Chinese espionage
The AfD is not the main problem
A comment from Thorsten Benner
May 1, 2024, 11:03 a.m
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The AfD’s leading candidate for the European elections’ involvement with China must be clarified. But Chinese influence is more than just an AfD problem. Beijing is far too clever to limit itself to the AfD when selecting targets and means.
For the first time last week the Germans were… Political barometer questioned about “influence peddling and espionage” by China. But unfortunately only, according to pollsters, “in connection with the AfD”. This reflects an unfortunate narrowing of the discussion.
Yes, the AfD is now the party that, alongside the Wagenknecht alliance BSW, represents the strongest (and most disgusting) pro-Beijing positions. Maximilian Krah, the AfD’s top candidate for the European elections, for example denies Repression in Xinjiang as “scary stories” and “anti-China propaganda” and wishes There is “more intellectual and ideological work, especially from China,” in Germany to change the understanding of human rights that is dominated by Western NGOs. Yes, it is right for the media and investigative authorities to now take a close look at Krah and those around him’s involvement with China. And yes, AfD MPs and employees are obvious weak points when it comes to passing on sensitive information to Beijing. But we would be lucky if Chinese espionage and influence peddling were purely an AfD problem.
Unfortunately, this is not the case. The news from the last ten days alone makes this clear – both with regard to the years of industrial espionage at Volkswagen as well as that arrest by three Germans in Bad Homburg and Düsseldorf on suspicion of being secret service agents for China. Neither has anything to do with the AfD.
Research institutions are particularly in focus
Beijing is far too clever to limit itself to the AfD when selecting targets and means. The most sensitive knowledge, the most useful lobbyists, all of this currently still exists with the political and economic establishment, not the anti-system force AfD. The GDR also placed Günter Guillaume with Chancellor Willy Brandt, not in the office of the DKP chairman.
The fact that Beijing recruited or placed the alleged agent Jian G. in the office of the pro-Beijing AfD MP is almost like playing hide-and-seek in the shop window. We should assume that Beijing will otherwise place its spies in the ranks of the established parties, associations, companies and research institutions or will look for its supporters there. The danger is particularly high in the case of industrial espionage, whether traditional or through digital attacks. Just last week warned Sinan Selen, Vice President of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, about the dangers from China: “We have a large number of case studies in which a perhaps highly optimistic and overly positive attitude towards trade relations with China has led to these companies practically dissolving.”
The case of the Germans arrested in Bad Homburg and Düsseldorf shows that research institutions are also particularly in focus. Task of the three suspected agents was to provide Beijing with information about and access to innovative technologies that can be used militarily. The fact that they used a corporate vehicle called “Innovative Dragon Ltd” could not have been written in a more clichéd way by any screenwriter. We need a massive increase in China expertise in the secret services and law enforcement agencies in order to better pursue espionage threats. Parliaments, authorities and companies must also invest in awareness-raising measures and response capabilities.
Ego, belief and profit
Most of China’s influence takes place in the legal area, far away from classic espionage. Beijing can rely on one large number of German elites count, who, out of a mixture of ego, conviction and profit, can be harnessed for the purposes of the party-state and its companies. Gerhard Schröder, Rudolf Scharping and Hans-Peter Friedrich are just them tip of the iceberg. This also includes less prominent lobbyists, business people and media professionals. None of this can be classified as espionage, as the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office painfully learned in the case of former EU ambassador Gerhard Sabathil. The espionage allegations against Sabathil collapsed. Sabathil was not an agent, but after his time at the EU he worked as a lobbyist for the company Eutop, of which he was the Brussels director – with Huawei as a major customer.
The Berlin Senator for Justice Felor Badenberg demands “a legal regulation in the criminal code according to which state influence operations that are controlled from abroad are also subject to criminal sanctions.” It would be more practical if there were finally effective transparency obligations for those who allow themselves to be used for Chinese interests. It comes in the Bundestag’s lobby register entry for Rudolf Scharping’s China consulting firm without naming a single customer.
This shows that previous instruments are ineffective. There you have to sharpen up before you reach for the unwieldy cutlery of the criminal code. The more resolutely one acts against espionage and Beijing’s influence on a broad scale, the more credibly one can point the finger at the AfD’s unpatriotic behavior towards China.
The author: Thorsten Benner is director of the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin.