Olaf Scholz is heading to China. Green Party leader Omid Nouripour expects the Chancellor to also address “the hard and contentious issues” there. “It must not be the case that China supports Russia’s defense industry directly or indirectly through North Korea and Iran,” warns Nouripour in an interview with ntv.de. Scholz will also speak about economic policy issues. “Germany doesn’t want a trade war,” said Nouripour. “We want to balance interests and create fair economic conditions for companies on both sides.” And: “China needs us too.”
ntv.de: Olaf Scholz is embarking on his longest trip abroad to date and it is aimed, of all things, at the competitor and strategic rival China. What does that say about German-Chinese relations?
Omid Nouripour: For us, China is a partner, but also a competitor and strategic rival. That’s why we want to continue our cooperation and at the same time minimize risks. This also means reducing dependencies on autocracies and diversifying partnerships. We must not become dependent, that is one of the central lessons of the war in Ukraine. That’s why it’s right for Olaf Scholz to fly there. Especially in a year full of uncertainty – be it because of the war in Ukraine or because of tensions in the South China Sea.
The problems with China are numerous: the relationship with Russia, the impending war against Taiwan, the human rights situation in Hong Kong, Xinjiang and Tibet, Beijing’s aggressive territorial claims, cyber attacks, the flooding of Western markets with cheap products and state-subsidized high-tech, climate policy: where should Scholz will be the focus of this trip?
I don’t know if the list of critical issues is complete, but these are all important reasons why we need to talk to each other. I assume that all of these topics will be addressed. Some aspects fall under the responsibility of the accompanying Greens, Federal Environment Minister Steffi Lemke and Federal Agriculture Minister Cem Özdemir. I’m thinking of China’s participation in the plastics agreement or the question of whether pork can be exported to China.
How should you speak to China?
China only takes its counterpart seriously if you clearly and clearly formulate your own interests and stand by your own values. I assume that Olaf Scholz will also address the hard and controversial topics. As a basis for this, the federal government adopted the German China strategy last summer under the leadership of Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock. We will continue to cooperate with China. Leaving out controversial topics does not help collaboration.
When Scholz traveled to China in autumn 2022, he was met with a lot of mistrust from the Greens because of the Chinese state-owned company Cosco’s involvement in the port of Hamburg. Has your trust in the Chancellor’s China policy increased since then?
I think we all have an interest in strategically better protecting the critical infrastructure in our country and greatly reducing dependencies in this area on authoritarian states such as China. As you mentioned, there was a different assessment in the case of the Port of Hamburg. We have since found common guidelines with the China strategy.
What can Scholz achieve with regard to Ukraine?
During the Chancellor’s last trip, China once again emphasized that it finds Russia’s threats to use nuclear weapons wrong. That was good. Now it has to be about what is actually happening in Ukraine. It must not be the case that China supports Russia’s defense industry directly or indirectly through North Korea and Iran. This would also affect our security interests. The Chancellor must reject this clearly and unequivocally.
Why is the Chinese leadership behaving this way?
China’s CCP thinks long-term. Beijing has an interest in Russia becoming a cheap, relatively exclusive gas station for oil and gas. Aside from the security policy questions described, this also raises the question of whether China wants to be a partner in climate protection. We have already observed many changes in direction. Beijing is currently focusing more on decarbonization again. I hope the prospect of cheap Russian gas does not become a temptation to abandon it.
Scholz and the SPD are keen to remind people that Xi Jinping persuaded Russia to moderate the issue of nuclear weapons after the Chancellor’s visit. But is that actually true?
It was good that the Chinese Communist Party very clearly distanced itself from these threats during the last trip. This statement was made both before and after by the CP. The Chinese voice is heard in Russia. But we didn’t know back then and we won’t know what Putin will do with the Chinese warning. The Russian threats should be taken seriously. However, one must always keep in mind that the Russian model of power is based entirely on fear. Such threats will keep coming because Putin wants us not to make necessary decisions out of fear. But we can’t afford that.
There have recently been increasing calls, especially in the SPD, to involve China more closely in a diplomatic pacification of the war. Does Olaf Scholz have any arguments or leverage beyond mere criticism?
The Chinese need us, Germany is an important trading partner. And they also know that a possible re-election of Donald Trump would have significant consequences for them. Accordingly, China depends on good trade relations with Europe. So we can appear confident. There is an imbalance in our economic relationship. Many EU countries are understandably much tougher in their dealings with China because Beijing does not allow products onto the market. Germany doesn’t want a trade war, we want to balance interests and fair economic conditions for companies on both sides. Therefore: The Germans are not going to China as supplicants, but as competitors on an equal footing.
So the possibility of further market access restrictions for China is on the table?
No, but EU Commission President von der Leyen has announced that she will review the import of Chinese electric cars. The Chinese government massively subsidizes production among its own manufacturers. Unfortunately, we know from the solar industry the impact of such unfair trading practices.
But this is an economic conflict, not a means of pressure for China to deal differently with Russia.
True, but that shows that the federal government is not just politely asking China to consider our interests. Given the network of fields of work that connects us, Germany doesn’t have the worst cards. China needs us too.
The Greens have long been calling for greater strategic independence from China, including diversification and de-risking. However, the dependence on rare earths, for example, has hardly decreased in recent years. German investments reached a record level in 2023. Has Federal Economics Minister Robert Habeck failed at this point so far?
No, we have made progress in many areas, including raw materials. Among other things, it’s about circular economy and the efficient use of raw materials. Both will play a role on the trip to China. Europe also needs to make progress, for example with the Critical Raw Materials Act, which is currently discussing what we can mine ourselves. And we have to position ourselves more broadly when it comes to imports and diversify our sources.
Has the politically desired rethink reached the boardrooms of German corporations and large medium-sized companies? Many continue to invest heavily in China.
As a gigantic market, China remains highly attractive for German companies. But my impression is that after the experience with KP’s Covid strategy, companies are looking very closely at whether and how they invest strategically and what dependencies they enter into. In addition, many companies have withdrawn from Xinjiang province knowing about forced labor.
Last summer, the Greens also described the Indo-Pacific region as a potential field of action for NATO to protect supply chains and curb China’s aggression. Do Germany and Europe really have to contain the giant China militarily?
That’s not what it is about. Partner states such as South Korea, Japan and Indonesia, which value a rules-based order in the South China Sea, would like Germany to show its colors there. For the first time, the traffic light has given the Indo-Pacific issue its own chapter in the coalition agreement. Because Germany’s interests in this region are highly relevant. At its core, this is not about the military. The goods that pass through the Strait of Malacca affect us directly. A military escalation in the South China Sea would have significant economic and security implications for Germany and all of Europe. To bury our heads in the sand and say that none of this has anything to do with us would be simply naive.
Sebastian Huld spoke to Omid Nouripour