Russia and USA: Lavrov demands written answers

“We are very patient, but now our patience is at the end.” Sergei Lavrov has been Russia’s foreign minister for almost 18 years. The almost 72-year-old chain smoker has probably never harbored any illusions about the course of the world and Russia’s role in it. But bitterness at the West’s behavior now knows no bounds. The traditional press conference at the beginning of the year was this time mixed with a special portion of it.

Only the NATO expansion counts

For a week, Russian delegations met with representatives of the USA, NATO and the member states of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to discuss Russian proposals for Europe’s security order. It was Lavrov’s job to pull the strings together and explain why Russia is not happy with the result – and what might follow when patience runs out.

The day before, Lavrov’s deputy Sergei Ryabkov, Russia’s chief negotiator at talks with the US earlier in the week in Geneva, caused a price drop on the Moscow stock exchange saying he saw no point in continuing negotiations anytime soon. Without going into detail, Lavrov relativized this verdict, which can also be seen as an attempt at pressure. Written answers to the draft treaties on security guarantees presented to the USA and NATO are now decisive. Based on the objections, counter-proposals or approvals, Moscow decides how to proceed.

According to Lavrov, in the end there can only be a package solution. Russia will measure everything by whether the United States responds positively to the Kremlin on the crucial points: the end of NATO expansion to the east, the withdrawal of NATO units from East Central European member states, and the refraining from stationing offensive weapons in the vicinity the Russian borders. All of this must be legally binding; neither political nor verbal assurances should be trusted.

The fact that the interlocutors are open to disarmament issues, the ban on short- and medium-range missiles in Europe and the restriction of maneuvers and overflights near the border is of course to be welcomed. But these are old Russian demands that have always been rejected in the past. Now, for Moscow, they are only of secondary importance compared to the question of NATO expansion. They alone were not enough to satisfy Russia. Lavrov defended the approach of essentially conducting the negotiations with Washington by saying that NATO was only a vehicle for the United States to secure its influence on Europe. America is showing enough that it has no regard for its allies.

Hacker attack on Ukraine

Russia suddenly upholds the value of the OSCE and the foundations negotiated there. The key document for Moscow’s understanding of Europe’s security policy is the Security Charter adopted at the 1999 Istanbul OSCE Summit. NATO also refers to them when it insists on the freedom of alliance for the European states. Lavrov does not hide this, but points to two other points contained therein: that there should be no security of one state at the expense of the security of others and that no bloc of states should claim supremacy. It is about indivisible security on the European continent.

However, Russia is convinced that the eastward expansion of NATO and military cooperation with post-Soviet states and the establishment of bases there are clearly at the expense of Russia’s security. Because the West has continued to do so and is crossing a red line with Ukraine, patience is now over. In doing so, he justified the sudden and inexplicable urgency with which Moscow has been making these demands since late autumn.

Lavrov described Western accusations that Russia was concentrating more and more military units on its western border as absurd. This is happening on Russian territory. Russia is acting as if it has a completely clean slate itself – towards the East Central European states that feel threatened, as well as towards the European Union, which Lavrov accused of unreliability and a unilateral severance of relations. If he himself took the OSCE Security Charter seriously, he would have to come to the conclusion that Russia’s troop deployment along the border with Ukraine and with NATO members in north-east and south-east Europe poses a threat to them.

A look at the websites of numerous ministries, including the foreign, energy and disaster protection ministries, showed how real the threat to Ukraine is on Friday morning. These had been paralyzed by a hacker attack. Instead, there was a text written in Ukrainian, Russian and Polish with a threatening undertone. The government in Kiev blamed Russia for this. Cyber ​​attacks on critical Ukrainian infrastructure could be part of an attack on the country.

Putin’s decision

When asked what would happen if the written responses from the US and NATO were unsatisfactory, Lavrov was unable to give a clear answer. “Military-technical” responses such as the transfer of offensive weapons, possibly also to the territory of allies such as Cuba or Venezuela, are just as conceivable as provoking an escalation in Donbass or an attack on Ukraine. Putin will seek military advice and then make a decision, Lavrov said.

It seems as if the diplomats themselves are poking around in the dark. The State Department has the expertise to conduct such talks, but has not traditionally had much power or particular influence. This is especially true of the negotiators. With his order in November to wring binding security guarantees from the United States and NATO, Putin set in motion a bureaucratic process that Lavrov, Ryabkov and their ilk are now carrying out. After all, the negotiators have not slammed doors.

But the decision on war and peace is made in the Kremlin – by a president who only listens to the advice of a very narrow circle. The strategy expert Fyodor Lukyanov pointed out that such fundamental changes in the European order as Moscow is demanding never happened without wars – hot or cold. A lot probably depends on whether Putin feels the price of waiting is higher than that of an early reaction.