Fifteen years ago, NATO held out the prospect of Ukraine joining, but did not help it, as has become clear at least since the Russian war of aggression. That could change at the Vilnius summit. Again it is the Germans who are building the walls.
When NATO heads of state and government meet for a two-day summit in the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius on Tuesday, the focus will be on an issue the alliance discussed years ago: Ukraine’s NATO accession. Although the Russian invasion of Ukraine completely changed the situation, the outcome could be very similar to Bucharest 2008.
At that time, NATO decided that Ukraine could join, but did not attach a concrete timetable to this, in part due to pressure from then-Chancellor Angela Merkel. “The Bucharest summit put Ukraine in the most vulnerable position since its declaration of independence,” writes Ukrainian historian Serhii Plokhy in his book on Russia’s war of aggression. “Ukraine was a lone warrior in the open country, pursued by enemy forces, who rushed for refuge in a safe fortress, only to find its gates closing on him due to disagreements among its defenders.”
In retrospect, it can hardly be denied that Plokhy was right about this. With NATO membership on the back burner, the alliance wanted to strike a balance between commitments to Ukraine and consideration for Russia. Six years after Bucharest, Russia attacked Ukraine. Today defended Merkel backed the decision at the time by arguing that Putin would not have accepted Ukraine’s hasty NATO accession. “What was decided in Bucharest created a power vacuum,” says historian and Eastern Europe expert Philipp Ther. “NATO has kept Ukraine at bay while keeping the door open.”
“We need that motivation”
Ukraine is urging NATO to catch up in Vilnius on what Bucharest failed to do. “We are talking about a clear signal, some concrete things towards an invitation,” President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on a visit to Prague on Thursday; Zelenskyj is currently campaigning for support on a tour of NATO countries. “We need that motivation. We need honesty in our relationships.” The Baltic NATO countries in particular share this position. Lithuania’s President Gitanas Nauseda, for example, called for “bolder decisions” because “otherwise the Putin regime will come to the conclusion that the western allies are too weak, should be cornered and will surrender.”
This is not about accession during the war. “As long as there is war, Ukraine cannot become a member of NATO, because then NATO would become a war party,” said CDU foreign policy expert Norbert Röttgen in an interview with ntv.de. “It is absolutely clear within NATO and between NATO and Ukraine that this must not happen.”
Fifteen years ago, the United States in particular campaigned for Ukraine’s speedy accession. That is no longer the case today: “The United States will maintain an open-door policy,” said US National Security Council spokesman John Kirby in an ntv interview. Maintain – do not open further. “Unlike in 2008, the United States is currently one of the hesitant ones,” explains political scientist Thomas Jäger in an interview with ntv.de. “Their main concern is to prevent anything that might involve NATO or the US in the war.”
It is currently being discussed that NATO could assure Ukraine that after the war it will not have to go through an elaborate “Membership Action Plan” as originally intended when it joins, but that it can quickly become a NATO member. Röttgen also relies on this variant: “What Ukraine is doing militarily in this war is more than any action plan could ever have done,” he says. There must be “a fast-track procedure” for Ukraine. “Demonstrating this will credibly is now also psychologically vital for Ukraine.”
Accession excluded during the war
A proposal made by the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Michael Roth, among others, has no chance. The SPD politician had at the time” campaigned for the parts of Ukraine “which are under the reliable control of the democratic Kiev government” to belong to NATO territory as soon as possible. The obligation to provide assistance should only apply to these areas.
Such a proposal is highly controversial, because unresolved border conflicts are an exclusion criterion for joining NATO – not formally, but factually. “When NATO formed itself in 1995 Rules “That’s why it says there that states in which there are ‘ethnic disputes or external territorial disputes’ must settle them peacefully.” That is not a clear exclusion criterion. “But the spirit of these sentences is that no state will be admitted that is waging a defensive war against a neighbor.”
In addition, Jäger refers to Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty. It states that only a state “capable of promoting the principles of this treaty and contributing to the security of the North Atlantic area” will be invited to join. If Ukraine were admitted, that would not be the case at the moment.
The federal government is stonewalling
For the German government, Ukraine’s immediate accession to NATO is out of the question. “There can be no accession to our defense alliance during the war,” said Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz in the ARD summer interview. But what follows from this attitude is unclear. At a press conference with Romanian Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu on Monday, the chancellor said: “At the time, decisions were made in Bucharest. We will have to develop that further.”
Röttgen criticizes the fact that the federal government always only emphasizes what is taken for granted: that a country at war cannot become a member of NATO. “But everyone knows that. The crucial thing is: what is the position of the federal government for the time after the war? I got the sentence, ‘when the war is over, Ukraine should become a member of NATO’, from the Chancellor or his ministers At least not heard of before.” The CDU foreign policy expert fears “that there is no clear will for Ukraine to join NATO,” at least not yet.
Safety guarantees alone would be worthless
Political scientist Jäger goes even further with his criticism: “I don’t know exactly what the position of the federal government is. But I can imagine that some people in Berlin still have the idea that Ukraine is a buffer state between Russia and NATO Then NATO membership or non-NATO membership could be a possible aspect in later negotiations with Russia – but only if a path for Ukraine’s NATO membership has not yet been decided.” This would be an attitude that contradicts the officially proclaimed motto “Nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine!” would stand
Both Röttgen and Jäger emphasize that post-war Ukraine can only be secure as a NATO member. “I think the idea that Ukraine could have a different status after the war than that of a NATO member, given the security conditions in Europe, is downright adventurous,” says Jäger. “Anything below NATO membership leaves Ukraine in a gray area of security and insecurity and makes another aggression more likely,” says Röttgen.
In the Budapest Memorandum, a 1994 agreement, Russia, the US, Great Britain and later China had given Ukraine security guarantees. As is well known, this was of no use to Ukraine. Currently, at its most recent summit, the EU was not even able to bring itself to issue security guarantees, only security commitments. “It can hardly be more spongy,” says Jäger. “The only thing that can keep Ukraine safe from Russia is a close alliance with the US.” When asked what that means for the Vilnius summit, Jäger says that the invitation to Ukraine must be reinforced there. “The summit must give the political signal that NATO has abandoned the buffer state option.”