Reisner’s view of the front: “Russia determines where Ukraine has to deploy forces”

Instead of the Ukrainians in the south of the country achieving the hoped-for breakthrough at the front, the Russians in the northeast are now going on the offensive. Military expert Colonel Markus Reisner explains to ntv.de why Kiev’s troops could not prevent this and what it means.

The two Ukrainian advances north of Mariupol and north of Melitopol have apparently almost come to a standstill. The troops can currently no longer gain any terrain near Bakhmut. Does the current news from the front rightly make you pessimistic?

If you then add to that the fact that the Russians recently managed a counterattack in the south, near Werbuoye, in which they were able to take back localized territory from the Ukrainians, then we actually have reason to be concerned. We are also now seeing the first images of the beginning of rain, which means: the Rasputiza, the mud season, is just around the corner. Soon it will make it impossible to move larger groups. At the same time, at a tactical operational level, i.e. in individual sections of the front, we see the Russians attempting to go on the offensive themselves.

Where does this happen?

There is very intense fighting in the area between Kupyansk and Svatowe and also south of there around the city of Avdiivka. Here the Russians are trying to encircle the city in a pincer movement. Avdiivka is also called “The Gate to Donetsk” because it has been expanded into a kind of fortress since 2014, with minefields and anti-tank barriers. The Russians try to take possession of this city, but suffer very heavy losses in the process.

In the summer, Western supporters repeatedly said that Ukraine should pool its forces in the central area for the advance. The Ukrainians did not do this, pointing out that they need reserves in case the Russians attack in the northeast. Is this exactly what is happening now?

That’s what Ukraine meant at the time, these current advances at Svatowe and Adiivka. She is now trying to fight back, and so far she has been successful. However, the Russians have managed to gather significant forces in recent months. Their losses show how large the units must be to include at least several regiments. These formations are now on the offensive and are trying to advance meter by meter.

Apart from these developments on the battlefield: Do you also see changes at a strategic, i.e. higher level, level?

For almost three weeks now, the Russians have been increasingly attacking infrastructure and using capabilities that they did not have in the past.

For example?

They are now in a position to specifically reconnaissance and attack the fighter jets, which are particularly valuable to Ukraine. There are now at least three videos circulating here that show how the Russians recognize these aircraft, MiG29 and SU25, and fight them with kamikaze drones. We are again seeing the approach of cruise missiles and Iranian drones with the aim of attacking industrial facilities and critical infrastructure.

Ukraine had succeeded in increasingly pushing back the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Many cruise missiles had previously been launched from the ships. Is Ukraine’s success now having a noticeable impact on Russia’s air attack capabilities?

The Russians had to act and withdrew some of their ships from the Crimean port of Sevastopol. But unfortunately they can still launch their heavy bombers from Russia and then fire cruise missiles from Belarusian airspace. And they have even more ships from the Black Sea Fleet, which are also capable of firing cruise missiles at Ukraine. So far, the Russian air offensive has not been able to stop this; it is continuing.

You just mentioned the Russian ground offensives in the east, in Donetsk Oblast, such as the attempt to encircle Avdiivka. Offensives cost a troop a lot of energy; you have to be superior to the defender. Does Ukraine benefit from the fact that the Russians in the center of the country lack these forces and the soldiers who die in battle there to defend themselves?

The devastating thing about the situation is that Russia obviously has enough forces for these offensives in the East. Many had hoped that Ukraine’s offensive in the central area would lead to the Russians using their last reserves in defense there. They actually moved mainly airborne units into the central area, but these were apparently enough to maintain the defense. Ukraine has not yet achieved a breakthrough, and the Russians were even able to provide additional forces for the offensive in Donetsk.

Could this offensive have been prevented somehow?

For example, if Ukraine had had long-range surface-to-surface missiles, such as the American Atacms, which are a recurring topic, then the Russian staging areas could have been targeted in depth before the offensive even started. But the Ukrainian troops couldn’t do that because these long-range missiles have not yet been delivered.

So instead of being able to thwart the attack in advance, the Ukrainians had to stand by until the Russian troops were ready?

Exactly. Now they have to fend off the offensive and they are successful at that. The problem, however, is that Ukraine is then forced to repeatedly deploy new forces to defend itself against these Russian attacks. And these forces are missing when it comes to combining forces to carry out a central push. A member of the Ukrainian parliament’s defense committee recently expressed doubts that the troops would be able to reach the Sea of ​​Azov by the end of the year. Only then would it be possible to divide the Russian-occupied territory and interrupt supply routes.

It sounds as if the fact that Russia has more soldiers, more equipment and more combat power than Ukraine is still an important factor in all technological developments. Is that so?

Despite all the developments in military technology, the principle of mass still exists. If forces can be deployed in a massed manner, then a breakthrough through enemy lines can usually be achieved, for example. However, Ukraine has the following problem: it keeps receiving deliveries of weapons, but never enough to be able to use them on a mass scale. That is the dilemma.

And the consequences of that?

In the meantime, the Ukrainian offensive forces in particular, these twelve brigades in total, nine of which the West had equipped, have been significantly depleted. Now the West would have to decide to deliver again so that Ukraine can actually go on the offensive in the spring. Because to do this it needs new battle tanks, more infantry fighting vehicles and new artillery systems. This would now have to be delivered over the winter so that the Ukrainian armed forces can regain the initiative. Otherwise it may pass to the Russian side. This is what we are seeing right now: Russia is suddenly determining through its attacks where Ukraine has to deploy its forces. The Ukrainians are forced to react. But it should be exactly the other way around. Ukraine should be able to determine where the Russians must respond. To turn this around again, additional Western weapons are essential.

Frauke Niemeyer spoke to Markus Reisner