For a few hours, a major war in the Middle East seems almost unavoidable. It would probably also have meant intervention by the USA. Middle East expert Stephan Stetter from the University of the Federal Armed Forces in Munich analyzes how Israel got itself into this difficult situation in an interview with ntv.de.
After the Iranian drone and missile attack, the Israeli war cabinet meets in Jerusalem. According to the New York Times, an attack on Iranian territory as a response is off the table. Was that to be expected?
In my view, the question of whether Israel’s response would affect Iranian territory was open. It was clear that the USA would do everything to prevent this. The statements from the White House were clear from the start that there had to be a tough diplomatic response. And that adjective was important: diplomatic. At the same time, it was Iran’s first direct attack on Israel – a new and dangerous situation.
Are there any conflicts from the past that are worth comparing?
In 1991, Saddam Hussein attacked Israel with rockets and, unlike the current attack, which appears to have caused little damage, there were fatalities and much destruction in Israel’s heartland. The USA was also able to prevent Israel from reacting directly back then. The Israeli government’s calculation may have been to allow itself to be “persuaded” by Washington not to respond to Iran in the same way, but at the same time to be able to signal: “Our defense is in place.” Israel has also proven this.
Stephan Stetter is Professor of International Politics and Conflict Research at the University of the Federal Armed Forces in Munich. After studying in Heidelberg, Jerusalem, London and Florence, he researches and teaches on the Near and Middle East.
But in order to send this signal, the Israelis took a big risk.
There has been a shadow war between Israel and Iran for a long time and the Israelis have repeatedly targeted Tehran’s scientific and military personnel, for example with reference to the Iranian nuclear program. The attack two weeks ago hit Tehran deep inside. The general he targeted was high up in the hierarchy of the Revolutionary Guard, and according to Iranian interpretation the attack took place in a diplomatic building. What we also know: It was apparently not fully professionally coordinated on the Israeli side.
In what way?
The chains of command were adhered to. However, there is evidence that the implications of this killing were not addressed within the Israeli security cabinet. This would have been politically very unwise.
So this dimension was not necessarily intended by Israel?
You can say that, yes. It was not fully politically thought through.
If you compare the two military strikes, the Israeli one two weeks ago and the Iranian one last night, it’s like responding to a precision attack with a shotgun – very broad but almost ineffective militarily. Should this specifically give Israel the opportunity to react coolly, as is apparently happening now?
I don’t want to rule that out. Neither Iran nor Israel has a strong interest in all-out war, according to analysts who cover the region. Great Britain, France and especially Jordan supported the USA in its efforts to respond to the situation by helping to intercept the attacking missiles. And Iran itself announced last night, while the missiles were still in the air: “That’s it from our side.”
Israel is currently led by a strongly right-wing government. The smaller, right-wing extremist coalition partner is aggressively influencing Israel’s actions in the Gaza Strip. What agenda do these right-wing extremists have with regard to Iran?
The focus of the right-wing extremist forces in the Israeli government is not primarily Iran, but rather they have nationalist, religiously charged goals, which primarily relate to the West Bank and to some extent also to the Gaza Strip. Their policies are directed against the Palestinians. But of course these parties are not de-escalating forces and their aggressiveness comes into play against Iran, even if a counterattack has now been averted. What is important is that the forces escalating the situation the most are not in the war cabinet. Among those sitting there are the former chiefs of general staff Benny Gantz and Gadi Eizenkot, who are not part of the government and who have a moderating influence.
In today’s situation, the right-wing extremists were only able to have a limited influence. But how will they do this in the long term?
We see that Israel is in a multi-front conflict. We have Iran, we have Hamas, which carried out a massacre on October 7th and is still holding hostages, the Houthis in Yemen and, above all, the constant military strikes by Hezbollah in Lebanon on the north of Israel. The region there is depopulated; Lebanese and Israelis cannot live in their homeland on either side of the border. And in this situation, the forces in the Israeli government that you allude to have not de-escalated.
What options would there have been?
There are proposals for a deal to rescue the hostages, for the Gaza Strip, for Israel’s security. But this would require a comprehensive regional diplomatic solution, which the extreme forces in the Israeli government are refusing to accept. At the same time, it has been observed for weeks that Israel has actually completely lost sight of its war goals in the Gaza Strip. And this continues what began on October 7th: that Israeli deterrence no longer works as it did in the past. That is why the forces rallying around Iran will continue their attacks.
Israel has completely lost its war goals – would you put it that drastically?
Israel risks actually losing the Gaza war. The campaign is taking too long and is disastrous on the humanitarian level. According to the official reading, Israel’s goals were to defeat Hamas and bring the hostages home. However, this hostage rescue is delayed. This is certainly not just due to Israel. We don’t know whether Hamas would really agree to an exchange because the terrorists are using tactics. But they can do that very well at the moment, because they see that Israel is not doing well worldwide, and above all there is pressure from the USA.
To what extent is Israel responsible for this international headwind?
Few would deny that the October 7 attack gave Israel the right to self-defense, meaning that Israel is allowed to fight Hamas militarily and – I would even emphasize – must fight it, because the state is obliged to protect its own population . From the beginning, however, there were warnings about the humanitarian consequences and the political costs that this war would have. Israel never heeded these warnings and, according to many sympathetic observers, did not adhere to proportionality.
However, many military experts specializing in urban warfare had already predicted that an offensive would result in many civilian casualties. What could or should have gone differently?
The alternative was obvious: Israel would have had to mobilize what was possible in October 2023: broad international support not only in the West, but also from Arab states – from Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Egypt. They are on the line that Hamas is a big problem in the region and in many countries also domestically. Israel would have had the support of Gulf states and others to set a political roadmap parallel to warfare. But that didn’t happen. Instead, we are now stuck in a long-term conflict that affects the West Bank and the north of Israel and which has now gained another component with the direct attack by Iran.
Frauke Niemeyer spoke to Stephan Stetter