Russia abducts not only children, but also adult civilians from the occupied territories in Ukraine. It is unclear how many people are affected. For Ukraine, any exchange is a dilemma.
230 Ukrainians returned in early January during the first prisoner exchange with Russia since August 2023. These included six civilians who were able to return to Ukraine.
The exchange of soldiers and the repatriation of children abducted to Russia is a mammoth task for Ukraine. An even bigger problem is the civilians, most of whom were arrested in Russian-occupied territory and then deported to Russia. According to human rights commissioner Dmytro Lubinets, just over 140 have been able to return to their country so far.
Officially, Ukraine has at least 763 civilian hostages (as of November 2023). However, the number of unreported cases is likely to be much higher. Lubinets estimates the total number of Ukrainians missing in Russian-controlled territory to be more than 25,000. A significant proportion of these are civilians who have been abducted, he says, without providing any more specific information. Ukrainian NGOs that deal with such matters estimate that there are around 7,500 Ukrainian civilians in Russia and in the occupied territories.
“It’s better if you are considered a criminal”
For objective reasons, an even halfway correct assessment is almost impossible. On paper, Russia makes no distinction between prisoners of war and captured civilians, which is already a clear violation of the Geneva Conventions. The Russian Defense Ministry claims it is treating Ukrainian civilians “in accordance with the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War.” However, the Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilians in Time of War does not provide for the possibility of taking civilians as prisoners. It expressly prohibits taking hostages.
Although civilians can be arrested, they have the right to a “fair and due process” in accordance with the laws and rules of the occupying power. However questionable the prospect of a fair trial in modern Russia may sound, the reality surpasses even the absurdity of Russian law. The reason given for the arrest of Ukrainians in the occupied territories is usually “opposition to the special military operation.” “For such detentions, there should actually be a corresponding article in the legal code that would make this ‘resistance’ a criminal offense,” said Russian lawyer Polina Murygina to the Russian editorial team of the BBC. “Then these people would have procedural status and we could send a lawyer. But we are told: We are not accusing them of anything and are not accusing them. They were just arrested.”
Russian law allows a person to be detained without a court decision for a maximum period of 48 hours. In the occupied territory, where martial law has been declared by Moscow, people can be detained for up to 30 days, but only if they are suspected of having committed a serious crime or violating martial law. In fact, the vast majority of abducted civilians are detained for significantly longer than 30 days; The time, place and reason for the arrest are rarely recorded. No proceedings are initiated and the person’s whereabouts usually remain unknown.
“It’s a paradox: it’s actually better if you’re seen as a criminal, so to speak,” Murygina told the BBC. A person who is officially accused at least exists in the Russian legal sphere and has at least some rights. However, almost only those who are suspected of terrorism are charged. Almost everyone else has to sit in Russian pre-trial detention centers or penal colonies without protection, without charge and without trial – and, unlike prisoners of war, can hardly be exchanged, with a few exceptions.
For Ukraine, any exchange is a dilemma
What Russia considers to be “opposition to the special military operation” is difficult to say and probably does not have any well-thought-out logic behind it. Ukrainian human rights activists, such as those from the Media Initiative for Human Rights, say it is striking that the number of detentions always increased when Ukrainians were about to or in the middle of successful offensive operations. People are often arrested because the Russians suspect them of giving the Ukrainian army information about where their rockets or artillery ammunition hit – so that it can then correct course in the event of future fire. Most of the time, people simply live too close to a corner that is militarily important to the Russians. Finally finding them in Russian prisons is a near-impossible task.
Almost the only thing that helps is statements from civilians who have already been repatriated, who remember cellmates or first and last names that they have occasionally heard. This can also be effective because Ukrainian civilians in Russia are largely held separately from other prisoners. Because international law does not provide for mechanisms for repatriating civilians from captivity, international organizations are powerless. The only thing that can be effective is the use of third countries as mediators, as was the case with the United Arab Emirates at the beginning of January.
It is unknown on what specific basis six civilians were allowed to return. What is clear, however, is that this involved several difficult decisions for Ukraine. Kiev can hardly afford to constantly exchange civilians for soldiers, because this could motivate Russia to take even more civilian hostages in order to free its own prisoners. Bringing your own citizens back from Russia, who are effectively without rights and protection, is therefore always a complicated game with fire.