War – power and economic dependence

The concept of power or “power politics” has become increasingly obsolete in recent decades, at least in the West. National as well as international politics must, this is the conviction, be cooperative and based on mutual understanding and respect. There is no longer any room for power as the “potential to assert one’s own will, even against resistance” (as Max Weber defined it). At most in its diluted derivation, as «soft power», power can still develop a consensual homeopathic effect by means of the persuasiveness of ideal values.

The role of the economy

It was forgotten that power in Weber’s sense is morally neutral: it can also be necessary to achieve altruistic goals – for example, to force an aggressor to make peace. The Russian war of aggression was a sudden reminder of this fact. As a result, cherished beliefs in Europe, particularly in the military field, have faltered. The costly maintenance of an army, which can also project “hard power” if necessary, is no longer seen as a relic from the Cold War. Appropriate financial resources are demanded even by formerly decidedly pacifist forces such as the German Greens.

However, the (direct) western reaction to the Russian attack was not of a military, but of an economic nature. Despite this, there has so far been no analogous reassessment of the role of the economy in the increasingly gloomy geopolitical climate. Rather, the ability of the West to take effective economic sanctions to protect its own system of values ​​in the event of a conflict continues to be taken for granted, as does the willingness of private companies to support these sanctions.

But neither the one nor the other goes without saying. Effective sanctions require economic potential. In this respect, there is still a relative western preeminence, but it is far less clear and lasting than during the Cold War, the outcome of which it still decisively influenced. The subsequent hope that globalization could create a stable order through economic interdependence was not fulfilled. Rather, new Western dependencies emerged, of all things, in relation to autocratic systems – from Russia in the energy sector, from China with regard to supply chains and through the selectively granted access to the Chinese market.

At the same time, competition for Western companies has intensified at the microeconomic level. This competition is partly backed by authoritarian regimes, through state-owned companies. They subordinate economic considerations to their geopolitical ambitions and pay little heed to social, human rights or ecological goals.

Ultimately, the ability of Western states to impose effective economic sanctions also depends on the strength of their own private sector in a global comparison.

However, it is precisely such goals that are increasingly being formulated as binding for Western companies at national and regional level. That in itself is a very welcome development. Paradoxically, however, companies can only meet these targets in their home markets if they can hold their own in global competition while maintaining their independence.

The Ukraine conflict also shows that the ownership structure of private-sector actors dictates their behavior in political conflicts. The attitude of Chinese-dominated companies to the Russia sanctions makes this clear. The agricultural group Syngenta, for example (as the largest such company based in Switzerland), justifies its continued business activities in Russia solely with the danger of global famine.

This line of argument is understandable – even if it fails to mention Russia’s warlike instrumentalization of the grain supply. At the same time, however, there is no question that Chinese companies will have to follow China’s political guidelines. This would apply all the more if the West wanted to react to a (for the time being hypothetical) conflict over Taiwan with sanctions.

International law and economic resilience

Ultimately, the ability of Western states to impose effective economic sanctions also depends on the strength of their own private sector in a global comparison. In this respect, there is a connection between the promotion of an (international) rule of law agenda on a global level and economic resilience.

Nevertheless, the word should by no means be advocated for the absolute primacy of international competitiveness, and certainly not at the expense of social and ecological concerns. But it would be a form of Eurocentrism (albeit a benign one) to believe that Europe can always realize these concerns autonomously and self-sufficiently – the current energy crisis is a clear portent for this.

Accordingly, the Western reaction to the Ukraine war must not be limited to a reassessment at the military level. The following also applies to the power-political conflicts of the near future: “It’s the economy, stupid.”

Lorenz Langer is an assistant professor of public law and international law at the University of Zurich.