Lhe meeting between the Turkish and Syrian defense ministers in Moscow on December 28, 2022, the first since the start of the Syrian uprising in 2011, marks an important step in relations between the two countries. It could be followed by the end of January by a meeting between foreign ministers, which would give a more political character to the resumption of bilateral relations by showing that it goes beyond the simple framework of security cooperation. .
However surprising it may seem given the international isolation of the Syrian regime, this meeting follows months of pressure from the Turkish president on his Russian counterpart to force the hand of his Syrian ally. On closer inspection, however, it appears that the advantages for Ankara are much greater than the benefits that Damascus can derive from it.
For Erdogan, who is obsessed with the June presidential election and the risks of witnessing the end of his nearly quarter-century rule over Turkey, the gains he can make from renewed relations with Damascus are multiple.
This would first be a signal sent to the Alevi community, which represents 15% to 25% of the Turkish electorate, depending on the sources. This community, whose beliefs are similar to those of the Alawite community, from which the security establishment in Damascus originated, for the most part supports the Syrian regime and has never looked favorably upon Ankara’s support for the Syrian opposition.
A scenario to avoid
The Turkish president also sends a sign of firmness to the Syrian refugees present on his soil. Numbering 3.5 million according to Ankara, they are relatively well integrated into the Turkish economic and social fabric, but serve as practical scapegoats in these times of crisis.
Finally, Ankara seeks to put an end to the Kurdish experiment in managing North-East Syria. Even if a military intervention carries its share of risks, the Istanbul attack of November 13, 2022, attributed by the Turkish government to members of the PKK [Parti des travailleurs du Kurdistan] based in Syria, pushes Ankara to act. Although Erdogan does not need the green light from Damascus, his agreement would facilitate a military intervention as well as the administration of the areas taken back from the Syrian Democratic Forces.
For Damas, on the other hand, the benefits to be reaped seem very meager. Admittedly, meetings with Turkish officials would relaunch the regional rehabilitation of Syria, which seems to have stagnated – since the reopening of the United Arab Emirates embassy in Damascus in December 2018, which marked the first step in this rehabilitation process, little progress has been made. The Syrian media also announced that Ankara had yielded to all of Damascus’ demands, including the return under its fold of the northwestern regions of the country, currently under Turkish control.
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