Reisner’s view of the front: “We see that Russia can be stopped”

The West has loosened a few shackles: for two weeks now, the Ukrainians have been allowed to target Russia with Western weapons, albeit only near the border. Colonel Reisner analyzes the effects of this decision on the front in the north for ntv.de. They are already more obvious than anyone would have expected.

ntv.de: For about two weeks now, Ukrainian troops have been allowed to use Western weapons against targets in Russia. Is this having an impact now?

Markus Reisner: Both sides distribute dozens of videos every day of their operations at the front. Much of the material available shows how Ukraine is trying to put pressure on the front Russian troops on the attack. Exactly where the Russian logistics are located. This requires Russia to get its logistics lines in order. If pressure is successfully put on logistics and supply lines, the Russian army’s deliveries to the front automatically decrease, and less material is available there.

That should have an impact on the front lines pretty soon, right?

We are already seeing this. Where Ukraine has been able to carry out such attacks or is still doing so, it has at least been able to regain the initiative in certain areas.

Does that mean that they are again the acting side and the Russians are reacting?

This was achieved, for example, at Lipzy, north of Kharkiv. The Ukrainians carried out a counterattack there. The Russians were unable to counter this because they lacked resources. They were unable to take further control of the area and have even been pushed back over the past 14 days. The question is: how long can the supplies be held back? Will the Russians manage to reorganize themselves over the next few days and weeks and push resources forward again?

And you can observe this effect several times at the front?

East of Lipzy, near Vovchansk, we see a similar situation: a Russian attack has now been followed by a Ukrainian counterattack. The situation is currently unclear, as the war is also raging in the information space. The Russians claim that they have encircled the Ukrainians, the Ukrainians claim that the Russians are surrounded. The truth is difficult to determine at the moment. Images we have show that there is at least heavy fighting and that Russian troops have advanced further, but may be under strong pressure from the Ukrainian side. Here, too, Ukrainian troops have attacked Russian supply lines. They also used Western weapons systems. A video recently came from the Vovchansk region in particular, showing the use of GBU-39 precision bombs. This is a Western air-to-ground weapon that can be compared to the Russian glide bombs.

Are these just isolated successes? Or does this indicate a major change in the situation?

The front has stabilized. The Russian advance near Sumy is also very limited and has not gained any ground. The Ukrainian troops have managed to slow down and halt the Russian offensive near Kharkiv. It is therefore quite possible that the attacks with ATACMS and HIMARS missiles have had such a great effect that the planned Russian offensive has not yet taken place.

That means?

We see that Russia can be stopped. If the West has the will to really get involved, then it is possible. The tragedy is that the situation always has to escalate before Ukraine’s supporters realise: the situation is bad, we have to do something! Then they do something, are reassured afterwards, but do not understand that the success needs to be nurtured. If we want Ukraine’s success of the last two weeks to be sustainable, then the aid must not stop again.

Is it enough to maintain the current level?

From a military perspective, massive attacks with different weapon systems would have to be carried out in quick succession. This would oversaturate the Russian defenses, and this is necessary to achieve lasting success. To do this, Ukraine needs a large number of high-quality weapons. What it does not have available must be supplied.

How important is the right timing here?

Very crucial. It is not enough if this massive support is only provided when the situation for Ukraine becomes extremely critical. Above all, Ukraine should receive these weapons when the situation appears to be favorable for it. As we are currently experiencing in the Kharkiv area, due to the permission to use Western weapons against targets in Russia.

What is the situation in Donbass? The front there is not close to the border with Russia, but in the middle of Ukraine. To attack Russian territory, the Ukrainians would have to use more extensive weapons.

In Donbass, I have not yet seen such positive effects as in the north, where the Russians continue to advance between 200 and 500 meters every day. It is this miserable fight from one windbreak, i.e. one row of bushes, to the next. But here we see: the pressure of the Russian attackers on the Ukrainian defense forces is still great and the advance is ongoing. Above all, near Ocheretyne, the Russian bridgehead in Ukraine’s second defense line has steadily expanded over the last month.

What happens if the Russians break through here?

If there is a significant breakthrough, Ukraine’s supply lines will be in danger. A very important supply route runs just a few kilometers northwest of there. If the Russians can take control of this line, it will effectively lead to a disruption of Ukrainian supplies and all supplies. That is why both sides are fighting there with great vehemence. The situation is also coming to a head at Chasiv Yar. There the Russians are trying with all their might to get across the Donbass canal. So unlike in the Kharkiv area, the Russians can still advance along various sections of the front in the Donbass.

Aren’t the Ukrainians in Donbass trying to attack logistics across the Russian border?

We are not getting any material showing Russian troops in the Donbass under massive pressure. For example, images of exploding ammunition depots, images of destroyed Russian command posts, of burning loading stations. Rostov-on-Don, Voronezh, Kursk – these are central distribution and transshipment points from which the Russians transport their resources to the front. We are not seeing any attacks there. Unlike in the summer of 2022, when this almost “famous” HIMARS effect occurred and successful attacks on Russian supply routes and depots were widely documented.

This still isn’t happening in this number?

There are drone attacks on infrastructure in Russia, but the Ukrainians only report them when they are successful. And there aren’t many of them. Successful drone attacks – when an ammunition depot explodes, for example, or a refinery – do happen every now and then, but we don’t know whether they have a lasting effect and weaken supplies to the front. We can’t look behind the scenes. If Russian offensives were to decrease, that would be a measurable result of such attacks on infrastructure. We can see that in the Kharkiv area, but not in the Donbass. We’ll have to wait and see.

Are there other targets on which the Ukrainian side is concentrating its attacks?

The Ukrainians often use ATACMS and HIMARS missiles against anti-aircraft positions, against Russian S300 and S400 systems. In this way, Kiev is trying to create the framework for future deployments of the western F-16 fighter jets. The fewer air defense systems Russia has at its disposal, the greater the chance that the now extensively trained Ukrainian pilots will survive their deployment. The same goal is being pursued with attacks on air bases in Russia. If they succeed in destroying fighter planes there, they will no longer be available in air combat against Ukrainian jets. It seems to me that Ukraine has made the decision to use its precious resources of these precision weapons in a major way.

Frauke Niemeyer spoke with Markus Reisner