At best, the EU Commission would be willing to consider a sectoral approach in the negotiations with Switzerland – i.e. to negotiate a kind of Bilateral III. This variant also depends on mutual concessions.
Federal Councilor Ignazio Cassis.
The statement was clear: last January at the Albisgütli conference, Federal Councilor Ignazio Cassis of the SVP, who had contributed to his election in 2019 and could contribute again in 2023, said that “there will be no InstA 2.0”. State Secretary Livia Leu repeated exactly this language rule last week when asked about the “open letter” from the European Commission.
Livia Leu, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs.
The leaking of the EU letter to journalists was perceived by some circles as an attempt to influence public opinion in Switzerland. Still, it’s hard to see how the letter could be manipulative: in ten years, the EU’s position has remained almost unchanged. Instead, the question arises as to the willingness of the Federal Council to develop a negotiation strategy that reconciles Swiss interests with the needs of the EU.
Taking into account the two basic needs of the Union
In principle, two needs of the EU can be identified behind the diplomatic jargon: The first need is equal treatment within the internal market. The same rules must apply to all participants. This basic principle explains the position of the EU in several areas: free movement of workers, trade (state aid) and EU financial equalization (cohesion billion).
The second need is equal treatment in the future. Internal market law is constantly evolving, but bilateral agreements do not always keep pace. This is the case with the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons, where two directives important for the EU have not been adopted by Switzerland, which lies at the heart of the current conflict. That is why the EU wants the bilateral path to become more dynamic with a legal dispute settlement procedure in order to resolve possible future conflicts in a structured manner.
The content of the EU letter confirms that a myriad of variants to InstA 1.0 can be negotiated, depending on which concessions the parties agree on. At that time, InstA 1.0 showed that concessions are possible, even in areas that are important for the EU, provided an equivalent concession is made elsewhere. Nevertheless, the cornerstone of all realistic alternatives remains the same: taking into account the basic needs of Switzerland and the EU.
Welcome to Hotel Europe
The open question is now: Does the statement that there will be no InstA 2.0 contribute to the acceptance of the new start? Even if it seems obvious that any solution will involve some concessions on the free movement of people, dynamic legal adoption and the dispute settlement mechanism? The reset button rhetoric that the head of the EDA used at the time quickly showed its limits.
The EU letter could be a glimmer of hope. The Commission would be willing to consider the sectoral approach – keyword: Bilaterals III – instead of a horizontal agreement. The more the end result would differ cosmetically from InstA 1.0, the easier it would be to defend it politically. At this point, however, it is difficult to see how the “Bilaterals III” wrapper will suffice to depoliticize the fundamental issues of the Swiss-EU relationship. It would probably be more intellectually valuable to delve into these questions rather than resorting to political marketing tricks.
For almost a decade, our European policy has been reminiscent of the line in the Eagles song “Hotel California”: “You can check out any time you like, but you can never leave.” Welcome to Hotel Europe.
Darius Farman is Co-CEO of Foraus, the foreign policy think tank.