Bourgeois parties do not win the race with radical right-wing parties simply by making wild demands. Bourgeois parties must deliver. They should choose their topics accordingly.
The current poll high of the AfD follows a political logic that has been observable for years. Right-wing extremist parties always gain approval when bourgeois parties raise identity-political issues but are unable to get their proposals accepted. The topics of foreign policy, migration and integration or everything that affects the relationship between citizens and “elites”, for example parliamentary allowances or public broadcasting, are particularly influential.
When the CDU/CSU and FDP make demands on these issues but are unable to implement them, conservative voters get the impression: There is a problem, but the Union and/or the Liberals are too weak or too progressive to solve it in my opinion to solve. This perception feeds into the AfD’s anti-elite narrative and its claim that it is the only true party with conservative positions.
If, on the other hand, bourgeois parties can deliver on questions of identity politics, far-right parties collapse in the polls. This is what happened in 1993, when the CDU/CSU pushed through the asylum compromise against great resistance. As a result, Republicans fell from 10 percent to under 5 percent approval. Or in 2015, when the clearly communicated austerity policy of Chancellor Angel Merkel and Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble almost destroyed Greece economically, but instead halved the AfD in the polls from 8 to 4 percent.
Failures strengthen the AfD
Bourgeois parties that want to attract voters with identity-political issues must absolutely visibly assert themselves with their demands. Only then will they become credible as advocates of conservative interests. If they don’t prevail, raising these issues strengthens the radical right-wing competition. This is exactly what has been happening in Germany for a few months.
The FDP positions itself in the government as an opponent of the Greens, for example in the nuclear phase-out or the heating law. These issues are then deliberately removed from the factual level and sharpened in terms of identity politics: The Greens are branded as an unworldly, ideologically blinded city dweller party. This is how social and economic issues become identity-political battles: FDP vs. Greens. The government compromises are then rarely on the FDP line: The nuclear phase-out was only marginally delayed, and the heating law is likely to be debated at least until the parliamentary summer recess. In the eyes of conservative voters, the FDP is clearly too weak: it has strong demands, but is rarely able to push them through. Which is not surprising given that it is the smallest coalition partner. But this approach only strengthens the AfD.
The same applies to the opposition work of the CDU/CSU. She addresses social challenges, for example integration problems in Berlin or the accommodation of refugees. But she has no suggestions with a unique selling point, let alone she could implement them. For example, if the Union had a unified position on integration issues that clearly differentiated it from its competitors, it could implement it in the states it governs, such as Bavaria and North Rhine-Westphalia. But she doesn’t. What’s more, the prime ministers of Bavaria and North Rhine-Westphalia seem to be pursuing a different course on integration issues than the CDU chairman. And the conflict over the question of accommodation tends to separate the federal government from the states, rather than the CDU from the SPD and the Greens. So there is no clearly recognizable conservative position that the Union could push through. The CDU/CSU campaigns on these issues also strengthen the AfD.
All the better if the Greens are against it
There are several ways to avoid this mechanism. Bourgeois parties could completely do without identity-political issues, i.e. only talk about economic and social policy. Or they look for identity-political issues where they can clearly deliver. Elsewhere I have called this a “civil compromise.” Examples are the already mentioned asylum compromise and the austerity policy, where the Union was able to forge a party-political consensus up to the SPD. The Greens were firmly opposed both times, which only made the “conservative victory” all the more visible.
In the federal opposition, the Union has two options for achieving a civil compromise: through projects that require approval by the Bundesrat, in which the votes of the state governments with CDU/CSU participation are required. Or through issues that only have to go through the Bundestag, the CDU/CSU, but on which they can build up so much media pressure that the traffic light coalition has to switch to the Union line.
The route via the Federal Council seems more difficult. Because it seems that the two most important Prime Ministers of the Union, Markus Söder in Bavaria and Hendrik Wüst in North Rhine-Westphalia, deliberately do not want to go on the same course as CDU leader Friedrich Merz on central issues. Of course, this is about the most advantageous positioning possible with a view to the CDU chancellor candidacy. Building a unified line of union is therefore difficult. But still possible. For example, a reform of the State Media Treaty, which regulates public broadcasting, would be a good idea. Here the Union could try to weave in clear conservative accents. However, it is not clear whether the Union would succeed in convincing all key players of a fundamental reform of public service broadcasting.
With the nuclear phase-out, the Union missed an opportunity
Popular support and media pressure are easier to generate on issues where the traffic light government is clearly not acting in the national interest. The Union missed a great opportunity here when it phased out nuclear power. The survey values, the energy policy needs and above all the broad European resistance to the German special path make our nuclear phase-out appear highly questionable at this point in time. The Union could have run an even broader media campaign here. Had the Union been successful here, it would have been a striking defeat for the Greens; that in turn would have made an impression on conservative voters.
One topic that is now available is the equipment of the Bundeswehr. Defense Minister Boris Pistorius from the SPD reports an additional financial requirement of 10 billion euros per year. Due to the spending requests of other ministries, however, only 2 billion are available. Here the Union could pick a symbolic project and call for its introduction, such as the acquisition of a whole new armored division, dozens of nuclear-capable fighter jets, or even more symbolic issues. Former CDU Defense Minister Annegret-Kramp-Karrenbauer spoke, albeit somewhat unhappily, of a Franco-German aircraft carrier. So there are enough symbols. These purchases are not made because other departments also need money. The Union could specifically demand here that projects by green ministries not be financed in order to acquire said weapon systems. The headline “CDU/CSU wins across the board: More tanks, less money for the Greens” would probably be a heavy blow to the AfD.
Topics that are related to European politics should be avoided. On the one hand, because implementing them requires partners in other countries, whom we have more difficulty influencing. The Greens feel this painfully, especially in asylum policy. If the Union bets on such issues, failure is more likely.
First, Merz, Wüst and Söder have to coordinate
Furthermore, such issues may win voters back from the AfD, but may be against Germany’s long-term national interest. For example, it was the austerity policy towards Greece that led to the long-term weakening of the eurozone and the forced sale of strategic Greek infrastructure to China. Or with Brexit: the referendum was a highly successful blow by the British Conservatives against the right-wing party UKIP – but at a catastrophically high price.
The best way to deal with the AfD is to focus on social and economic policy, in which the AfD has no competence. Any form of “culture war” about identity-political issues carries a great risk of only strengthening the AfD. But if the Union absolutely wants to play on identity-political issues in order to get to grips with the AfD, it must achieve clearly visible policy changes on these issues well before the next federal election. Announcements and demands alone only strengthen the AfD.
In order to increase the chances of implementation, the union proposals should be coordinated between Merz, Wüst and Söder, have broad popular support and contain no European policy components. The Union should therefore be advised against the issues of migration/integration and European policy. On the other hand, she should take a closer look at the topics of the media state treaty and defense.
Timo Lochocki is a political scientist and currently Senior Fellow at the Mercator Foundation.