Risky proxy war between Europe and Russia

Within a few days, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has rendered a number of supposedly untouchable conventions in Europe obsolete. The EU not only imposed unprecedented sanctions packages on Moscow, but also decided to provide Ukraine with military aid worth 500 million euros.

The countries supplying military goods such as shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles, anti-tank weapons and assault rifles to Ukraine include NATO members as well as neutral states such as Finland and Sweden. And even Germany is making an exception to its longstanding policy of banning the transfer of arms to war zones. Many donor countries have now announced further arms deliveries.

Alternative to direct confrontation

Thanks in no small part to this military aid, the Ukrainian armed forces have managed to stall the Russian advance on several fronts. Horrifying images of dead civilians following the Russian withdrawal in the north will further fuel calls for even more robust support, including intervention.

It should be borne in mind that the delivery of arms already represents an indirect participation in the war. In other words, Europe is in the midst of a proxy war with Russia. One speaks of proxy wars when third parties try to indirectly influence the course or outcome of an armed conflict in accordance with their own strategic goals.

To this end, they support selected conflict parties through training, financing or the provision of war material. In some cases, such measures are supplemented by the exchange of intelligence or the coordination and operational planning by their own special forces, which can also request air or artillery support.

Crucially, the brunt of actual combat operations, and especially ground warfare, is borne by local allies. During the Cold War, waging proxy wars was a popular alternative to direct confrontation, which the superpowers shied away from due to the potential for nuclear escalation. However, it is also indispensable in current theaters of war, as a look at hotspots such as Syria, Yemen or Nagorno-Karabakh shows.

The basic logic of proxy wars has changed only marginally over the past few decades. The assumption that this is a cheap option compared to conventional military interventions remains central. According to proponents, they reduce the risk of an escalation, since the exertion of influence often takes place covertly and can be publicly denied.

At the same time, the intention to keep the conflict limited is signaled to the opponent. Proxy wars also allow, under certain circumstances, parliamentary hurdles to be bypassed for military intervention and reduce the likelihood of being punished at the ballot box by a war-weary electorate. The risk of international sanctions or even criminal prosecution is also lower for external third parties than for those directly involved in the war.

costs and risks

However, there are also risks and dangers of proxy wars to consider. In this way, the desired escalation control can quickly turn into its opposite. American involvement in the Vietnam War, which originally began as a limited training mission, is an example. External support also often lengthens the duration of wars, increasing both the death toll and the likelihood that conflict will flare up again in the future. In addition, the prospect of external support can tempt a warring party to take particularly risky action; a phenomenon known as “moral hazard”.

All of these aspects must also be taken into account in the current support for Ukraine, which is by no means limited to the delivery of military equipment. It is known, for example, that the Ukrainian armed forces benefit from NATO reconnaissance data, which enable them to get a picture of the situation in so-called near real-time.

Reports from the “New York Times” also suggest that Ukraine is also receiving at least limited help in cyberspace. In view of the “foreign fighters” problem over the past decade, the European position on war volunteers is also remarkable. While many governments (but not Switzerland) quietly tolerate travel to Ukraine, some actually encourage their own populations to do so. British Foreign Minister Liz Truss, for example, stated that she expressly supported British citizens taking part in the conflict.

Europe’s balance of goods

Europe must adapt to a number of challenges that have already shaped the wars of the recent past. It remains unclear how arms deliveries can be prevented from falling into the wrong hands, or who is ultimately responsible if European citizens commit violations of international law in Ukraine.

It is not yet possible to assess the extent to which Europe should continue to support Ukraine in the future. It is unclear whether the current level of military aid will be sufficient to enable the Ukrainians to resist in the longer term. Of particular explosive importance is the question of Europe’s willingness to support insurgents should the Ukrainian government eventually fall.

While an increase in military aid should strengthen Ukraine’s position both on the battlefield and at the negotiating table, it increases the risk of Russian retaliation. In addition to direct military strikes, Moscow could also consider acts of sabotage by covert actors. In addition, it cannot be ruled out that Russia will take revenge for Western “interference” at a later point in time, whether through attempts to destabilize Southeast Europe or through targeted support for armed groups in areas of European interest in Africa or the Middle East.

Not only the Russian invasion, but also Western military aid to Ukraine mark a turning point for European security and defense policy. Europe must have no illusions that it is engaged in a potentially protracted proxy confrontation with Russia. It is necessary to carefully weigh up the costs, the benefits and the risks of doing the same – the top priority must be the prevention of a major conflagration.

Michel Wyss researches at the Lectureship in Strategic Studies at the Military Academy at ETH Zurich. This post is an edited version of an article that appeared in March on Lawfare, an American national security blog.