Regulatory brakes: Unnecessary changes to the democratic rules of the game

In the future, a simple majority in parliament will no longer suffice for the adoption of major regulatory proposals. The Federal Council is proposing this on the orders of Parliament. But there is no convincing justification for such a reform.

Why should different rules of the game apply in Parliament for economic regulation proposals than for almost all other business?

Yoshiko Kusano / Keystone

Complaints from business circles about the “regulatory frenzy” of politicians are standard in federal Bern. The density of state regulations is constantly increasing. Quotas for women, wage analyses, reporting and due diligence requirements for sustainability, combating money laundering, recording working hours, environmental protection, information requirements for banks and much more: the list of topics with growing requirements for companies is long. The regulatory trend has several drivers: life is becoming more complicated, the pressure to adapt to international developments has increased, and politicians, by virtue of their function, tend to see a legal loophole in every problem.

higher hurdle

Parliament ordered the Federal Council to propose regulatory brakes. The Federal Council was against these advances, but has fulfilled the order with gnashing of teeth. The government sent its proposals to Parliament on Friday. The change in the democratic rules of the game in the federal constitution demanded by parliament is highly controversial: in the future, the hurdle of a qualified majority in parliament should apply to legislative projects with significant financial consequences for companies. In the future, such a law would only be considered adopted if it received a majority of the council members in both chambers of parliament instead of just the majority of the voters. If, for example, 185 of the 200 members are present in the National Council, a relevant law would have to achieve 101 instead of just 93 yes votes for adoption. This rule would not bring about a revolution, but it could change the outcome of certain deals.

As in other state policy issues, political opportunism also dominates here among the actors in federal Berne: regulation skeptics (bourgeois) are for the reform, regulation friends (left) are against it. So life is. From a democratic point of view, however, a completely different question should be central: Measured in the interests of society as a whole, is there “too much” company regulation due to political failure, so that a corrective to the rules of the game is needed?

There is such a failure in fiscal policy. Politicians tend to “generously” distribute foreign funds and pile up government debt at the expense of future generations. And with financial proposals, the beneficiaries have strong lobbying incentives, while the costs are diffuse and widely shared, making effective resistance difficult. The people are restricted here as a corrective: the federal budget is not subject to the referendum, and there is also no general financial referendum. This justifies the special rules in force via the federal government’s debt brake and Parliament’s spending brake.

The problem of cost estimates

But no such political failure is discernible when it comes to company regulation. The companies affected have a strong interest in a lobbying campaign, and the economy in Berne is correspondingly well networked. It is not apparent why certain legislative projects with cost implications for companies should be subject to different rules than almost all other bills.

The core problem with regulations does not lie in the democratic rules of the game, but rather in the difficulty of estimating costs. On Friday, the Federal Council also sent a proposal for a law on company relief to Parliament on orders. Among other things, it is planned to give cost estimates more weight in the case of new regulations, regular monitoring of regulatory costs and the expansion of digital access to authorities. This could perhaps shift the weights a bit, but a reversal in the regulatory trend is not to be expected as a result. Ultimately, the basic attitude of the people is decisive. And that’s how it should be in a democracy.

source site-111