After a long wait, the decision is made: Western states allow Ukraine to use its weapons in and over Russia. But does this really help Ukraine in combat? The permission does not yet apply to all weapons and all areas. Answers to the most important questions.
What changes will the operational permit bring for Kharkiv?
“By using long-range weapon systems, one could attack Russian command structures, logistics hubs, supply lines, artillery groups and missile positions north of Kharkiv,” Colonel Markus Reisner told ntv.de. Such attacks could curb the combat power of the Russian troops, who are acting there with immense pressure, carried out with surface-to-surface missiles, air-to-surface missiles or artillery, for example. “From German supplies, the MARS II rocket launcher, which Ukraine already used in its successful offensive in Kharkiv in autumn 2022, would be suitable here,” said the military expert. The Panzerhaubitze 2000, which Germany delivered quite early on, is also an option.
The use of Western air defense systems close to the border would be very effective. In the case of German arms deliveries, this applies primarily to IRIS-T SLM and Patriot. “These could be used to shoot down the Russian fighter planes, which are currently causing enormous damage with their heavy glide bombs,” says Reisner. Thanks to their own propulsion, glide bombs can fly up to 70 kilometers and target their target with precision. They are difficult to locate by radar. The devastating attack on a shopping center in Kharkiv last weekend was carried out by a glide bomb.
These weapons, which are launched over Russian soil, will therefore be able to be fired over Russia by Western defense systems in the future. But there is a catch: Ukraine has repeatedly used Patriot in its own airspace in recent months, but was spotted by the Russians and lost at least two Patriot launchers. This creates a major problem for the use of these weapons, which could be of such use against the glide bombs right now. “Russian reconnaissance with drones is currently so dense around Kharkiv that it is too dangerous to use Patriot systems there,” says security expert Gustav Gressel from the European Council on Foreign Relations. “If the Russian troops found out that there was a Patriot there, a Russian Iskander missile would be fired into every assembly hall or firing position.” So today’s decision will not help against the glide bombs for the time being.
What effect does the authorization to deploy have on the situation around Kharkiv?
According to Reisner, the effect of this policy change can only be measured with a visible result. A few months ago, for example, Western weapons systems hit Russian targets very successfully, but were still unable to stop the Russian advance. “In addition, attacks with Western long-range weapons systems are becoming less and less effective, as Russian jamming measures are increasing massively,” said the colonel. “The Russians have the momentum, they decide where to attack, and the Ukrainians are forced to react. The Ukrainian army must break this vicious circle at all costs, otherwise it will be steadily worn down.”
But the current arsenal of weapons is hardly sufficient for this, even with permission to use it on Russian soil. Especially since it is not yet clear whether this will apply to all weapons. The USA has apparently not yet decided which weapons systems they want to include in their authorization to use them on Russian territory. If the ATACMS are excluded from this, the Ukrainians will be denied another important option for defending themselves against Russian glide bombs.
“If the glide bombing continues, Ukraine will have a massive problem,” explains Gressel. In his view, the best way to do this would be to attack the air force bases from which the fighter jets launch glide bombs. But that would only be possible with ATACMS, as these missiles not only fly far, but can also fire cluster munitions. These disperse their explosives far and can thus still exert their destructive power even if they have been deflected by a Russian jammer. If the Ukrainians are not allowed to use these missiles, Gressel sees little effect from today’s decision. “Then, thanks to this permission, the Ukrainians will be able to win artillery duels on the border,” says the scientist. “But then I even question the survival of the northern front.”
How can the Russians react to protect themselves from Western weapons?
The Russians have learned a lot in the last two years. Markus Reisner sees a major learning effect from the summer of 2022 in particular. At that time, the Ukrainians managed to cause massive, surprising damage to Russian logistics with HIMARS missiles supplied from the USA. Such a HIMARS effect cannot be reproduced a second time. “The Russians have already put in place defensive measures,” says Reisner. “They have loosened up their command and logistics structure and created additional supply routes. They are also following the hesitant discussions in the West from the front lines,” also fueled by Russian threats. So there was more than enough time to prepare for the decision of Ukraine’s supporters.
Even if not all facilities can be secured, Reisner assumes “that there will be no effective decapitation strikes.” In any case, modern weapons systems are only successful until the attacked party has developed functioning defense measures, for example by analyzing captured offensive weapons. “If you want to achieve a decisive result, you should attack massively without warning and not do things lightly.”
Can today’s decision substantially improve the situation in Ukraine?
In Gustav Gressel’s view, such an effect requires the complete go-ahead from the western partners. However, too much is still unclear as to which types of weapons the permit covers. Above all, as things stand, it is limited to the Kharkiv area and does not apply to targets deep in Russia. “Whether the French and British will allow their cruise missiles to be fired further into the country and hit higher-value targets is still up in the air,” said Gressel. In his view, however, this commitment is needed, along with the activation of all delivered weapon systems.
Only when the Ukrainians can also use Western weapons with large warheads against military targets involved in the war would it make a difference. “This includes command posts, electronic warfare systems and air force bases. This also includes logistics depots, the railway network on the other side. That would be the effect that is actually needed.”
Based on the intercepted phone call of the German Air Force officers, Reisner estimates the number of available Storm Shadow and SCALP cruise missiles to be small. US precision bombs are massively hampered by the Russian jammers. “There are still different versions of the ATACMS. These missiles are already being used, but there is still no visible ‘ATACMS effect’.” From a military perspective, massive attacks with different weapon systems would have to be carried out in quick succession, says Reisner. This would lead to the necessary oversaturation of the Russian defense measures. “This would require many high-quality weapons. If they are not available, they would have to be delivered. This also applies to TAURUS.”