Where is the Russian army attacking?

The Russian generals and their staff officers have probably slept little in the past few days. They may have worked day and night revising their operational and action plans. Because after the defeat in the Kyiv area, the Kremlin has narrowed the spatial goal of the so-called “special operation”: It is now “only” about control over areas in the east and south of Ukraine.

But they don’t have many options for action. An extensive encirclement of the Ukrainian army along the road from Kharkiv to the Sea of ​​Azov would be the safest option, but hardly feasible, as an analysis of the current situation suggests. A pincer attack from Izyum in the north and from Greater Donetsk in the south appears possible. This would include the Kramatorsk node.

Possible development of the situation in Eastern Ukraine

As shown on the map, the Russian army’s revised operational plan could look like if the generals adhere to the principles of mechanized warfare. But in the course of the war so far, deviations from the textbook have been noticeable from day one.

The invasion of Ukraine on February 24th began with a basic tactical mistake – at least at first glance: the Russian main battle tanks crossed the border on the street, in a column line, one after the other. The webcam of the Belorussian-Ukrainian border crossing in Senkivka broadcast the images to the internet.

The leading Russian units, which should have arrived north of Kyiv as quickly as possible, became easy targets for the Ukrainian anti-tank defense. A hit must knock out the first vehicle for the convoy to stop. Another tank at the end to block the way back. One train after the other stayed on the road and became an obstacle for the following associations and especially for logistics.

“He must come through this hollow alley!”

But the tactical behavior of the Russian troops can be partially explained on closer inspection of the terrain: The main road M-21 from Yelsk in Belarus across the border to the south leads through light forests. The terrain doesn’t allow the tanks to fan out and advance in a wedge or V formation. It also remains inexplicable why the individual vehicles drove close together, even if they were on the road.

When planning a military action, environmental analysis plays a central role. According to the expedient for general staff officers in the Swiss army, this involves, among other things, determining the “key areas” for one’s own and the enemy’s side. This refers to parts of the terrain that are crucial for the success of an action.

Such key areas are often so-called “passages obligés”, i.e. places that cannot be avoided in the event of a shift. Or as Friedrich Schiller has his Wilhelm Tell justify the tactical decision to tyrannically murder Gessler: “He must come through this hollow alley!” The Confederates acted similarly in 1315 at Morgarten, where they stopped and destroyed the Habsburg army of knights in a narrow passage.

Objective: crush the Ukrainian army

With its mountains and valleys in the Alps and also in the Jura, Switzerland is relatively easy to defend, basically still today. Ukraine, on the other hand, is largely flat. Forests, water bodies and swamps are the main features of the terrain. The Dnipro River, which flows into the Black Sea from north to south, divides the country into two parts: one eastern and one western.

According to the Kremlin, the second phase of the Russian war of aggression will be limited to the complete seizure of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. An advance across the Southern Bug in the direction of Odessa was previously repelled by the Ukrainian army and is currently not a priority in the plans of the Russian General Staff.

Rather, the Russian attackers could try to encircle the Ukrainian units in the Kramatorsk area. In this way, despite considerable difficulties, they could still achieve one of their main military goals, at least in part: the “demilitarization” of Ukraine.

This means, in all cruelty, that the Ukrainian troops still in the Kramatorsk pocket would be crushed. According to the blogger with the eminent name “Jomini of the West”, a considerable part of Kiev’s combat brigades are still stationed along the front line to the separatist areas and the areas occupied by Russia.

It is therefore worth attempting an environmental analysis of the possible theater of war over the next few days or probably weeks. Two questions are paramount:

The Prussian war theorist Carl von Clausewitz, who continues to shape military thinking to this day, provided the basis for dealing with the terrain: “There are three properties that influence the area and the ground on military activity, namely: as an obstacle to access, as an obstacle overview and as a means of covering against the effects of the fire.»

