A counter-offensive from the Zaporizhia area to the Sea of Azov could enable a military victory for Ukraine. However, this is not to be expected in the short term.
The United States has delivered 20 pieces of the Himar artillery system to Ukraine, and 18 more are to follow.
In two waves of attacks in the early morning of July 3, the Ukrainian army destroyed a Russian ammunition depot near the occupied city of Melitopol. According to data from the American NGO Acled, a multiple rocket launcher of the Himars (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System) type was used. The Ukrainian army had only been operating the system supplied by the USA for around two weeks at the time, but was able to weaken the occupier’s fighting power right away.
Precise artillery attacks like those at Melitopol on Russian logistics brought a turning point. The war at a distance forced the attackers on the defensive. The difference compared to the Russian artillery is the digital networking and in particular the ammunition, which hits with an accuracy of three meters and can hardly be defended against.
The hardware, i.e. the launcher and the carrier vehicle, play a secondary role. More importantly, Himars can be integrated into the Ukrainian army’s digital command and control system.
Himars reaches previous supply axes, but no further
This significantly reduces the time between acquiring a target, deciding to engage it and actually firing. The coordination between artillery attacks and the actions of other units is also improved. At the same time as Himar’s attack on the Melitopol ammunition depot, Ukrainian resistance fighters derailed a train carrying supplies en route to that city.
In a rapid advance in the first days of the war, Russian troops in southern Ukraine created a land bridge to annexed Crimea. A supply route from the Donbass to the Russian troops west of the Dnipro in the Cherson region also runs through this area.
The corresponding railway line, on which Russian logistics are mainly based, runs through the northern part of this land corridor and is therefore within reach of the Himars. The United States is supplying Ukraine with so-called GMLRS unitary missiles that can engage targets at a distance of up to eighty kilometers.
Possible weak point of the frozen frontline
However, Kyiv has not yet received any ammunition that can be fired deeper into enemy space. Washington wants to prevent Ukrainian artillery from firing across the occupied territories at Russia itself. The US fears that Himar’s attacks on Russian territory could serve as a pretext for a further escalation, possibly with a tactical nuclear weapon.
In fact, the Americans have Himars ammunition that flies up to 300 kilometers and hits. These are the so-called Atacms missiles. But there is a middle ground: A version of the GMLRS ammunition with an extended range of 150 kilometers (ER-GMLRS) was recently developed.
Such ammunition opened up new operational opportunities for the Ukrainian army. Instead of hitting the Russian logistics facilities in the area of the railroad crossings, the Himars batteries could work as far as the Sea of Azov. This increased the chances of using a possible weak point in the Russian defense lines for an energetic counter-offensive.
Lately, the new commander-in-chief of the occupying forces, Army General Sergei Surovikin, seems to be consolidating the front and freezing the fighting for the time being. In the north-east, the terrain helps, in the south-west the Dnipro is a natural obstacle, and in the Donbass, where fighting has been going on since 2014, field fortifications have long existed that make Ukrainian counter-offensives more difficult.
Sketch of a fire control concept
On the other hand, the front section in the area of Zaporizhia province is relatively less well protected. A look at the topography and modes of transport in this area shows that the Ukrainian army could come up against the Sea of Azov on at least two axes. Partisans also seem to be active around the city of Melitopol, as reports from the region have shown repeatedly since early summer.
The use of artillery would be critical to the success of a counter-offensive through the approximately 200-kilometer-wide strip – especially the fire in the depths of the area. At present there is a chance to behead the occupying forces in the area with precise fire blasts: the Russian army has essentially withdrawn its command infrastructure from the areas west of the Dnipro to the area south of Zaporizhia. If the commanders drop out, the Russian units stand still.
The effect of Himars missiles: During the recapture of Balaklija, a Russian fleet of vehicles that was camouflaged in a factory building was hit.
The chain of command of the Kremlin troops has turned out to be strictly hierarchical. Unlike in Western armies, which give subordinates maximum freedom of action in fulfilling their mission, the Russian army lacks a culture of individual responsibility down to the individual tank crew. In the case of the Ukrainian army, on the other hand, the culture change away from the Soviet system is obvious.
