Saying “enemy” has advantages

The Federal Republic is faced with a Russian ruler who is striving for a world order of great empires and spheres of influence. Why is the question of the classification of the Russian Federation still so difficult?

Russian President Putin on April 22, 2022.

Mikhail Klimentyev / Sputnik / Reuters

Germany is struggling with a clear position on autocracies. For some because of the central geographic location, for others because of the logic of a trading power, for still others because of the German experience after 1945. Material interests are often suppressed as the driving force behind one’s own policies and all too often this is combined opportunistically with criticism of the United States .

The Federal Republic faces a Russian ruler who not only acted consistently when he consistently withdrew the registration of the German party-affiliated foundations. Moscow sees a systemic contradiction with a democratic West, which threatens a traditionalist, autocratic Russia that will last forever. It wants a world order of great empires and spheres of influence in which actors such as China, the USA, Russia and Western Europe agree on mutual bans on intervention.

Russia is no longer a partner

This state of affairs raises the painful question of our classification of the Russian Federation. In this regard, the dominant phrases in this regard are that Russia is no longer a partner and that things can no longer be normal with Putin. This is often accompanied by demands that Moscow must stop the war in Ukraine and withdraw.

There is little objection to these assessments. But these are mere denials. There is no clear categorization of an actor who practices an open antagonism towards the West and can basically only fall into the enemy category.

The term enemy is frightening. In some forms, however, it has advantages for dealing with powers such as Russia. First, the Russian Federation could be defined as a “relative” enemy. The enemy here is the adversary in more or less defined geographic or digital spaces, such as in Ukraine or Syria, but not in the settlement of global problems.

On the other hand, classification as a “real” enemy would be a good idea. This would go beyond relative enmity and include a strong political-ideological component that recognizes incompatibilities but does not lie in the annihilation of the opponent.

The “absolute” enmity, in which an actor is located outside of the human community, for example through his classification as a barbarian or beast, with the result that he is dealt with in a relatively irregular or radical manner, should be distinguished from both forms.

Like in the 19th century

The German debate is currently moving between the denial of relative or real enmity with Russia and the tendency towards absolute enmity. The first position is peppered with capitulative and defeatist demands on Ukraine, the last with those for a no-fly zone over Kyiv and a regime change policy towards Moscow.

Both positions can be interpreted as signs of an insular and restless society that thinks neither historically nor contextually. They are an expression of a nation that cannot or does not want to understand when countries act as they did in the 19th century. Values ​​and structures reflect historically evolved power relations.

But the German turning point stands and falls in the head.

Tobias Fella, Political scientist, is a security policy officer at Haus Rissen in Hamburg.

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