Access to WhatsApp, Signal Or Telegram could he have prevented the knife attack which cost the life of Dominique Bernard, a literature professor killed by a former student? The Interior Minister seems to think so.
It has become a sad refrain. With each attack, attack or tragedy that affects the country, the use of encrypted messaging is called into question. The terrible murder which took place in Arras this Friday October 13 was no exception. During a press briefing intended to take stock of this affair, Gérald Darmanin put the subject back on the table, pointing out the difficulties that this software could pose to law enforcement.
Doubt about “ encrypted messaging »
While the Minister of the Interior explained that “ classic telephone tapping […] have not demonstrated any threat “, he moved directly to an issue that is dear to him: ” Did the terrorist use encrypted messaging to be able to plot his attack if it was premeditated? “.
In the viewfinder of the ex-LR MP is therefore the famous “Dark Social” and more particularly the WhatsApp, Signal or other Telegram messaging services which have exploded in popularity in recent years. Due to their end-to-end encrypted architectures, the content of messages exchanged on these applications is (most of the time) inaccessible to law enforcement. A problem for the Minister of the Interior who would have liked these companies “ allow access to conversations » in order to simplify the investigation. “ This is not allowed in any country in the world », nevertheless noted Mr. Darmanin, before specifying that it would be useful to establish a dialogue with these “ international companies » For “have access to a certain number of conversations “.
Government positions that are not new
This is far from the first time that the Minister of the Interior has attacked encrypted messaging. Already in 2021, on the occasion of the bill devoted to intelligence and the fight against terrorism, he explained that it was necessary to “ go in and make security breaches » within encrypted messaging. Last June, he also campaigned for a change in the law on the subject, already arguing that “ classic telephone tapping gives less and less information “.
As it stands, law enforcement cannot effectively monitor the content exchanged by this software. They can only access metadata (telephone number, IP, date the message was sent) if a request is made to the company concerned. In highly regulated cases, it is also authorized to use spyware or use data collection boxes.
Backdoors, a major problem
However, allowing the State to monitor the content of encrypted messaging on the fly, even for the noblest of causes, poses numerous technical and ethical problems. A backdoor (which allows you to sneak into the code of an application) never stays secret for long and building one for the government is the assurance that ill-intentioned actors will also be able to use it. Tim Cook, the boss of Apple, said it himself in 2020, “there is no back door just for the good guys“.
In addition, weakening encryption risks penalizing people who try to keep their information out of the clutches of large Internet advertising agencies much more than the real criminals. Indeed, nothing prevents malicious users from using other applications or other encryption techniques that do not include backdoors. In these cases, everyone will lose.
Source: Ministry of the Interior
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