After a bitter battle, the Ukrainian army was forced to abandon the mining town of Wuhledar, which was surrounded by Russians. Colonel Markus Reisner explains to ntv.de what this means for Ukraine’s situation during the war.
ntv.de: Mr. Reisner, last week the Ukrainian troops defended Wuhledar, but they have now had to give up the mining town. How did this come about?
Markus Reisner: The 72nd mechanized brigade has withdrawn. From the comments on Ukrainian networks it can be seen that she suffered heavy losses. In my view, Wuhledar is a classic example of the consequences of the war of attrition. A year and a half ago, the city was very successful in fending off Russian attacks. But after a grueling battle against artillery, against cruise missiles, then against rocket artillery and now also against bombs, the time has come. The base, this important fortress, was simply ready for attack.
So did the brigade there fight non-stop for a year and a half to take the city?
Wuhledar had a similarly high symbolic power in his defensive fight as Bakhmut. If you remember, the Ukrainian narrative was: Our army is suffering heavy losses, but in comparison, the losses on the Russian side are much higher. Bakhmut was a bulwark against which the Russians rubbed themselves until they could no longer hold on.
Markus Reisner is a colonel in the Austrian armed forces and analyzes the war situation in Ukraine every Monday at ntv.de.
(Photo: ntv.de)
The same goes for Wuhledar?
The city was the bulwark in the south. If we look at the front there, it stretches in a semi-arc from Zaporizhia to Kupyansk. This course results in a pivot point, and it is right near Wuhledar. From there the Ukrainians could threaten the Russian supply lines, north of Mariupol. These supply lines – road connections and railway lines – are important for Russian troops. Some of them were only built after the Kerch Bridge was attacked so many times. Wuhledar was like a spike in these Russian positions from which to threaten the supply routes.
And the Ukrainians almost lost this effective sting in January 2023?
Yes, in the first Russian winter offensive, Wuhledar was under massive pressure, and for a special reason: the Russians tried with all their might to force Ukraine to use its reserves. So that these reserves were no longer available for the planned Ukrainian summer offensive from the beginning of June. But the Ukrainians didn’t take this bait back then. They saw the Russians heavily harassing Wuhledar and wearing themselves out heavily in these attacks. But the Ukrainians did not react. But they held back their reserves because they wanted to go on the offensive with them in the summer.
Then instead of the fresh, fighting reserves, the “B team” held Wuhledar?
You can’t say B team. The 72nd Mechanized Brigade was already an elite unit that had been deployed there for years. They knew practically every mouse hole there. If the reserves had been deployed there, they would have been the second set. But the 72nd Mechanized Brigade had to do it alone a year and a half ago, did it alone. It withstood all the pressure from the Russians; after all, two brigades of the Russian armed forces were destroyed there and suffered heavy losses. The pictures went around the world at the time, saying: After more than a year of war, the Russians still haven’t learned anything. After this defeat, they didn’t stop, but continued to attack the city. With artillery, rocket artillery, with glide bombs. Week after week, month after month. And now here we are a year and a half later. A year and a half of constant attacks.
Until the Ukrainians were forced to abandon the city?
Kiev’s troops could only withdraw and retreat to avoid being completely destroyed. The Russians moved up and then tried to encircle the city with a pincer movement. The brigade endured this for a long time. There were also desperate videos circulating online where soldiers asked: Why are we still here? What are we defending?
The 72nd Brigade could not achieve the same performance as it did back then.
The units were now so worn out that the success of 2023 was no longer repeatable. I call this the drama of the war of attrition, and many still don’t understand it. There are units deployed in this war that have been fighting for 955 days. And they gradually wear out and at some point they can no longer function. Today is day 956 of this war of invasion. If nothing improves, if Ukraine continues to have nothing to counter glide bombs, if it has nothing to hit enemy artillery with counter-artillery fire, then you can still be an elite fighter. They will simply be shattered. About the timeline. It is precisely this calculation that follows a war of attrition.
Back to the videos you just mentioned. It almost sounds as if it was a relief for the Ukrainian troops to finally accept that Wuhledar could not be held.
Precisely not because this space had significance on an operational and tactical level, as a thorn that reached into the Russian positions. Now this strong base has been given up for a delaying battle in the depths.
How far have the Ukrainians retreated?
It’s only a few kilometers. The challenging thing here is, on the one hand, the terrain. It’s very flat. This means that whoever holds the few high points, especially the mines and mining towns, is automatically in the better position. On the other hand, what we see again and again now comes into play: the positions further back, in the next defensive line, do not have anywhere near the quality of the forward positions that have been occupied so far. You must not forget that Wuhledar was a front line position. That means it was developed for over eight years.
So at the operational level, for the situation at the front, Wuhledar was of great importance?
At the operational level, yes. But not on a strategic level, i.e. when it comes to the question of whether something is absolutely necessary, for example, to maintain the capabilities for a long war. Hardly anything that happens at the front has any real immediate strategic significance. However, attacks on critical infrastructure are strategically important. Without electricity, for example, it would be extremely difficult for Ukraine to continue the war.
If we broaden our view from Wuhledar a little: How threatening does it look for other sectors of the front?
A second cauldron is already on the horizon, west of Nevelske. After the capture of Ukrainsk, the Russians continued to advance, including in the south of the city. There is a small lake there, and the Russians are currently fighting their way along a railway line towards this lake, Vovcha. Only two or three kilometers separate the Russian army from this lake, and if they manage to take control of the railway line to the lake, then a larger Ukrainian force will be trapped there. If Kiev’s army fails to withdraw its soldiers in time, then it will be an even greater challenge than was the case with Wuhledar. There is still a kind of stalemate on the sectors of the front near Kharkiv and Kursk.
Reports are circulating predicting an attack on the city of Zaporizhia. The nuclear power plant there has been occupied by Russians for a long time, but the city has not yet been occupied. Do you see this danger?
Over the last few months, Russian troops have gradually retaken territory that Ukraine recaptured in the summer offensive. Ukrainian networks now see possible preparations for an attack on the city of Zaporizhia, that’s true. But it’s not that far yet. I think this is comparable to the situation in the spring northwest of Kiev. Ukrainian sources reported several times that an attack was being prepared in the Sumy area and that forces would therefore have to be relocated there. The Russians did not attack Sumy. But the Ukrainians’ attack on Kursk.
So the Ukrainians spread these reports in order to be able to relocate troops to the region without it being noticed and without people asking themselves: What do they want there?
That’s exactly how it was assessed in retrospect. The Ukrainians have justified the transfer of troops to the region with Russian preparatory measures for an offensive. In fact, they provided the troops there for the attack on Russian territory, on Kursk. This does not necessarily mean that we have a similar situation in Zaporizhia. But it is advisable to consider such reports in context.
Frauke Niemeyer spoke to Markus Reisner