Director of research at the CNRS and member of the Center for Research and Documentation on the Americas, Franck Poupeau has worked on water policies and urban inequalities in South America and the United States. Author of Altiplano. Fragments of a Revolution (Bolivia, 1999-2019) (Raisons d’agir, 2021), he also coordinated the posthumous editions of Pierre Bourdieu’s works and collaborates with the Raisons d’agir publishing house.
What was the context of the Cochabamba water war that began in December 1999?
While Bolivia was going through a serious economic crisis, the government implemented policies of privatization of public services in the 1980s in order to respond to the recommendations of the World Bank. A second wave concerned, at the end of the 1990s, urban water management services. After La Paz in 1997, the process concerned Cochabamba in 1999, the third city of the country, located in the heart of the Andes mountain range. The water supply concession was transferred to a consortium led by the Italian company International Water Limited and the American company Bechtel.
What is the trigger for the mobilization?
The change was brutal, in a context of triumphant liberalism. This privatization policy did not in fact provide for any social measures. The outlying working-class neighborhoods were more expensive to equip, which prevented any prospect of profitability. If the threat of a price increase alerted the social forces, it was a decree prohibiting the population from appropriating rainwater that lit the fuse. This traditional practice allowed the poorest families to provide for their domestic or agricultural needs, in a context of already very marked shortages. The measure was the last straw. From December 1999, the entire city was blocked by demonstrations.
Rather than negotiate, the government sent in the army. The repression left one demonstrator dead and dozens injured. It escalated, with scenes of urban warfare between soldiers and residents on the barricades. The local conflict had national and soon international resonance, until victory in April 2000, when the government cancelled the concession contract.
How can we explain the scale of the movement?
The water war in Cochabamba has often been presented as a spontaneous mobilization of local indigenous populations, in a somewhat overly romanticized vision. In reality, it is no coincidence that the movement began in this city, which is at the heart of Bolivian political struggles. This is where the 1952 revolution took place, and where some of the former miners who were laid off emigrated in the 1980s. It is also an under-equipped city affected by recurring water shortages, particularly in the peri-urban and rural areas of the south. The poorer the population, the less access they have to water and the more they pay for it, because it has to be brought in by tanker truck, while the more affluent neighborhoods in the north are equipped with logistics networks. Abandoned by the public authorities, the populations have organized themselves into cooperatives, often very involved in the supply. There are the irrigation committees (rulers), neighborhood committees (local councils) and industrial workers’ unions (factories). The residents themselves maintain the existing network. All these organizations constitute a local political and social breeding ground favorable to mobilizations. It is also the union representative of the factoriesOscar Olivera, who will become one of the leaders of the water war.
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