Who is the ideologue whose daughter was killed by a car bomb that might have been aimed at him? And what does his theory of Eurasism mean for the war in Ukraine?
Alexander Dugin at a rally in Moscow in 2014.
A gruesome image went viral on social media shortly after the assassination attempt on Kremlin propagandist Daria Dugina. It shows the father in front of the daughter’s burning car, throwing his hands over his head in horror. Who is Alexander Dugin, Putin’s alleged idea generator, whom the Western media also call the Kremlin ruler’s whisperer or Rasputin?
Russia experts warn against exaggerating the intellectual light, but also the political influence of the 60-year-old. He does not have direct access to Putin, and his ideas of “Eurasian imperialism” are actually vulgar clichés of the thinking of philosophers such as Ivan Ilyin, Nikolai Berdyaev and Alexander Solzhenitsyn.
Political scientist Vladimir Pastukhov describes Dugin’s ideas as a concoction of communism, mystified orthodoxy, nationalism and imperialism. These are ideas that have long languished on the fringes of society before becoming part of the Russian mainstream in recent years.
Nationalism within, imperialism without
The ideology has two thrusts. One is directed inwards and postulates the primacy of the collective over the individual. The other acts outwardly and asserts the superiority of its own nation over the other nations – especially over those in the neighborhood. This results in authoritarian nationalism and aggressive imperialism.
Ukraine, in particular, appears as an artificial nation in an artificial state, kept alive only thanks to the Western umbilical cord. The country is essentially an agent of America’s claim to power. This points to the fundamental conflict of our time: the struggle of Russia, the (potential) dominator of the Eurasian landmass, with the Atlantic sea power USA. China and the Pacific only play a marginal role in this worldview.
Dugin’s confidence feeds on the supposed decadence of the West. It can be seen in the migratory flows that flood these countries and in the decline of the family, which is undermined by gender ideology and gay marriage. Here there are also major ideological overlaps with parts of the European and American right. Dugin occasionally maintains good contacts with these circles.
With good reason: Because, according to Dugin, the Russian soft power could tie in with recipes from the Soviet era. Just as Moscow was able to influence parties and parliaments in Europe back then, it can now support and support selected partners in the West. It’s a business model that’s obviously successful in some countries.
The sky of Russian history
Dugin was born in Moscow in 1962 into an officer’s family. Nothing came of the originally planned military career. In the 1980s, the mediocre student moved in circles of right-wing dissidents and anti-communists. The KGB kept tabs on him. He later exchanged views with French legal intellectuals, who urged him to go his own “Russian way”.
Dugin did, but in the chaos of the 1990s his ideas found little resonance. In 1993 he helped found a national-Bolshevik party, but resigned five years later. There was no academic progress either, he only taught at obscure universities.
It was only in 2010, in a radically changed social climate, that he received a chair in sociology at the prestigious Lomonosov University. But that ended in 2014. He remained isolated among his colleagues, and in the year of the annexation of Crimea he said in an interview that as a professor he recommended killing the Ukrainian leadership. A petition called for his release.
The invasion of Ukraine, Dugin said in the spring, ended his internal exile. However, he criticizes Putin’s strategy of carrying out the “special operation” away from the Russian public as much as possible. On the contrary, the whole nation must now be totally mobilized. The time for soft solutions is over.
When asked if Putin took note of his writings, he replied: “We read the same letters that are golden in the sky of Russian history.”