Dn a fractured country where the juntas in power have always managed to accommodate recurring ethno-political instability, the bankruptcy of the Burmese military regime is obvious. Not since independence in 1948 has the Myanmar army found itself in such an unfortunate position. For her, the situation is worse than after the departure of the British colonist, when the guerrillas of the Karen ethnic group had reached the suburbs of Rangoon, directly threatening the capital; or the difficult days of 1968, when the communist rebellion, supported by Maoist China, launched an attack on the soldiers of the regular army on the fringes of the Middle Kingdom.
The regime seems on the verge of collapse: the protean galaxy of resistance movements continues, in the north, south, west and east, to reap military successes; more than thirty towns fell into the hands of the “revolutionaries” in a few months; the territories controlled by the regime are shrinking to nothing. Some diplomatic sources in Rangoon even dare, according to the Japanese press, to quantify the lifespan of the junta in months.
However, apart from the fact that a brutal scenario like the fall of Saigon (1975) or Kabul (2021) is far from being a certainty – the Burmese army remains strong, well equipped and constitutes the very backbone of the State , or what remains of it – the essential question is perhaps no longer only that of the moment and modalities of a regime fall.
While the date of 1er February has just marked the third anniversary of the 2021 coup that overthrew the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi, another uncertainty looms: what shape will the Burma of tomorrow take in the event of the army’s defeat? How can a country, which has long been powerless to become a “nation-state(s)”, be able to recompose itself into a true federation that the minority ethnic groups (30% of the population) and their respective guerrillas are calling for? ? Will the majority Bamar ethnic group, which swallows up power, agree to make necessary concessions, as some of its elites who have joined the resistance are now promising?
“National disunity”
The National Unity Government (NUG), an example in exile of the “revolution” and an emanation of the former government of Mme Suu Kyi, now incarcerated, certainly signed a “federal charter” with the main “ethnic” resistance organizations. A promise was therefore made that, in the event of victory for the armed opposition, the new Burma will respect the rights of all these citizens, regardless of their ethnic or religious affiliation.
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