It’s too early to tell whether the Ukrainian offensive will be successful, says Colonel Markus Reisner — that was also shown by the example of a Russian advance near Wuhledar in January. It is also not uncommon for losses to occur in an offensive. “What is unusual, however, is that these casualties already occur in the combat outpost line; the heavy casualties usually only take place in the first line of defense.” The colonel fears “that by the time of the NATO summit in Vilnius, Ukraine would want to demonstrate successes in order to convince the NATO countries that the next steps are now necessary”.
ntv.de: Is there one offensive or are there several? And is a main direction already recognizable?
Every Monday, Colonel Markus Reisner answers questions about the current situation in Ukraine on ntv.de. He is a military historian, head of the research and development department at the Theresian Military Academy in Vienna and commander of the Austrian Guards Battalion. He has analyzed the war in Ukraine since the beginning of the Russian invasion.
(Photo: private)
Markus Reisner: In the last few days since June 4, we have seen advances in several places – one reason is certainly that the Ukrainian armed forces wanted to try to cover up where the emphasis of their offensive is for as long as possible. Unfortunately, these advances have already shown that the Ukrainians suffered heavy losses there. From the pictures circulating on social networks, one can see that special equipment, which is of great importance when it comes to smashing Russian defenses, failed. That’s pretty sobering.
Where are the advances taking place?
We can roughly divide the occupied territories into three areas: the south, i.e. Cherson up to the bend in the Dnipro near Zaporizhia. Then the central area between Melitopol and Mariupol. And finally the north-east region with Donetsk and Luhansk up to Kupyansk. From today’s perspective, several directions can be identified. One is the Ukrainian advances near Bakhmut in the north-east. Centrally, there are advances north of Mariupol – here one tries to advance in three places at the same time. In the last 48 hours, the Ukrainians have had minor successes north of Mariupol, advancing four or five kilometers and capturing three towns. But they still haven’t reached the Russians’ first main line of defense.
And the third thrust?
It is also located in the western central area, north of Melitopol, in the area north of Tokmak. That’s the area that can be expected to potentially be the heavyweight space.
Why?
Because you can clearly see in this area that special equipment has been lost – equipment that allows you to conclude that the central strike is taking place here. Here we also see the powerful Leopard main battle tanks and Bradley armored personnel carriers in action.
What about the Kherson region?
The southern area cannot be used by either side for the time being because the dam was blown up. This has the advantage for the Russians that they can withdraw reserves from this area, which they then use to ward off Ukrainian attacks in the area north of Melitopol and Tokmak.
Russia has reported the destruction of up to seven Leopard main battle tanks and over ten Bradley infantry fighting vehicles. Is that believable?
The numbers are probably even higher, and on top of that there is the special mine clearance equipment. What we have in terms of analytical material at the moment are pictures from the Russian side, because Ukraine is currently silent. But the quality of the images makes it clear that this device was either destroyed or lost. North of Tokmak, near Orikhiv, there were two minesweeping raids on two different days: once at Mala Tokmachka southwest of Orikhiv, and again immediately south of Orikhiv. At least three of the six armored mine clearance vehicles Ukraine received from Finland have been destroyed. In addition, there are probably two German armored recovery vehicles of the Büffel or Wisent type. Here Ukraine has apparently tried repeatedly, with the support of Leopard main battle tanks, to carve an avenue through the Russian minefields. Around seven Leopards were destroyed in the process, with even more of the Bradleys according to CNN 16 of the 109 infantry fighting vehicles sent to Ukraine. So the Ukrainians have already suffered quite heavy losses in the first few kilometers.
What kind of weapons does Ukraine particularly need right now?
What we are seeing here is a D-Day without an air force, and that is precisely the problem. Breaking through a defensive position requires a high level of synchronization and preparation. If Ukraine does not manage to gain air supremacy in some way during its offensive, even if it is through air defense systems that are on board, so that the Russian air force cannot be deployed here, then it will be difficult. Ukraine has carried out one or two spectacular attacks, for example with long-range Storm Shadow missiles fired in depth from Su-24M bombers, behind Russian defenses. In doing so, they are attempting to attack logistics hubs and command posts in a very targeted manner. But what’s missing is immediate on-the-spot air support, firing at the enemy while the demining squads break through.
Another point: Ukraine’s short- and medium-range anti-aircraft defenses apparently did not produce the effect that was actually needed, partly because the Russians used electronic jammers. As a result, the Russians were able to shoot down one vehicle after the other with attack helicopters from a distance of up to eight kilometers. And third is the artillery, where there seems to be a shortage of available ammunition, including smoke grenades that could have been used to camouflage a breach site.
It’s probably too early to tell who will emerge victorious from this Ukraine offensive, right?
Yes. I would like to remind you of January when the Russians tried to advance near Wuhledar. There the 155th naval brigade of the Russian army ran into Ukrainian minefields. Many observers said at the time that it was a disaster for the Russians. But when you go attacking, that’s to be expected. The attacker always faces the dilemma of needing a superiority of one to three – one to four when the opponent is dug in, even one to eight in urban terrain. Losses are not uncommon. What is unusual, however, is that these losses already occur in the combat outpost line; the heavy losses usually only take place in the first line of defense. In the central area, Ukraine deployed at least four of its twelve offensive brigades, which also suffered significant casualties. Four out of twelve brigades, that’s a third of the available offensive forces, so there’s still some material left. The question now is: is Ukraine trying to advance again in the same place? Or were they diversionary attacks?
What do you think?
One argument against the thesis of the diversionary attacks is that Ukraine used the best equipment it has, the Leopard or Bradley, for example, and the very expensive mine clearance equipment. From a military point of view, that would not be wise for diversionary attacks. The device, which Ukraine has already used up, should not have been used until its more subordinate forces have already punched gaps in the battle outposts.
On the one hand, we now have to wait and see what the next few days and weeks will bring. The offensive began almost ten days ago, the intensive phase staggered in several places from June 4th. But on the other hand, one has to say that the offensive brought soberingly little. The military situation in Ukraine is currently extremely precarious. I am afraid that by the time of the NATO summit in Vilnius, Ukraine would want to show some achievements to convince NATO countries that the next steps are needed now.
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu wants to integrate private military companies into the Russian army by July 1. What do you think of this initiative – and what will happen if Yevgeny Prigozhin doesn’t go along with it?
I’m not convinced that what we see and hear here always corresponds to reality. It may well be that the public dispute between Prigozhin and the army surrounding the fighting in Bakhmut was a huge deception, a classic maskirovya – a masquerade in the tradition of the Soviet army, intended to disguise the fact that the defensive positions were already in the works to expand massively. Because Prigozhin kept saying things that turned out to be wrong. During the fighting in Bakhmut, for example, he said his troops did not have enough ammunition and weapons. In fact, he has always been given the best weapon systems, such as this devastating TOS-1 multiple rocket launcher. And fundamentally, one has to see in this dispute that Prigozhin’s criticism is never aimed at Putin, only at Shoigu or the Russian chief of staff, Valeri Gerasimov. This has been the case in Russia for centuries: the tsar makes sure that the boyars fight among themselves so that they don’t ally themselves against him.
Hubertus Volmer spoke to Markus Reisner