Retired Lieutenant General on the situation: stalemate or not stalemate – time is ticking for Ukraine

Retired Lieutenant General on the situation
Stalemate or not stalemate – time is ticking for Ukraine

A guest contribution by Kersten Lahl
08/20/2023 10:54 am

Ukraine can show some successes in the current offensive, but the big breakthrough has not materialized so far. In a guest article, former NATO officer and security expert Kersten Lahl analyzes the situation and explains why there is no sign of peace in the near future.

Russia’s war of aggression against its neighbor Ukraine has now lasted around a year and a half. Hardly anyone can dare to make a reasonably reliable prognosis as to when and with what result this tragedy can end. The only thing that is certain at the moment is that the fronts have hardened both in diplomacy and on the battlefield. While initially it was all about Ukraine’s sheer survival as a state or as a surviving state, the current focus is more on the question of how much of its own territory it is capable of reconquering. There is now almost no talk of a broad-based defeat or even capitulation.

Apparently, the goals of the two warring parties have evolved accordingly – remarkably in opposite directions. Admittedly, one can only speculate here. But the Russian leadership seems to be content at the moment – or rather: for the time being – with securing what it has achieved in violation of international law, but has actually achieved since 2014: the occupation and annexation of Crimea and the four Ukrainian oblasts in the east and south of the country, large parts of which are admittedly not yet under their own control. This can certainly be seen as a forced withdrawal of Russian ambitions, at least in the short term.

The Ukraine, on the other hand, sees the chance of a strategic counter-offensive, and with significantly higher chances of success than a year ago. She sees a real possibility of chasing the Russian invaders out of their entire territory – including Crimea. This is indisputably the right of the defense attorney and, although it seems extremely difficult and involves sacrifices, it is by no means unreasonable given the extensive military aid from the West. In any case, it cannot be expected to be content with anything less than a full restoration of its territorial integrity and sovereignty. And there is no reason not to accept it.

Time is ticking for Ukraine

Therefore, the eyes are currently on the military counter-offensive of the Ukrainian armed forces, which has been expected since the spring. Everyone asks themselves: has it already started and has it almost failed right at the beginning? Or is it still imminent because, according to the Ukrainian assessment of the situation, the sufficient prerequisites in terms of forces, space and time have not yet been created? From the outside, this can hardly be judged seriously. But two theses can be dared with caution:

Thesis 1: Time is ticking for Ukraine. It is true that the defender is faced with an enormous problem due to his overall lower human resources, provided that the fights continue to result in losses as before. But on the other hand, the fighting power of the troops is increasing every day thanks to the – initially very hesitant but nevertheless continuous – western support. New capabilities are being made available step by step, mission-critical material is being added and the logistical situation is improving, as is the level of weapon training. All in all, the options for help from outside are enormous and far from being exhausted, as long as the political will of the West remains unbroken. On the Russian side, on the other hand, in addition to the well-known problems of logistics, troop leadership and the overstretched front, one aspect is significant: Russia is to be understood on its fringes as a kind of colonial power, with the constant risk of further crumbling or even disintegration. This ties up enormous forces across the huge country that are missing against Ukraine.

Thesis 2: The war will be decided militarily as soon as the currently rigid fronts dissolve. The Russian troops have meticulously built up defensive positions in the space they occupied, which were difficult to break through. A kind of trench warfare – roughly analogous to the First World War – is currently shaping the military picture. However, if the Ukraine succeeds in forcing an operational breakthrough with at least brigade-strong forces, the situation will change radically. On the ground – if the threat from the air can be successfully countered – their troops are superior in mobile combat. At the same time, however, there is the operational risk of being countered in the transition to a large-scale war of movement. This means that Ukraine will only fully exploit its offensive possibilities if it considers the chances of success to be correspondingly high. When such a culmination point is reached, the future of the entire country is at stake. And there probably won’t be a second chance.

There is almost nothing that speaks for a negotiated solution

Following this rough assessment of the military situation, options and obstacles for diplomatic efforts can also be derived from it. For a “major negotiated solution” is currently as good as nothing. The suggestion of a “balance of interests” is a fiction. Neither warring faction will deviate from their respective goals. The Russian side doesn’t want it, the Ukrainian side can’t. Both are clinging to a vague chance that the military situation could develop in their favor in the foreseeable future: Moscow is hoping that the West will become war-weary and thus end military aid. Ukraine is relying on the counteroffensive mentioned above and rightly fears that a ceasefire and “freezing the war” will ultimately only serve the Russian side, which could continue the war in its favor at any time after an urgently needed refreshment of forces. The drama would not end there, but would at best only be interrupted, without even the remotest possible realistic solution being recognizable through diplomatic channels. This is understandably unacceptable, at least for Ukraine.

The alternative to this approach is: the necessary prerequisites for a viable and lasting negotiated solution must necessarily be created through military facts. This is reminiscent of Clausewitz and his thesis that war is the continuation of politics by other means. In essence, this means: A serious opportunity for diplomacy only arises when the costs of a further military conflict threaten to be significantly higher for both sides than the foreseeable or at least hoped-for benefits.

For Kiev, this threshold is very high, as long as it doesn’t want to question its own existence. The Kremlin, on the other hand, could find it easier to calculate accordingly, because after all, if its troops withdrew, the war would end abruptly and without any territorial loss relevant to international law. And this is exactly where the quite responsible expectations of the West and overwhelmingly large parts of the global community lie, which are anything but like “senseless slogans to persevere”. (What that would then mean domestically in Russia is, of course, speculative. It’s well beyond outside influence, but it’s also a factor to consider with an uncertain outcome.)

Putin does not have escalation dominance

At this point it is necessary to take a brief look at three other risks that are repeatedly mentioned in the German debate:

Some commentators continue to see an “escalation dominance” with Putin. They assume that the Russian side can increase the stakes at will in order to achieve its own goals, which in turn makes resistance seem futile or far too sacrificial. They therefore demand the immediate renunciation of Western military support for the Ukrainian defender. Well, here it can be countered that since the beginning of the war such an escalation dominance has not been detectable, at least on the battlefield, even in phases in which the Russian side has come under severe military pressure. The opposite is the case, as Western arms shipments and the course of military operations show. However, it is true that the Russian leadership does not shy away from resorting to war crimes of terror from the air against Ukrainian cities and the civilian population.

At the same time, the risk of an impending war participation by NATO and a kind of slippery slope is conjured up just as persistently. So far this has also been irrelevant. On the contrary, all Western measures are meticulously designed to avoid being labeled as a “war party”. And secondly, such theses completely misjudge the decision-making bases and realities within the alliance. It is true that the West has long struggled – and still struggles – to supply certain weapons. But that is exactly what shows the prudence on the one hand and the open scope for action on the other.

Finally, there is the specter of “nuclear war” in the room. Of course, no one can rule that out, and it can in no way be argued away. But at the same time, such a scenario is not only highly unlikely, but paradoxically, the more willing it is to give in to such threats, the more relevant it becomes. After all, where would that end in a world where nuclear weapons are unfortunately all too common? Honest pacifism doesn’t help here. Therefore, the US signals are effective on this issue: If Putin decides to use nuclear weapons in this war, the answer (which one remains deliberately open) will be unbearable, especially for Russia.

As a result, it can be assumed that the bloody hostilities on Ukrainian soil and also the terror from the air against the Ukrainian population will continue indefinitely. This is very bad news. Unfortunately, there is currently no better one.

This article first appeared in the magazine “Certainly Controversial” the Society for Security Policy.