Critics assume that a kind of fifth column of Muslim Brotherhood and Wahhabis is at work in local mosques. But such attempts at infiltration have failed, scientists now say.
A Muslim praying in the Langenthal Mosque.
Jews, Christians, Hindus, or Shiites: the Biel Imam Abu Ramadan is said to have wished all of these groups to be destroyed during his sermons, according to the Bern prosecutor’s office. The Libyan “hate preacher” has therefore been prosecuted for racial discrimination. It is figures like this that help shape the image of Muslims in this country.
Around ten percent of Swiss Muslims have roots in the Middle East, the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa. Many critics regard this group as an Islamist fifth column, as puppets who receive millions of francs from the Muslim Brotherhood or the Saudis and in return spread their ideologies.
But the reality is far more complex, a new study shows. Researchers from the Swiss Center for Islam and Society (SZIG) at the University of Friborg have for the first time examined in detail which connections Arab-influenced mosques and organizations maintain with the countries of origin of their exponents. To do this, they examined seven institutions in case studies, three in German-speaking Switzerland and four in French-speaking Switzerland.
Financial aid for the construction of mosques
The Arabic-influenced mosques were among the first to open in Switzerland. One example is the Fondation Culturelle Islamique (FCI) in Geneva, funded by Saudi Arabia. When it opened in 1978, the Saudi king was joined by Federal Councilor Pierre Aubert. That was typical of that early phase of Muslim immigration, as SZIG director Hansjörg Schmid says. “Transnational connections played an important role in the emergence of many Islamic institutions: the Muslims, who had immigrated relatively recently, needed financial and logistical support from Islamic countries to build mosques.” And the Swiss authorities also recognized the transnational networks as representing Muslims, as Aubert’s visit showed.
However, according to Schmid, the influence that the countries of origin exerted on the diaspora gradually decreased. For a good decade now, the second and third generations, who have only weak ties to their ancestors’ home countries, have held key positions in the mosques. “They were socialized in Switzerland, speak a national language and are less receptive to attempts to spread an externally controlled or even fundamentalist variety of Islam.” The next generation sets its own accents, especially in youth and social work as well as in pastoral care, says Schmid.
However, the critical attitude of the media and the population towards the financing of mosques by foreign financiers also contributed to a reorientation: the attacks of September 11, 2001 and at the latest the emergence of the so-called Islamic State made such flows of money highly suspect. “That shook up the Muslim associations, as did the negative headlines about extremist preachers,” says Schmid.
Above all, there are two actors who were and are suspected of wanting to export their ideology to Europe: the Muslim Brotherhood, which originated in Egypt and is now heavily supported by Qatar, and the Saudi Wahhabis. Their most important proselytizing instrument is the Islamic World League, which also owns the FCI in Geneva. Islam critic Saïda Keller-Messahli warns that there is a whole network of radically oriented mosques in Switzerland in which itinerant preachers from the World League work. They have the clear intention of “spreading Salafist ideas in this country”.
The role of the Muslim Brotherhood in Switzerland
However, the Freiburg researchers come to the conclusion that such efforts have largely failed. Contrary to what the Saudis had hoped, the center in Geneva was not able to spread to the whole of Switzerland or at least to French-speaking Switzerland, says Hansjörg Schmid. “The mosque has remained a foreign body.” Since 2017, the center has had an imam who studied in Switzerland and, unlike his Salafist predecessors, is considered relatively moderate. The World League said it was looking for local partners to hand over the mosque to, but so far this has been unsuccessful.
Unlike in France, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood has never become a power factor in Switzerland, emphasizes Schmid. The Ligue des Musulmans de Suisse, founded in 1994 in the canton of Neuchâtel and associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, was never able to redeem its claim, already registered in its pompous name, to represent Swiss Muslims. “It has remained more of a ‘league of a few people of Arabic descent’, and its influence has waned in recent years.” In any case, it is wrong to understand the Muslim Brotherhood as a hierarchical, centrally managed organization. “It’s more of an elusive network with a wide variety of currents.”
Schmid does not deny that there are a few mosques in Switzerland in which a “narrowing and anti-diversity” form of Islam is propagated. And that not all institutions are equally transparent with their funding. But it is obvious that it is not possible for problematic foreign actors to control large groups of Muslims.
“Rather, the cantonal and national umbrella organizations are playing an increasingly important role, including in contact with the authorities.” In these organizations there are the most diverse theological currents. And the dominance of one ethnic group is hardly possible in view of the diversity of Swiss Muslims – in addition to the Arabic speakers there are many Turks, Bosnians or Albanians.
Negative portrayal in the media
The researchers have identified a discrepancy between the multifaceted reality of Islam in Switzerland and the media portrayal, which is often black and white. Once a mosque has acquired a negative image, journalists often reproduce it uncritically for years – even if a lot has improved in the meantime. As an example, the scientists cite the Arrahma Mosque in Basel, which is part of a radical religious movement. The local imam, who is said to have insulted non-Muslims in a sermon in 2010, has now largely withdrawn.
Schmid and his team advise the local mosque associations to create transparency about their financial situation and to react proactively to criticism. That creates trust. In terms of finances, increased domestic collection could be an alternative to support from abroad. Higher revenues would enable better pay for those responsible – and such professionalization would in turn simplify interactions with the authorities or other civil society actors.