LThe government is preparing a reform of the energy market applicable from 1er January 2026; THE proposed text during public consultation mentions four times the ” competition “six times the “benefits” and forty-seven times the ” walk “, but not once the words “public service” or “general interest”. Aren’t we forgetting the essential?
The mechanism of “regulated access to historic nuclear electricity” (Arenh) today allows all French people, even non-EDF customers, to benefit from the competitiveness of nuclear electricity, the cost of which has been largely amortized historically. Even though it generally functioned well for thirteen years, the Arenh has sparked controversy, particularly due to its misuse by a few unscrupulous suppliers. It will end, whatever happens, on December 31, 2025.
For the future, EDF and the State agreed on November 14, 2023 on a system which would give EDF complete freedom to set its nuclear sales strategy. However, profits beyond certain thresholds would be captured by the State according to a progressive scale, then redistributed to French consumers in the form of a “universal nuclear payment” (VUN).
The three effects of the mechanism
This mechanism would let EDF make a residual surplus profit compared to its full costs: around 50 billion euros over fifteen years, paid by the national community, which would subsidize investment in new nuclear power plants. At first glance, this may seem like a good idea. But the devil is in the details.
The first obvious effect of the reform is that EDF will no longer be encouraged to optimize the nuclear fleet in the general interest. Taxed marginally at 90%, it would have only a paltry incentive to make its assets available in the event of a new energy crisis. We can only hope that EDF will behave responsibly by acting as if this mechanism did not exist!
The second effect is that by fully exposing consumers to market prices, the mechanism will widen inequalities between end customers (who are currently only exposed to the share of energy excluding Arenh). Aware of this danger, the government plans to modulate the VUN according to the price of energy paid by the customer. Suffice to say that we are creating a huge administrative gas factory offering multiple means of circumvention to unscrupulous actors.
Third problem: the mechanism assembles two parts (the VUN and the market price paid by customers) but entrusts its manufacturing to two different entities. On the one hand, for the VUN, EDF optimizes its nuclear fleet and values it freely on the market; on the other, the price per kilowatt hour paid by a customer depends on the contract he signs with his supplier. In the extreme, if EDF “poorly” optimizes the valuation of its nuclear production, it may have nothing to redistribute even though customers would have suffered significant price increases. Who will bear the political cost of this situation?
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