This description from the 19th century assumes infantry, cavalry and artillery combat. At least since the Second World War, however, the decisive means has been the main battle tank, which is characterized by firepower, protection and, above all, speed. A closer look at the tactical advantages and disadvantages of the terrain in eastern Ukraine is also about recognizing the movement areas for the tanks.

expansion and compartmentalization

The following analysis is based on the methodology of the Swiss army, albeit in a reduced form: The area that is likely to be decisive for the next phase of the war is limited to the north by the city of Kharkiv, to the south by the coast of the Sea of ​​Azov, which is approximately corresponds to 400 kilometers. From east to west, the area stretches from the Russian border to the Dnipro. That’s a maximum of 600 kilometers. The Donets, a tributary of the Don, meanders through the area from north-west to south-west.

Resupply is a critical success factor for the Russian army. According to American information, the Russian tactical battalion groups have a theoretical supply autonomy of 250 kilometers, so they should be able to advance this distance without additional ammunition and fuel. The expansion of space forces the attackers to follow suit with some of their logistics.

This worked more poorly than right in the first phase. The Ukrainian army managed to slow down the momentum of the Russian attacks with targeted attacks on the supply lines. Moscow’s revised operational plan must now provide an answer to this.

transport network

An environmental analysis deals with the following questions:

The transport network favors the attacker. There are several road connections from the east to the west. From the south to the northwest, i.e. out of a possible pocket, there are only limited possibilities for a rapid shift. This limits the defenders tactically considerably.

The Ukrainian general staff could therefore face an uncomfortable decision during the second phase of the Russian offensive: either the defending units hold the front line along the separatist areas for as long as possible, or they withdraw from a possible encirclement.

The timing of a tactical retreat by the Ukrainian combat units depends on the speed of the Russian attacks. Counterattacks on the flanks of the advancing troops could slow the pace of the march and give the defenders greater freedom of action.

An important hub in the east is the city of Kramatorsk with its railway junction. In the west, dominance over the connecting axis from Kharkiv in the north via Krasnohrad to Dnipro in the south of the country, including the subordinate hubs, is imperative, both from the point of view of the attacker and the defender.

landform

In contrast to the areas north of Kyiv, the east and south of the country are less forested. The patches of forest along the rivers, especially on the Donets, are clearly visible. Ironically, in the area between Kharkiv and Izyum, ie in one of the main combat zones, the area is covered with forest.

In the phase of static trench warfare, this was an advantage for the defenders because the wooded areas offer good camouflage opportunities.

Swampy areas that make it difficult for armored units to swarm out are only found along the rivers – quite unlike in Belarus and in northern Ukraine. Whole German units got stuck there in the morass. The area was therefore also called “Wehrmachtsloch”.

Bodies of water, bottlenecks and obstacles

The built-up areas are particularly effective obstacles. The city of Kharkiv is stuck in the north of the fighting area. In order to encircle the Ukrainian army, however, a north-western thrust would have to be made on the main axis towards the Dnipro-Azov Sea. The Russian army’s known deployment of forces leads to the conclusion that such an energetic action is not planned immediately.

The bodies of water are essential for the freedom of movement of attackers and defenders. Similar to the road network, the rivers and streams channel the area from east to west. This potentially facilitates the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces to the west and complicates the Russian army’s pushes from the south and north.

The attackers are dependent on the existing bridges. These «passages obligés» are ideal blocking points for the Ukrainian army to bring the enemy tanks to a standstill and destroy them with artillery fire.

In other places, the Russian engineer associations have not succeeded in building alternative bridges quickly enough. The Ukrainian defenders were able to thwart such attempts with barrages, inflicting human and material losses on the attackers. Only the main axis towards Dnipro, Krasnohrad, Kharkiv or then very narrowly guided from Mariupol and Donetsk to the west past Kramatorsk remain for the push to the north.

The Ukrainian army leadership seems to have come to the same conclusion: They have formed a heavyweight south of Kharkiv to prevent a further encirclement. According to “Jomini of the West”, the bulk of the Ukrainian army will not remain in a tighter pocket.

Nevertheless, the withdrawal of these formations to the west and their delaying battle will remain a critical success factor so that Ukraine can continue to control the Russian war of aggression. This has also been successful so far because the Kremlin has conducted its operations in the neighboring country like the fight against insurgents. The Ukrainian army now forced a symmetrical war. In its revised plans, the Russian general staff is now likely to take Kiev’s troops more seriously – with all the brutal consequences that entails.