that can cut a swathe eight meters wide and a hundred meters long in a minefield with one shot. So, with a minefield three or five kilometers deep, you need to fire this gun thirty or fifty times to get a narrow passage. It takes far too long, and the element of surprise is completely missing.

Therefore a new solution is needed.

Yes. Experiments are already being carried out – with autonomous vehicles, with robots, with drones, with explosives and the like. You need something that goes faster and can clear a lot of mines at high speed.

The Ukrainian ambassador in Germany, Oleksii Makeiev, told the “Rheinische Post” that “we would like to take long-range missiles from Germany, including the Taurus cruise missile.” However, Defense Minister Pistorius has announced that there will be no delivery of Taurus. Are we back to where we were when Pistorius came into office?

I think that in principle you shouldn’t rule out anything, if only to avoid constantly telling Russia what you’re not going to do. When it comes to cruise missiles, Ukraine is particularly successful when it can take targeted action against Russian logistics, command and communication. We have seen what a great change the HIMARS have brought about in this war. We already supply artillery and rocket artillery. Now it’s about doing the same thing, just with longer ranges. The British led the way here with the Storm Shadow cruise missile, the French supply SCALP-EG, which is the same model. Such systems are very important for Ukraine’s counteroffensive.

And the Taurus?

In terms of burden-sharing between the US and Europe, it might make sense for us to also supply cruise missiles. There are two possibilities: you can technically adapt the Taurus and then deliver it; so far, the Taurus are not compatible with the Ukrainian systems, but Storm Shadow and SCALP-EG have succeeded. But you could also think about the French and British supplying more and we replenishing their stocks with Taurus.

So another exchange of rings, like last year with the tanks?

It would be a possibility that would have the advantage that technical solutions already exist for Ukraine’s use of Storm Shadow and SCALP-EG.

Who do you talk to when you visit Ukraine?

During the war, I spoke extensively with Ukrainian commanders and soldiers for a study on what NATO forces could learn from Ukraine. There are many things that the Ukrainians do very well, sometimes much better than we do. Through my years in Ukraine, language skills and these interviews, I have many contacts in Ukraine and therefore also contact persons whom I can ask again and again: How is the situation there? How can I help? What is needed?

And how do you assess the mood in the Ukrainian army?

Of course, the atmosphere is sometimes very serious because there are always news or direct experiences of dead people, of injuries, and of psychological stress. But there is a great deal of determination, grim humor and an almost unshakable optimism. People want to defend themselves against Russia, they are desperate to liberate their homeland, and they believe that they will prevail in the end, even though they know it will be difficult. It is moving, but it also often makes one angry at those among us who act as if they were the victims of this war.

Western states want to give Ukraine bilateral security guarantees for the post-war period – it’s still unclear exactly what that will look like. Putin’s spokesman has just said again that such guarantees would contradict the principle of the “indivisibility” of security, which would “lead to a further deterioration in the security situation on the European continent”. Is that a legitimate point?

Russia says “indivisibility of security” but by that means Russian dominance in Europe. That’s why it’s waging this imperialist war. Russia wants its neighbors to be as weak as possible, so that it can pressure them, blackmail them, or even subdue them. The security guarantees that are currently being discussed are actually more like security promises or security agreements, they are not about obligations to provide assistance in the sense of a guarantee, but rather a network of bilateral agreements. In addition to the G7, ten other states now want to negotiate such agreements with Ukraine – so there are already at least 17 states that want to commit themselves to supplying Ukraine with a certain amount of weapons, ammunition and material every year, maybe also weapons and ammunition to produce together, to train and practice troops together.

But that is no substitute for NATO’s obligation to provide assistance.

No, but on the way to NATO membership it creates more security for Ukraine. These agreements are intended to enable Ukraine to defend itself and be strong enough to deter Russia from attacking again. The fact that Russia does not like this, that Russia is still driven by the idea of ​​threatening neighboring countries or even launching further raids, only confirms that such security promises have to produce results.

Hubertus Volmer spoke to Nico Lange


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