DGAP expert on gas price dispute: “Russia sees us as opponents”

The gas price has kept Europe in suspense for weeks, and winter could be expensive for local consumers and companies. Russia expert Stefan Meister from the German Society for Foreign Policy explains in an interview why Russia is currently no longer supplying gas, although it could – and what the fundamental problem is when dealing with the Putin empire.

ntv.de: Green leader Annalena Baerbock accuses Russian President Vladimir Putin of putting pressure on the approval for the Nord Stream 2 pipeline by raising the gas price. Does Putin run a poker game? What are his goals?

Stefan Meister: There are different reasons why gas prices have gone up. It is difficult to understand to what extent Russia is actually exerting pressure here. But we are of course aware that Russia Nord Stream 2 is very, very important – geopolitically and in terms of energy policy. One tries to exert pressure to speed up the approval process. We can see that in the holding back of gas and in the fact that more gas could flow through the Ukrainian pipeline. There is also a statement by the Russian EU ambassador, Vladmir Tschischow, that Germany could speed up the process. I see typical Russian bargaining here: The current difficult situation with the high gas price is being used to speed up an approval process. Also in the knowledge that under a new federal government with green and liberal participation it could be more difficult to get such a permit through. One tries to use this intermediate situation to maybe actually get through with the procedure by the beginning of January or sooner. I can already see a political game from the Russian side here.

Is Nord Stream 2 for Russia just about weakening Ukraine?

That is not the only point, but it is an essential one. Also to weaken the Ukrainian negotiating position through the transit pipeline with a view to the integration of Ukraine into the EU or the situation in the Donbas. You also need to see Nord Stream 2 in context. We have two pipelines, one in the north serving northern and western Europe and the other, Turkstream, serving the south. Only both together are able to replace the Ukrainian transit network. That is the goal of the Russian leadership. But there are other reasons as well.

Which?

Ensure the European market that no other providers come onto the market, for example the Americans with their liquefied gas. But of course also to split the EU and the transatlantic partnership by cultivating these special relations with Germany. You had already reached your destination before the pipeline was finished. It is also about strengthening the negotiating position vis-à-vis an important EU member state such as Germany through this growing dependence on Russian gas.

Many energy experts say that Germany doesn’t even need the pipeline because you could get enough gas from Ukraine. Was it stupid building the pipeline?

Yes. I don’t think it’s necessary. It sends the wrong signal in terms of climate, energy and power politics. This has in part to do with the failed energy policy in Germany, which wants to get out of nuclear energy too quickly without creating alternatives. I still have the Steinmeier quote in my head, according to which energy is possibly the only remaining bridge to Russia. But that is a mistake. In Russia we have an actor who no longer wants to cooperate with us, but sees us as opponents. We are now making it possible for them to create an instrument to strengthen their negotiating position with us. In terms of power politics and energy politics, I think that’s not well thought out.

Doesn’t Nord Stream 2 give you better relations with Russia?

I do not believe that. Merkel’s support for the pipeline did not lead to Putin’s support in Ukraine or on any other issue. If you look at Merkel’s last trip to Moscow, there was no success whatsoever to report. The assumption that one gets the other side to compromise with good energy and economic relations has simply turned out to be wrong. Despite the pipeline and growing gas imports from Russia, we are in the worst relations with Russia since the end of the Cold War. And we’re still building this pipeline on that justification, even though it has no effect on these relationships.

If you stopped them, relationships would get worse.

Yes, it may be that there will be a next level of escalation. But the main argument in favor of the pipeline was that you improve or at least maintain relationships. Now it would only be an argument not to make it worse. But that’s exactly what is happening right now. With or without a pipeline, relationships continue to deteriorate. We will soon see that German foundations are kicked out of Germany and NGOs and their sponsors are listed. It’s a process that just keeps going. Therefore it is a misconception that one could improve the relationship by strengthening economic and energy relations or keeping it at a good level.

Is it in relation to Russia that everything is always on the table at the same time, i.e. the pipeline, but also Syria or eastern Ukraine?

Exactly, that’s what I meant by bargaining. You give me something and I give you something. If you can’t give me anything, you won’t get anything from me. We have a very weak negotiating position because we are not a security actor, in Libya or Syria and ultimately not in Ukraine either. But we also do not use the instruments that we have in the economic field. Russia thinks exactly in this sense and then of course you connect things with each other.

But it is difficult in Germany and Europe to have everything on the table. There are always a lot of people involved.

That’s the problem. Because we are not in a position to sit around the table in a multipolar, geopolitical world and negotiate different topics with one another. We are doing it partly with Turkey with a view to migration, but we are actually not prepared for this world. Russia is not the exception. The Americans don’t do anything else. In this regard, we weaken ourselves because we are unable and may not be willing to negotiate in this way. The world works in large parts through a pressure and incentive system.

If we get a new government, what could it do? Adopt sanctions?

That is always the question. You need to have a target with sanctions and be able to calibrate them so they can go up and down to make them an instrument that works. We usually only sanction according to the all-or-nothing principle, but that’s not how it works. I think that the Ukraine sanctions made Russia realize how vulnerable it is. It is now trying to become self-sufficient, i.e. more independent from the EU. I think Germany must try to strengthen itself internally. You have to deal more with anti-democratic tendencies, protect yourself more against populism and disinformation. You have to think differently about all of Russia’s policy. You have to minimize dependencies, create alternatives in the energy sector and not rely even more on gas, as we are doing at the moment. Sanctions can be one element, but not the only one. Their effect is mostly overestimated.

Russia has more weapons, Europe has more money. Who is actually the stronger?

We see throughout the EU that Russia is involved in important conflicts, be it Syria, Libya or Ukraine, and that it is improving its negotiating position. We, on the other hand, are ultimately only supplicants. You cannot only act economically. You also need to have military means to be a relevant actor. If you have no military means in this world, you are a weak player. And ultimately we are not using the economic instruments that we have to improve our negotiating position and to put more pressure on others. Russia, on the other hand, uses the few instruments it has much more efficiently. Moscow also shows that it is not so important how strong you are economically, but how efficiently you use the instruments it has. We have to expand our toolbox in order to have more influence on our neighborhood and to negotiate on an equal footing. As long as we don’t do that and are dependent on the Americans in terms of security policy, we are more likely to be the weaker actor vis-à-vis Moscow.

Volker Petersen spoke to Stefan Meister