After months of diplomatic tension, Vladimir Putin chose to go on the offensive on the Ukrainian file, Monday evening February 21; the Russian president signed the act of recognition of the two separatist republics of Donbass and announced that he was sending his army in support.
This initiative, which puts an end to the diplomatic sequence opened eight years ago by the Minsk agreements, constitutes a major escalation in the confrontation open for several months with the West. If a “immediate massive offensive” does not seem to be on the agenda for the moment, “it is not to be excluded”, notify the correspondent of World in Moscow, Benoît Vitkine, who answered questions from readers of Monde.fr during a chat on Tuesday morning.
Xav Decaen: Is there a risk of a wider invasion of Ukraine following President Putin’s statement last night that Ukraine was just an “artificial construct”?
Judging by the comments on social networks, many Russians perceived Vladimir Putin’s (very harsh) speech as a kind of declaration of war, addressed to Ukraine and the rest of the world. This speech contained a lot of resentment, even if these basic positions of Putin have been known for a long time. Above all, he repeated that Russian security demands (mainly on NATO) were “ignored” by the West. However, the threat of military intervention is precisely there to support these demands. So the initial fear remains the same, especially since yesterday’s maneuver, the recognition of the separatist republics, brings limited gains to the Kremlin.
A mortgage is however lifted this morning: according to the project submitted to the Duma in the afternoon, the borders of these two republics are defined as following the current front line, not beyond. This decreases the risk of an immediate massive offensive. However, this cannot be ruled out, the result of an escalation on the ground (which will henceforth openly involve the Russian army) or of a provocation decided in all conscience by Moscow. Vladimir Putin thus called yesterday on Ukraine to cease its “offensive”. But there is no Ukrainian offensive in the Donbass: it has been widely staged for a week to achieve the result of yesterday evening.
Côme: How do the Russian media present the situation? Do we see anti-war posts from Russian citizens on social media?
The Russian media are overwhelmingly at the service of power. They were mobilized upstream to accredit the idea of an escalation, and therefore of a necessary response from the Kremlin. They have not stopped in recent days to evoke “fierce fighting” (fictitious), to present Ukrainian invasion plans and to show refugees. This morning, they therefore present the president’s decision as obvious. Experts and politicians are doing the same, whereas just a few weeks ago they dismissed such an initiative as impossible, a mere Western fantasy.
We see devastated messages on social networks, but it is difficult to know the feeling of the majority of the population: it has been white-hot for years but often skeptical, and very indifferent politically. Putin has called for nationwide unity, but it’s hard to imagine the current phase will spark the same fervor as the annexation of Crimea.
However, on these major international issues, Russian opinion tends to line up behind the version of power, which presents the country as eternally under attack. Among young people, Vladimir Putin’s speech was received with some amazement. Many feel like they live in a different country than their president. Its rather obsessive historical developments find little echo among this population.
Laura: Is a military intervention by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) envisaged?
It was excluded from the start, even in the case, more serious than what happened, of a pure and simple invasion of Ukraine. Several countries are helping Ukraine militarily but none will send troops to fight. Everyone said so. The answer will go through sanctions, which are emerging for the time being as quite limited.
We can guess the logic at work in Western capitals: the leaders will be forced to mark the occasion, but they probably hope that this sudden and serious initiative of the Kremlin will mark the end of the period of confrontation opened by Moscow to the fall. It is doubtful: the centers of crisis are numerous and continue to be open. Putin was to withdraw his troops from Belarus after exercises on February 20. This promise is already forgotten.
In the specific case of Donbass, this optimistic version would be that the conflict turns into a frozen conflict, without fighting, similar to what exists for South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Georgian territories also recognized by Moscow) or Transnistria (Moldova). If this is the bet that is made, it is also uncertain.
Romain: It is difficult to know the majority position of the Ukrainians on this subject, do they mostly feel close to Russia? Or do they really want a rapprochement with the West?
No, it’s quite easy to know the position of the Ukrainians: in this country there are elections and opinion polls. These show that Ukrainian national feeling is very strong, including in the predominantly Russian-speaking regions.
As for the rapprochement with the West, it is acclaimed. With regard to NATO, it is less marked, but each new Russian initiative increases support for the Alliance. It was very much in the minority before 2014, it is in the majority today. This is Putin’s tragedy: he insists that Ukrainians and Russians are one and the same people, but one of the two does not agree and he seems more and more lost for Moscow.
Regarding the inhabitants of the separatist Donbass, I can only guess but I think that a large majority sees the arrival of the Russian army as a relief. It’s not ideological but pragmatic: behind that there is great fatigue and hope that this war that has been going on for eight years will end, or at least go away.
Charly: What would be the interest for Russia to go beyond the borders of Donbass that Vladimir Poutine declared to want to protect?
The problem is that Putin alone defines what he considers to be his interest. There is even no doubt an element of irrationality, or even considerations that simply relate to the strengthening of his regime. The European view is that war is always a losing choice, the Kremlin is not.
We can therefore hypothesize: after having made very high demands on Westerners, Putin had to do something; by showing his determination, he anchors for a long time the idea that Ukraine will not enter NATO, failing to obtain formal guarantees; it frightens those who would have inclinations towards emancipation, as was the case in Belarus not so long ago; he punishes Ukraine and does everything to prevent an alternative development model from succeeding there…
But we can ask the question the other way around: what interest has yesterday’s maneuver, the recognition of the two Republics? It seems weak to me: the region is ruined, destroyed and populated by retirees. Above all, Moscow is losing its main lever over Ukraine, either to accuse it of not fulfilling the Minsk agreements, or, in the event that the latter are applied, to limit its sovereignty… Conclusion: the interest of the Kremlin n is not to stop now and let the tension cool down.
Miche: Hello, what do the Minsk agreements contain and are they flouted by Vladimir Putin?
Since yesterday evening, they are dead and buried. This is also the limit of the maneuver: Russia places itself at fault, whereas until now it could, partly rightly, accuse Ukraine of the blockage. These agreements, obtained thanks to the two direct interventions of the Russian army, in the summer of 2014 and the winter of 2015, were also very favorable to it. But Moscow considered that there was no longer any hope of seeing them applied, in particular because the West would not have done their job of putting pressure on Kiev.
Result: there is no longer any diplomatic process to resolve this Donbass conflict for the next few years. At best, it will be frozen.
Jérôme: Can economic sanctions test the oligarchs and weaken Putin?
Deflect Putin, certainly not. And test the oligarchs, yes, but not to the point of provoking anything in Russia.
As for the weight of the sanctions, that will depend on what is decided. Apparently, not too heavy things, not “the end of trade with Western countries”. But there can be threatening measures, especially for banks. This is the weak point of Russian strategy: it is based on uncertainty, which has enough to make its adversaries feverish, but prevents serious strategic preparation.
One last point: Russians are poor, but the state coffers are full. For ten years that the standard of living has been falling in the country, reserves have been accumulating, they are immense and they allow us to see what is coming. It’s a bit as if Moscow had been preparing for this tough confrontation for a long time.