In order to plan a successful artillery deployment, a so-called fire control concept is drawn up in the Swiss army. The methodology corresponds to international standards, the terminology is Swiss:
Steps for a fire control concept
- Artillery assessment: The aim is to identify where possible artillery targets are and when they can be fought. At the lower tactical level, the storage areas of the enemy formations are in the foreground or anti-tank positions on the flanks.
- Possible fireboxes: In preparation for a counter-offensive on the Sea of Azov, fire must first be fired into the depths of the area: This is intended to attack command and logistics facilities, mandatory transitions in the terrain or positions of the enemy artillery.
- firefight: This is mainly about the phasing of the battle. In the foreground is the question of when which targets should be fought by whom.
- artillery movement space: Depending on the range of the ammunition, possible positions for the guns are now being worked out. It is important to be able to move quickly between the individual positions in order to protect the artillery from counterattacks (counter battery fire).
- logistics and telecommunications: The real key to a successful firefight is ammo and fuel replenishment. Equally important are the connections between the sensors, the command and the guns.
A greatly simplified fire control concept is used here for an analysis of concrete possibilities of firefighting in a thrust towards the Sea of Azov. It adheres to the principle: the terrain commands, the fire decides.
Acceptance of a fight idea
The commander’s intention is the basis for the concept. The commander develops this in cooperation with his staff on the basis of an assessment of the situation and the decision-making process. The following analysis assumes two phases:
Possible intention
- Operational fire in depth to interrupt the supply routes in the occupied areas, to smash command facilities and to restrict the enemy’s freedom of movement. It is also about smashing enemy artillery positions.
- Counter-offensive on two to three axes to cut in two the occupied areas east of the Dnipro. Possible targets are the ports on the Sea of Azov and the crossings towards Crimea, typical intermediate targets are hubs on the transport network.
Such a push would have to be made with battle tanks in order to reach the attack targets as quickly as possible. The greatest risk would be that the front units would be surrounded. Therefore, the Ukrainian army should immediately protect the flanks. This also requires strong, direct artillery fire support in favor of the combat units.
Important targets out of range
First of all, the focus should be on the connections from the mainland to the Crimean peninsula. If these are interrupted, the Russian army would not be able to bring reinforcements or supplies from Russia directly to the south-west of the battlefield. The railway and the road lead through two narrow places and over bridges.
The aim should be to allow Russian formations that are withdrawn in this way to run onto the blocked crossings and smash them with well-coordinated fire. It is in the interests of the Ukrainian army to eliminate as many occupying forces as possible. If their options for retreat are cut off, they could also be forced to surrender.
Another priority is the command facilities. Publicly available data gives indications of the current positions of Russian command posts in space. Unsurprisingly, these are located near resilient modes of transport so commanders can quickly reach their troops.
Western sources indicate the approximate location of three Ukrainian artillery brigades along the front line. The positions are plausible because they are close to railway lines. How large the artillery movement area actually is and, above all, where the specific position areas are located is subject to secrecy.
However, it is clear that the most important targets are currently beyond the range of Ukrainian artillery. The ER-GLMRS would bring a significant improvement in the starting position for the Himars launchers. With these missiles, the chances of a successful counter-offensive increased.
The political will decides
However, the ER-GLMRS is not yet in series production. In addition, the manufacturer Lockheed Martin is struggling with bottlenecks in the supply chains. At best, a South Korean system would be available as an alternative, which Poland wants to procure. This has ammunition with a range of up to 200 kilometers.
In order for Ukraine to be able to launch another successful counter-offensive in the short term, Washington would have to deliver the Atacms missiles, which have a much greater range. This currently contradicts the political will. In addition, the onset of winter is getting closer.
A frozen war of the kind Moscow is aiming for is therefore perhaps not an unwelcome scenario for the Ukrainian army either. A military victory over the occupying Russian forces is possible. But until the right ammunition for the artillery is available, Ukraine needs patience – and the political will to persevere of the West.