Power struggle in Putin’s Russia: “Wagner and Kayrowzy should be put in their place”

The dismissal of the supreme commander of the Russian invasion troops in Ukraine, General Surovikin, should be understood against the background of a power struggle over funds, status and prestige, says the Russia expert Margarete Klein from the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. The decision shows that figures like mercenary commander Prigozhin and Chechnya’s dictator Kadyrov should be put in their place to some extent. In addition, the appointment of Chief of Staff Gerasimov makes it clear “that Russia is ready to go all in to achieve victory and will probably rely on further mobilization to do so.”

ntv.de: General Surovikin, who was appointed commander of the Russian troops in Ukraine in October, was replaced this week by Chief of Staff Gerasimov. Does this indicate that Putin is dissatisfied with the way the war is going?

Margarete Klein: Putin must be dissatisfied with the course of the war because it is progressing much more slowly than expected and there are numerous military setbacks, such as in November when Russia had to give up the city of Cherson and retreat to the southern bank of the Dnipro. However, I believe that the appointment more closely reflects the Department of Defense’s desire to strengthen its position in the war.

Russia expert Mark Galeotti posted on Twitter written, for Gerasimov it was a kind of degradation, but at least “the most poisoned of all cups”. Is that it, a demotion?

It’s not a demotion, but it’s a big challenge and if Gerasimov fails, it could also mean the end of his career. Because the expectations can hardly be met. This war has revealed structural weaknesses in the Russian armed forces that cannot simply be solved with orders from above.

For example?

The problems include the poor training status of many soldiers, the lack of professionalism among regular soldiers, the inability to act jointly with the armed forces or to implement modern concepts of warfare, such as network-based warfare. All of these things cannot be solved simply by changing the supreme commander.

Is it a demotion for Surovikin? Back then in the fall, his appointment was seen as a clear sign that the war was becoming more brutal.

The war was brutal from the start, as Buscha showed, among others. After Surovikin’s appointment, massive attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure began, but not yet the massive carpet bombing seen in the Russian military operation in Syria, which he also led. And yes, this is a demotion: Surovikin is now only the deputy of the supreme commander.

Is it even right to take these personnel decisions as a signal?

The step sends out several signals. First, that Russia is preparing for a long war because the highest-ranking Russian general is now the supreme commander. This can hardly be reconciled with the narrative of a “military special operation”. Gerasimov’s appointment shows that Russia is ready all in to go in order to win a victory and will probably rely on further mobilization to do so. And secondly, the decision shows that the proxies are being put in their place to some extent. Even from his time in Syria, Surovikin maintained good relations with private military companies such as Wagner, Gerasimov and Shoigu, and seems to have developed a different attitude here.

“Proxy” means deputy – what do you mean by that?

The term refers to the private military companies and to the troops of Chechen dictator Ramzan Kadyrov, the “Kadyrovtsy”. While mercenary groups like Wagner are still formally illegal in Russia because their formation is forbidden, Kadyrov’s troops are formally subordinate to the National Guard. In fact, they are a private army of the Chechen president. In general, irregular or non-state violent actors are referred to as proxies, although this description does not really apply here, because the Kadyrovtsy and the Wagner mercenary group are interwoven with the Russian state in so many ways that they are “non-state” in name at best.

And to what extent will Kadyrovtsy and Wagner be deprived of their power?

In recent months, these groups have increasingly developed an arbitrariness. They have deliberately adopted the criticism of the Russian military leadership, which comes primarily from nationalist military bloggers, in order to position themselves better in the power struggle for financial resources, status and prestige. Defense spending will increase massively in the coming years. Gerasimov’s appointment is a clear sign that the regular armed forces want to regain control. Incidentally, this is also indicated by the fact that the Russian General Alexander Lapin was actually rehabilitated. Lapin had been massively criticized by Kadyrov and Prigozhin in November. Now he even got the position of Chief of General Staff of the Russian Land Forces.

It is occasionally heard that Prigozhin is one of the figures who could one day replace Putin. Do you think this is a realistic possibility?

I don’t see it that way at all. Prigozhin is an entrepreneur, a businessman of war. He has a portfolio of companies all involved in paramilitary missions, hybrid warfare, or overt military interventions. He is the financier of the Wagner military company and is also believed to be behind the Internet Research Agency, a Russian troll company that intervened in the 2016 US election campaign. And he has his own foundation through which he uses disinformation to get involved in election campaigns in Africa. Ultimately, however, it is always about making money. This clearly distinguishes him from Kadyrov, who has a much more political agenda.

How much influence does Kadyrov have in Moscow?

Neither Kadyrov nor Prigozhin are part of the innermost circle of the so-called “siloviki”, the informal elite group made up of representatives of the secret services and military structures. Neither come from the Soviet secret services. Despite this, Kadyrov has more influence in Russia than other presidents of Russian republics and he is also active outside of Chechnya. For example, he is credited with involvement in political assassinations and has a role in cultivating relations with Muslim states in the Gulf region or with Libya. Kadyrov has a kind of personal loyalty to Putin that can best be described as neo-feudal. In it, Kadyrov assures Putin of loyalty and support, including in the military sphere through his private army. Putin, in turn, guarantees the high financial payments to Chechnya, more than 90 percent of whose budget revenue comes from the federal budget.

Officially, it was not Putin who decided on the implementation of Surovikin and the new responsibility of Gerasimov Defense Minister Shoigu. How far does his influence reach?

Shoigu is one of the few politicians in Russia who enjoy popularity independent of Putin: he has been among the five most popular Russian politicians in Russia for thirty years. And as the military has played an increasingly important role in implementing foreign policy successes since 2008, the status of the armed forces in the country has also grown. Politically, Shoigu has certainly shown ambitions beyond the defense ministry: he had the idea of ​​building megacities in Siberia. However, he has come under pressure due to the bad course of the war for Russia. You can see it in the fact that the proxies were able to take on a stronger role, but also in the fact that it only plays a subordinate role in the question of how the production of armaments can be boosted. For this purpose, Putin created a new body, the so-called Coordination Council. It was not Shoigu who was in charge, but Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin. In a central area of ​​responsibility, armaments policy, Shoigu was thus clearly deprived of power.

Hubertus Volmer spoke to Margarete Klein